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Abstract
This thesis makes three important contributions to the existing literature. First, 
it develops a new explanation for delays in bargaining. In the theoretical model 
presented, two parties are in an on-going relationship. Further, reaching agreement 
weakens the claim on surplus for one of the parties in subsequent bargaining pe­
riods. As a result, this player will require compensation for these future losses if 
they are to agree. If adequate compensation is not forthcoming, perhaps because 
of wealth constraints, that player will delay reaching agreement even if it reduces 
total surplus. Second, the predictions of this new theoretical model are compared 
to the empirical evidence of innovation and the delay of innovation in Australian 
workplaces. This empirical analysis examines: the probability of innovation; the 
attitudes of employees and unions to these changes; and the characteristics of work­
places that were prevented from innovating (workplaces that delayed). This is the 
first study to examine labour’s attitude towards innovation. It is also the first study 
that contains a direct measure of delay. The empirical estimations show support for 
some of the key predictions of the model. Third, the thesis develops a hold-up model 
in which the parties can make specific investments simultaneously or sequentially. 
Contracting is only possible after at least one investment is sunk. With simultane­
ous investment, renegotiation occurs after both investments have been made. With 
sequential investments, after the leader has sunk their investment contracting is 
possible; as a consequence the follower does not get held-up. This is an advantage 
of the sequential regime. However, sequential investment disadvantages the lead 
investor, decreasing their incentive to invest. Consequently, the timing of invest-
ment can act as an additional form of hold-up. This is a new result: the timing of 





Economic activity often occurs when contracts are incomplete. For example, it may 
be difficult to succinctly specify the detail of each party’s obligations so that they 
are verifiable by a third party, even if there is consensus between the trading parties 
at the time. Given this contracting environment, parties will invest and trade with 
the knowledge that renegotiation could occur. This thesis investigates the impact 
of incomplete contracts on bargaining and investment.
Bargaining is fundamental in economics. Reaching agreement not only deter­
mines the distribution of rents it can also increase total welfare by facilitating trade. 
On the other hand, disagreement or protracted negotiations reduce the total surplus 
available. Costly delays arise when a party’s concern over the distribution of rents 
dominates their personal losses from the reduction in total surplus.
Chapter 3 develops a new model that explains delays in bargaining (or inno­
vation) when: there are multiple bargaining periods; previous outcomes affect the 
subsequent distribution of surplus; contracts are incomplete; and the parties are 
wealth constrained. In this new model the two parties can choose to adopt a new 
innovation in each period of the game. (The basic model has two periods.) The 
innovation generates a known surplus that can be shared between the parties. In­
novation, however, affects each party’s claim on rents in future periods. When 
immediate innovation adversely affects a player’s future payoff, that player will 
only be enticed to accept innovation if the immediate returns are sufficiently great 
so as to compensate her for these future losses. If this is not the case, the player 
will choose to delay, even if this decision reduces total surplus.
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A crucial element in the story of delay is that the parties are unable to write 
a fully contingent contract. The incompleteness in the model arises because the 
relevant innovation at any point in time is unverifiable until the commencement of 
that period.*  Further, it is assumed that the surplus generated is always unverifiable 
preventing the parties from writing a surplus sharing agreement.
As a concrete example, consider a union bargaining with a firm that wishes to 
introduce a change in workpractices that would increase total surplus. The change 
could be the removal of some restrictive workpractice that provides union members 
with utility.* By assumption, change would increase overall welfare. As a result, 
the gain in surplus to the union of the current practice does not outweigh the cost 
to the firm in terms of forgone surplus.
However, the innovation also has the effect of reducing the union’s claim on 
surplus (bargaining power) in the future. For instance, agreeing to allow non­
union labour in a closed shop reduces the union’s bargaining position in the future. 
Alternatively, the adoption of a new technology may reduce the firm’s reliance on 
a group of workers with a particular skill, reducing their potential claim on surplus 
in future bargaining periods. Given this, the union would need to be compensated 
for both current and future losses. If this cannot be achieved through an adequate 
compensation package, or a credible promise of future payments, a union may decline 
to innovate, even if the change is efficient as it would increase overall surplus.
Current agreements affect parties’ claim on future surplus either by altering 
their default payoffs (historical bargaining/contractual positions) or by changing 
their relative contemporaneous bargaining strengths. Delay will occur at different 
times depending on which assumption applies. If agreement reduces the future 
default payoffs of a party, delay is more likely when expected future surplus is 
lower. If innovation reduces current bargaining power, however, a party is more
* Contractual incompleteness can also arise when the parties are unable to commit not to 
renegotiate.
*For instance, some rules provide workers with on-the-job leisure. The workplace could be a 
closed shop allowing the union to extract rents. Alternatively, the current workplace agreement 
may prevent the adoption of a new technology that would involve a loss of jobs or require employees 
to work harder.
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likely to delay agreement when expected future surplus is larger. It is also argued 
in Chapter 3 that a party with a narrowly defined set of interests, like a craft union, 
is more likely to delay than a party with broader interests, reaffirming the results 
of Dowrick and Spencer (1994).
The new model of bargaining delays presented in this thesis is compared with 
the existing literature, reviewed in Chapter 2. As noted above, delays in bargain­
ing typically arise in non-cooperative bargaining models when there is some asym­
metric information between the parties. With asymmetric information, delays in 
bargaining may occur because the informed party uses delay to signal their bargain­
ing strength. These delays, however, may not be lengthy as, once the bargaining 
strength of a party has been revealed, it is in the interests of both parties to reach 
agreementd On the contrary, lengthy delays arise in the incomplete contracts model 
presented in this thesis.
In addition, recent literature that shows that delays in bargaining can occur 
with complete information.*  These models typically exhibit multiple equilibria, 
some of which involve delay when the parties play complicated history-dependent 
strategies. In contrast, the model presented in this thesis has a unique subgame 
perfect equilibrium. Further, delay arises naturally when the bargaining parties 
play simple and realistic strategies.
Failure to adopt a change that increases total surplus is a form of a delay (Kennan 
and Wilson 1993, p. 45-46). With this point in mind, the model is applied to several 
case studies of delays, including: the adoption of new computer printing technology 
by newspaper proprietors in the United Kingdom; stalling of process reform in 
the automotive industry in the United Kingdom; union resistance to change on 
the wharves in Australia, United States of America and the United Kingdom; and 
opposition to social policy reform in Australia. These examples emphasise how 
reform often reduces the bargaining power of one of the parties in an on-going
* Further, if it is difficult to screen different bargaining parties from one another, delay may be 
an ineffectual screening device.
*See, for example, Haller and Holden (1990), Fernandez and Glazer (1991), Avery and Zemsky 
(1994a) and Busch and Wen (1995).
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relationship. Moreover, opposition to innovation arises when promises concerning 
future actions or payments are not credible.
Using the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995, Chapter 4 
examines innovation in Australian workplaces. This empirical evidence is then com­
pared with the predictions of the new theory of delays in bargaining. Three models 
are estimated, each exploring a different aspect of innovation and delay. The first 
model examines the probability of innovation. The second looks at the attitudes 
of unions and workers to a workplace innovation. The third model compares the 
characteristics of firms that were prevented from introducing innovation with those 
that did not experience delay. This is the first time attitudes towards innovation 
and a variable directly measuring delay have been used in such a study. Overall, 
the empirical evidence is consistent with the predictions of the theory, in particular 
the predictions concerning future surplus and the incentive to delay.
Chapter 5 explores the hold-up problem when trading parties can choose to make 
specific investments simultaneously or sequentially. An advantage of staging invest­
ments is that contracting on any subsequent investment becomes possible after the 
project is under way and better defined. It is shown in the model that there can be 
efficiency improvements with the sequential regime, as compared with simultaneous 
investment, if the parties are sufficiently patient. Further, as previously emphasised 
in the literature, sequencing of investments can allow some projects to proceed that 
would not be feasible with a simultaneous regime.* This is not always the case, 
however. A cost of sequencing investment is that it can disadvantage the party 
that makes the initial investment, reducing their incentive to invest. In fact, the 
mere possibility of sequential investment can be detrimental to overall welfare. In 
the extreme it can prevent mutually beneficial trade from occurring. This is a new 
result: it allows the choice about the timing of investment to be interpreted as a 
new (potential) form of hold-up.
Further, the decision over the timing of investment can be seen as a choice over 
the completeness of contracts: if parties opt for simultaneous investment they are
*See, for example, Neher (1999) and Admati and Perry (1991).
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opting for a more incomplete contract than necessary. As a result, the choice con­
cerning the completeness of contract is endogenous. The advantage of a (more) com­
plete contract with sequential investment is that hold-up of the follower is avoided. 
The cost of a complete contract is that it diminishes the first party’s incentive to 
invest. A party will opt for simultaneous investment - that is, they will opt for an 
incomplete contract - when their gain from the increase in total surplus outweighs 
the additional bargaining power they receive from avoiding hold-up.
Finally, interesting dynamics can arise out of this investment game when both 
parties want to be a follower rather than the leader. If there are just two potential 
investment periods (and the opportunity to invest disappears after the second pe­
riod) the parties find themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma. If the potential investment 
horizon is continually extended to three periods, four periods and so on, eventu­
ally the benefit from not investing (waiting) will diminish sufficiently so that the 
players will find themselves in a coordination game. (The players will mix between 
investing immediately and waiting.) If the horizon is extended further from this 
point, with certain parameter values it is possible that the players will again return 
to a prisoners’ dilemma game. This arises because the payoff in the coordination 
game (say in period K)  alters the expected return from waiting in the game with 
the longer horizon (say a game of K  +  1 periods). It is possible that the optimal 
strategies switch between a prisoners’ dilemma game and a coordination game as 
the potential horizon is extended. As far as I am aware, there are no games in the 
existing literature that exhibit this sort of dynamic switching.
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CHAPTER 2
Non-cooperative models of bargaining: a 
literature review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a selective review of non-cooperative bargaining models. In 
particular, it examines the conditions necessary for bargaining parties to delay reach­
ing agreement. Delay may take several different forms (Kennan and Wilson 1993, 
pp. 45-46). Two parties may engage in protracted negotiations or fail to reach 
any agreement. Alternatively, they could reach an inefficient agreement in that not 
all of the potential gains from trade are realised. If there are costs of delay (for 
example because the parties discount the future) any delay in reaching a settlement 
reduces the total surplus available. On the other hand, if the parties bring agree­
ment forward it is possible to make at least one party better off without making 
the other party worse off. That is, if the parties take the agreement reached af­
ter the delay as providing default payoffs to each party, there is an opportunity to 
make a second bargain over the additional surplus generated if agreement is reached 
earlier. Reaching agreement over this second bargain is in the interest of all par­
ties concerned as they can only benefit. This is the basic logic of the equilibrium in 
the alternating-offer models with complete information, notably Rubinstein’s (1982) 
model, reviewed in section 2.2. This model forms the basis of much of the existing 
non-cooperative bargaining literature.
Section 2.3 examines how bargaining delays may arise when there is asymmetric 
information between the parties. As well as alternating-offer models, this section
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also discusses one-sided offer models. These models are used to simplify the signaling 
process in the presence of asymmetric information.
Recently, other authors have developed bargaining models with symmetric infor­
mation in which delay can occur. Their models are discussed in section 2.4. Section 
2.5 links the results examined here with the other models developed in this thesis.
The main implications of the non-cooperative models presented are:
• With complete information, agreement between the bargaining parties is typ­
ically reached immediately, thereby maximising total available surplus.
• Outside options only affect the bargaining outcome when they can be credibly 
employed.
• The inability to commit to an offer affects the outcome of bargaining models. 
In models with asymmetric information the seller is made worse off (ex ante) 
by their inability to commit to a particular price.
• With asymmetric information, delays in bargaining may occur because the 
informed party uses delay to signal their bargaining strength. However, these 
delays may not be lengthy.
• Delays may arise with symmetric information when the parties are uncertain 
about the future value of the surplus and when they are unable to write a 
contingent contract.
• Party specific externalities may give rise to bargaining delays.
• Inefficient equilibria (delays) can be sustained with complete information if 
there are multiple equilibria and if deviations can be credibly punished.
The arguments discussed in this chapter draw heavily on other surveys of non- 
cooperative bargaining, particularly Sutton (1986), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) 
and Kennan and Wilson (1993).
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2.2 Alternating-offer models with complete information
In alternating-offer bargaining models, the parties take turns to propose and 
respond to offers relating to the division of surplus produced by the completion 
of a given transaction. Offers may explicitly involve proposals relating to how the 
surplus is to be divided or they may involve the parties agreeing on a transaction 
price: the transaction price determines the partition of surplus in this case.
This section first examines an alternating-offer model with a finite horizon. This 
model is then extended to an infinite horizon, as expounded by Rubinstein (1982). 
Several extensions are discussed, including the effect of allowing the parties to have 
outside options and how the inability of the proposer to commit to an offer affects 
the equilibrium outcome of these bargaining models.
2.2.1 Alternating-offer bargaining with a finite horizon
Following Stahl’s (1972) alternating-offers bargaining game with a finite horizon, 
two players must agree on how to divide a ‘cake’ or surplus the size of which has 
been normalised to equal 1. Feasibility requires that x\ + x2 < 1, where X{ is the 
share of player i and i = {1, 2}d
Figure 2.1 illustrates the bargaining process. In period t =  0 player 1 makes a 
proposal on the division of the cake to player 2, (xi, 1 — xi). Player 2 may accept 
or reject this proposal. If player 2 accepts the offer the game ends and each player 
receives the share proposed. If player 2 rejects the offer the game proceeds to the 
second period. In the period t =  1 , player 2 makes an offer to player 1 concerning 
the division of the cake, namely (x i,l — Xi). If player 1 accepts this offer, each 
party receives the payments prescribed by player 2’s offer and the game ends. If 
player 1 rejects the offer, the game proceeds to period t =  2, in which each player 
receives a payment (2/1,2/2)- This payment is exogenously predetermined and it is 
assumed that yi +  y2 < 1. Each player knows the structure of the game and there 
is no uncertainty.
+It is assumed that the cake is infinitely divisible, so X i  may take any value between 0 and 1.
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t = 0 1
t = 1 2
{2/1, 2/2, t = 1}
Figure 2.1: Finite horizon alternating bargaining model
9
The payoff (utility) for player i is S\xi, where Si is a discount factor for player i, 
and t is the period in which the payment is made, for example the utility of player 1 
would be x\ if agreement were made in period t = 0, if the payment was made 
in period t = 1. If the parties do not reach agreement in the first two periods the 
payoffs to player 1 and 2 are (S^yi^S^yf).
This bargaining game can be solved by backwards induction. In period t = 1 
player 2 makes an offer to player 1. As player 1 knows he will receive y\ if bargaining 
extends to the next period, he will reject any offer by player 2 in which he receives 
less than 8\y\. That is, for there to be agreement in period t — 1 player 1 must 
be at least as well off as if he refused the current offer (delayed agreement) and 
continued the bargaining process to the next period. Given this, player 2 will offer 
the division (Siyi, 1 — 5\yi) at time t = 1 so as to make player 1 indifferent between 
accepting and rejecting the offer. As player 1 discounts the future with a discount 
factor of <51} in period t = 1 player 1 will accept any offer x\ > Siy\.
In period t = 0, anticipating the outcome in the subsequent subgames, player 2 
will not accept any proposal by player 1 that gives her a payoff less than ^ ( l  — ̂ i2/i), 
which is her payoff from delaying agreement in period t = 1 and making an offer 
that is accepted by player 1 in the next period, appropriately discounted. Knowing 
this, player 1 makes the proposal (1 — £2(1 — ^i2/i)} ^ (1  — ^iyi)) in period t = 0, and 
player 2 accepts this offer. This subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is unique. As 
there is not delay joint surplus is maximised.
Further to this, player z’s payoff is increasing with their patience (Si increases), 
is decreasing as the other player becomes more patient and is increasing in their 
default (non-agreement) payoffs. These characteristics are summariämn Result 2.1.
R esult 2.1 In the finite horizon alternating-offer game the subgame perfect equi­
librium is unique and agreement is reached immediately, maximising joint surplus. 
Each player’s share of the surplus is increasing in their own patience, decreasing 
in the patience of the other player and increasing in their default (non-agreement) 
payoff.
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2.2.2 Alternating-offer bargaining model with an infinite horizon
In 1982 Rubinstein developed the alternating-offer bargaining model with an 
infinite horizon shown in Figure 2.2. In period t — 0, player 1 gets to make an 
offer of how the cake of size 1 is to be divided between herself and player 2. As in 
the finite horizon model above, player 2 can accept or reject this offer. If player 2 
agrees with the proposal, the payments specified in the proposal are made and the 
game ends. If player 2 rejects the proposal the game proceeds to period t = 1 in 
which player 2 gets to make an offer. As in the first round of bargaining, if player 
1 accepts the offer the agreed payments are made and the game ends. If player 1 
rejects the offer the game continues to period t = 2. In this period player 1 again 
gets to make an offer to which player 2 responds. If an agreement is not reached 
this process of alternating offers continues indefinitely.
The utility of each player is Sjxi, where 6i € (0,1) is the discount factor of player 
i and t is the period in which agreement is reached.
Any division of the surplus can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium. Consider 
the following strategy of player 1: offer the division (x i,l  — X \ )  in every period 
in which she gets to make an offer; only accept an offer from player 2 if X\  > X\ .  
Player 2 plays an analogous strategy: propose (äh, 1 — äq); accept an offer if and 
only if x \  < X \ .  Given the strategy of each player, neither player can do better by 
unilaterally deviating from their strategy. As such, the Nash equilibrium places few 
restrictions on the outcome of this gamed
However, the bargaining game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) 
that may be solved for using the stationarity of the game, outlined Shaked and 
Sutton (1984) d To find the SPE we first establish the maximum payoff for player 
1 in any SPE. Second, we demonstrate that this is the unique SPE outcome as it is 
also equal to the minimum payoff that player 1 would receive in any SPE.
First, let M  be the largest payoff player 1 can obtain in any SPE. Thus at
*See Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, pp. 41-43).
^For a discussion of this technique also see Sutton (1986), Osborne and Rubinstein (1990, 
section 3.8), Mas-colell et al (1995, pp. 298-99) and Gibbons (1992, pp. 70-71).
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t = 0 1
t = 1
t =  2
Offer {xi, ^ 2 , £ =  1}
R
{xi,  x2, t =  1}
1
Figure 2.2: Rubins tein’s (1982) alternating offers bargaining game
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time t = 2 the maximum player 1 can expect is M. Given this, at time t = 1,
player 2 can do no better than to offer player 1 — 8\M. If player 2 offers less than
1 — in period t = 1, player 1 will reject the offer and wait for the next period.
Repeating this procedure, at time t = 0, player 1 must offer at least (1 — <52(1 — 8\M))
to player 2 to get his agreement. However, given the stationarity of the game at
time t = 0, payoff for player 1 is the same as the payoff at time t =  2. That is,
(1 -  82( 1 -  SiM)) =  M, or M  =  (1 -  82)/{ 1 -  8 ^ ) .
Second, to show this is a unique outcome, let M be the smallest payoff that player
1 will receive in a SPE. Repeating the backwards induction arguments above, M
= (1 — 82)/{ 1 — W 2 ) must be the smallest payoff for player 1 in a SPE. As M
= M  the SPE is unique. Player 1 receives (1 — <52) /( l  — 8\82) and player 2 receives
82(l — <$i)/(l — W 2 ). If £ 1  = 82 , player 1 receives 1/(1 +  <5) and player 2 receives
(5/(1 +  (5). The strategies that sustain this SPE are: in every period in which a
player makes an offer he proposes a division that corresponds to the SPE outcome
h e .
in each period; and in every period in which a player responds to an offer that they
'*Cva)v\1 lf\C~
only accept an offer if they receive a payoff at least as large as they would receive 
from delaying agreement.
In a similar manner as in the finite horizon game, agreement is reached in the 
first period without delay despite the possible infinite horizon of the bargaining 
process. As each party knows the costs of the delay for themselves and the other 
player there is no strategic advantage in delaying agreement. Delay only serves 
to reduce total joint surplus. Thus, reaching agreement earlier increases the total 
available surplus available. This allows at least one of the players to be better off 
without making the other player worse off. The only SPE outcome of the game thus 
involves the parties reaching immediate agreement, maximising joint surplus. The 
main points of the outcome of this bargaining game are summarised in Result 2.2.
R esult 2.2 In the infinite horizon alternating-offer model, the SPE is unique, agree­
ment is reached immediately and joint surplus is maximised. Each player’s payoff 
is increasing in their own patience and is decreasing in the discount factor of the 
other player.
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Note also that there is an advantage in being the first mover in this game. 
Several authors modified the model to remove this first mover advantage. Sutton 
(1986, p. 711) argued that as the time difference between bargaining periods A 
tends to zero the share of player 1 becomes • When 6i = 62, this equals
1/2. Alternatively, some authors have suggested that at the beginning of each 
bargaining period the proposer be chosen at random (for example, by the toss of 
a coin). MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a) used this technique in their bargaining 
game in which two parties bargain over a flow of surplus, rather than a stock of 
surplus. As the number of bargaining rounds increases each party becomes the first 
mover approximately 50 per cent of the time.
Another possible augmentation to the model is to alter the way the players 
incur delay costs. For example, consider an infinite-horizon alternating-offer game 
in which each player has a constant cost of delay for every period in which there 
is delay. That is, the utility function of each player is rq =  Xi — erf, where c* > 0. 
If Ci 7̂  C2 there is a unique SPE. When ci < C2, in the SPE agreement is reached 
immediately and the division is (x\ = 1, £2 =  0). Alternatively, if ci > C2 agreement 
is reached immediately and the partition of the surplus is (cci = C2,X2 =  1 — C2). In 
this game having a lower cost provides the party making the offer with an absolute 
advantage. Thus if player 1 has a lower cost he receives all of the surplus. On the 
other hand, if player 2 has a lower cost of delay party 1 must provide her with at 
least an equivalent payoff as when she delays and gets to make the offer at t = 1. If 
Ci = C2 there is no longer a unique solution (provided c* is not too large) and some 
of the equilibria involve delay, although this delay is never more than one period 
(see Rubinstein 1982, pp. 107-108, Osborne and Rubinstein 1990, p. 49).
2.2.3 Outside options
Often bargaining parties have the option to quit negotiating and take up an 
outside option. Figure 2.3 illustrates the extensive form of a model based on Shaked 
and Sutton (1984). As before, both players must agree on how to share surplus 
normalised to size 1. In period t = 0 player 1 makes an offer to player 2. Player
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2 can accept the offer, ending the game, or she can choose to reject the proposal. 
If player 2 rejects the offer she then has two options: proceed to the next period 
in which she makes an offer to player 1 as in the standard alternating-offer game 
described above; or, alternatively, opt to quit the bargaining process and take up 
an outside option. The game proceeds to the next round provided: the parties do 
not reach agreement; and player 2 does not exercise her quit option. Again, the 
potential bargaining horizon is infinite.
The utility of each player is given by (StXi1 5tx2), where is the payoff received 
by player z, z =  {1,2}. If the quit option is exercised by player 2, player 1 receives a 
payoff of zero and player 2 gets 6 E (0,1). If the outside option is not exercised, the 
division of surplus is (xi,X2 =  1 — aq) as agreed. Note that as b < 1 the potential 
surplus is larger inside the relationship than outside it.
First, consider the case when b < Qfpyp As js the payoff player 2 receives 
in the SPE when no outside option is available, the existence of the outside option 
does not affect the division of surplus. Following the technique described in section 
2.2.2, player 1 will propose (1/(1 +  6), 5/(1 +  (5)) in period 1, and accept any offer 
of x\ > 5/(1 +  5). The best player 2 can do, given the strategy of player 1, is to 
accept any offer of x2 > 5/(1 + 6) and propose the partition (5/(1 +  5), 1/(1 -I- 5)). 
Given these strategies, it is never optimal for player 2 to exercise her outside option 
and quit. As a result, player 1 will not adjust any of his offers on account of the 
outside option; the SPE is unaffected by the presence of the outside option.
Second, considering when b > the outside option does affect the SPE
strategies and outcome of the game. In the unique SPE for this game: player 1 
proposes the division (1 — 6,6) and accepts an offer if and only if x\ > 5(1 — 6); 
player 2 proposes (5(1 — 6), 1 — 5(1 — 6)), accepts any offer provided x2 > b and opts 
out if x2 < 6. For example, consider an offer of x2 < 6 in period t = 0. If player 2 
rejects the offer and continues bargaining, the best he can obtain in period t = 1 is 
x2 = 1 — 5(1 — 6), as derived from the equilibrium strategies. Given the stationarity 
of player l ’s strategy she will again offer x2 in period t = 2, at which point player 2 
can do no better than opt out. Discounting these payoffs to their respective period
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t = 0 1
Offer {xi, x2, t =  0}
{Q, 6, t = 0} {xi, x2, t = 0}
{Q, t = 0} {xi, x2, t = 2}
Figure 2.3: Alternating bargaining model with an outside option
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t = 0 values it is apparent that 62b < 5(1 — 6(1 — b)) < b. The first inequality holds 
provided (1 — (5) > 0. The second inequality holds by the assumption that b >
Given that b > 52b, it is optimal for player 2 to immediately quit if X2 < b.
As it is not in the interests of player 1 to have player 2 quit, she will offer at 
least b in period t = 0. Moreover, as player 2 will accept any offer x 2 > b, player 
1 need not offer any more than X2 = b. In the SPE the division of the surplus is 
(1 — 6,6) and agreement is reached immediately.
Third, if 6 =  there is immediate agreement and the surplus is divided by
the partition (1 — 6, 6).
Result 2.3 summarises the main aspects of the model.
Result 2.3 In an alternating-offer model, the SPE is only affected by an outside 
option if it can be credibly invoked. In the SPE, agreement is reached immediately, 
maximising potential surplus.
There are several possible extensions to this model. First, the equilibria of the 
game are sensitive to the timing of the quit option. If, for example, the structure of 
the game is altered so that player 2 may only quit after player 1 has rejected one of 
his offers there are multiple equilibria for some parameter values (see Osborne and 
Rubinstein 1990, pp. 58-63).
Second, as demonstrated by Shaked and Sutton (1984), the player with the 
outside option may have to wait T  periods before the quit option becomes available f  
When T  is small, the outside option has the effect of giving player 1 (approximately) 
all the bargaining power so that the model mimics the result of a competitive 
market (for player 2). Alternatively, if T  is large the game approximates a bilateral 
monopoly, as in Rubinstein’s original game.
Third, the game may be altered so that after any rejection the game may be 
terminated with an exogenously determined probability p as shown in Figure 2.4 (see 
Sutton 1986, p. 715). In this game, all outside option values affect the equilibrium
t Shaked and Sutton assumed that at this point player 1 can begin bargaining with an outside 
party who is identical to player 2.
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* =  0 1
Offer {xi, £ 2 , t = 0}
{xi, £2, t  =  0}
t = 1 2
2
C
{6, 0, t =  1}
Figure 2.4: Alternative timing for exercising the outside option
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payoffs because any rejection could invoke the outside option. As it is exogenously 
determined whether the bargaining process will end (given an offer has been re­
jected) these outside options become a credible threat and will affect the bargaining 
outcome. Moreover, the finite horizon model (section 2.2.1) can be interpreted as 
a special case of this model where the rejection of an offer by player 1 means that 
the outside options are invoked with probability p = 1.
2.2.4 Commitment
Muthoo (1990) modified Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating-offer bargaining game 
to allow the proposer to be able to withdraw his offer once it had been accepted by 
the other party. That is, the proposer could reject an acceptance of his initial offer 
and opt to continue bargaining.
The model was set up as follows. The initial proposer (the seller) values the good 
at 0 and the other party (the buyer) values the good at 1. Given the alternating 
structure of the game, the seller makes offers in periods t =  0,2,4,... and the buyer 
makes all the offers in odd periods. Each party has a discount factor of 5 £ (0,1), 
so that the payoffs for the seller and buyer are pSt and (1 — p)5l respectively, where 
p is the agreed upon price.
Although Rubinstein’s unique result (that is, p = yq^) can be sustained in equi­
librium for any discount factor, Muthoo found that for 5 E ( ^ ,  1) any price between 
0 and 1 can be sustained in equilibrium. The reason for the multiplicity of equi­
libria is similar to the intuition behind the Folk Theorem in repeated games; an 
equilibrium is sustained through credible threats to punish deviations (and punish­
ing deviations from punishment and so forth). If the discount rate is high enough, 
any price can be the equilibrium price as it pays neither the proposer or the re­
spondent to deviate from this price. If the proposer deviates, the respondent will 
punish her by rejecting the offer and making the appropriate punishment offer in 
the next period. If the respondent accepts an offer she should have rejected, the 
proposer punishes her by withdrawing the offer and plays a punishment strategy 
in subsequent bargaining rounds. In equilibrium, the price p is immediately imple-
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mented and there is no delay (and the proposer does not change his mind). The 
possibility that the proposer may withdraw their offer can have a dramatic effect 
on the outcome of the game.
2.3 Bargaining with asymmetric information
In general, the models of bargaining with complete information reviewed (section 
2.2) predict that agreement occurs immediately. These stark results do not always 
accord with bargaining behaviour observed in practice. One way of explaining 
delays is to introduce asymmetric information. With private information a costly 
delay might be the only credible way for a party to communicate the strength of 
their bargaining position (Kennan and Wilson 1993, p. 46). For example, an agent 
in a strong bargaining position can signal her strength by making offers that a 
weaker bargainer would not wish to make. Alternatively, a player may use delay 
as a screening device to separate players with a high cost of delay from those with 
a greater willingness/ability to wait. Invariably, these models involve the stronger 
bargaining agent delaying for a period of time which a weaker agent would not find 
profitable.
When the parties have incomplete information they must form beliefs about 
the probability of particular events occurring. As subgame perfection is no longer 
a useful equilibrium concept we look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) or 
a sequential equilibrium.t Loosely speaking, a PBE requires players to maximise 
utility given their beliefs, and that these beliefs be formed using Bayes’ rule where 
possible.
In this section we first review bargaining models with one-sided information. 
Bargaining models with one sided information simplify the signalling process. Next 
we review a version of Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating offer model with incomplete 
information. The models reviewed in this section show that asymmetric informa-
*For further discussion of PBE and sequential equilibrium see Mas-Colell et al (1995, pp. 288- 
290) or Gibbons (1992, p. 188).
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tion can result in costly delays. Furthermore, with a finite horizon asymmetric 
information can result in the possibility of no agreement at all.
Several authors have questioned the effectiveness of models with one-sided asym­
metric information to explain protracted delays.t The argument is that if there are 
not significant intervals between bargaining periods, and parties cannot commit to 
future strategies, once a party with a high cost of delay has settled, agreement will 
reached immediately in the continuation game, given it is now a game with complete 
information. Realising this, however, the bargainer with a high cost of delay will 
also delay agreement. As a consequence the separating mechanism breaks down and 
all parties settle with little or no delay (Hart 1989, p. 26). Section 2.3.3 discusses 
these arguments and several models that attempt to overcome this criticism. Section 
2.3.4 briefly discusses bargaining models with two-sided asymmetric information.
2.3.1 One-sided offer models with one-sided asymmetric information
Consider a one-sided offer bargaining based on the model developed by Fuden- 
berg and Tirole (1983), hereafter FT. A seller makes an offer (or offers depending 
on the number of bargaining rounds) to a potential buyer who values the good at 
b € {b,b}. The buyer’s valuation is private information but each type occurs with 
probability | .  The seller’s value of the good is 0, and this is known by both parties.
First consider the one period game where the seller makes an offer to the buyer. 
If the buyer accepts the offer made trade takes place at that price; if the offer is not 
accepted, no trade takes place and the game ends with each player receiving their 
default (no trade) payoffs. The default payoffs are equal to zero for both parties, 
thus it is always efficient to trade. The trade payoffs are us = p for the seller and 
Ub = b — p for the seller.
In the one period game the buyer will accept any offer with a probability of one 
provided p < fy. Given the buyer can only have two possible valuations, the seller 
will either offer p = b and sell to all potential buyers, or she will offer p = b and
*See, for example, Gul and Sonnenschein (1988) and Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986).
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sell to the high valuation buyers. Consequently, if 6 > 6/2 then the seller will offer 
p = b. Conversely, if 6 < 6/2 the seller will offer p = 6. FT label the first type of 
seller ‘soft’ and the second type ‘tough’.
Already in the one period game, as a result of a party having private information 
a surplus enhancing trade may not occur at all. In the case above, this is when 
6 =  6 and the seller offers p =  6 as 6 < 6/2. Note, this would not happen with full 
information. In that case the seller would always offer a price equal to the buyer’s 
valuation and trade would always occur, maximising surplus.
Now consider the two period game in which the seller can make, at most, two 
separate offers to the buyer. If the offer in the first period is accepted, the game 
ends. If, instead, the buyer rejects the first period offer, the seller may make an 
offer in the second period. If the buyer accepts an offer trade takes place in that 
period at the specified price. If the buyer rejects the second period offer the game 
ends and no trade takes place. The seller discounts a payoff from the second period 
trade by the discount factor 6S; the buyer’s discount factor is 65. These discount 
factors are common knowledge.
FT showed that in this game there is a unique PBE. First, let us consider the 
PBE when the seller is soft in the one period game. If the first period offer has 
been rejected the seller will always offer p2 = 6 in the second period. From above, 
all types will accept such an offer.
Anticipating the second period price, the high type will only purchase the item 
in the first period if:
6 -  pi > 5b(b -  6)
or if:
Pi < bhb +  (1 -  6h)b =  6.
Considering the strategies of the potential buyers the seller must decide between 
offering two different prices in the first period: 6 or 6d The seller chooses the
t6 dominates any price between the interval (6,6) because the same number of customers 
purchase the good at a higher price.
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price with the larger payoff: if the seller charges b she sells to everyone and her 
payoff is us(b) = b] if the seller offers b in the first period her expected payoff is 
us(b) == + |(5s6.t
Now consider a seller who is tough in the one-period game. With 2 periods this 
seller has three choices for the price she will offer in the first period. First, if a tough 
seller sets P\ = b both types of buyer will purchase the good in the first period as 
above, and the utility of the seller is us(b) = b.
Second, the seller realises that a type b buyer will buy in the first period re­
gardless of the seller’s second period strategy i fb  — pi > Sb(b — 6), or if pi < b =  
5bb+ (1 — 6b)b, as the buyer cannot expect to make a larger gain in the second period 
(the seller would never offer a price less than b). Thus if the seller offers p\ < 6, a 
type b buyer will accept with probability id Given the high types accept this offer 
the seller will offer p2 = b. If the seller plays this strategy her expected return is 
us(b) =  \b +  \8sb =  5f)b +  (1 — 8b)b) +  18sb.
Finally, consider the mixed strategy of the buyer b if pi > b. The mixed strategy 
equilibrium requires that: (a) enough buyers with value b do not purchase the good 
in the first period so as to make the seller indifferent between playing soft or tough 
in the second period; and (b) the b buyer must be indifferent between purchasing 
the good in the first or second period.* 
In the two period game a seller who is tough in the one-period game can choose 
from either of the three separate strategies outlined above: the optimal strategy 
will depend on the relative payoffs of the three alternative strategies.
Several important economic issues arise from this model. In a similar manner 
to the one-period model, the buyer’s private information may result in trade being
*Thus the PBE is as follows: the (soft) seller offers either b or b in the first period. Her beliefs 
are Pr[b =  b) =  \  in the first period and that Pr(b =  ö) =  1 in the second period if pi =  b (and 
this offer was rejected.) A buyer with valuation b will accept offers of pt < b in both periods with 
probability 1 and pt > b with probability 0 in both periods. Buyers with valuation b will: accept 
Pi < b with probability 1 and reject all other offers; accept offers in the second period provided 
P2  < b  with probability 1; and will accept offers P2 > b with probability 0.
*As before, a price of b dominates an offer of any other price between b and b.
tThe buyer can satisfy these conditions by setting a price in the first period arbitrarily close 
to b (pi =  b — e) and playing soft in the second period with a probability arbitrarily close to zero.
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delayed or it may not occur at all. Further, the introduction of a second bargaining 
period may increase or decrease welfare (relative to the one period model). Ineffi­
ciency can arise when a type-6 buyer rejects an offer they would have accepted in 
the one-period game.
The seller may be made better off by the addition of bargaining periods as it 
may allow her to extract surplus from the high valuation buyer without losing the 
chance to sell to the low valuation buyer. For example, a soft seller has to be at 
least as well off by the addition of a bargaining period, as she could always charge 
6 in both periods. However, a seller who is tough in a one-period model may be 
made worse off by the addition of a bargaining period. In the one period game no 
buyer has positive surplus so the addition of a bargaining period cannot make a 
buyer worse off.
Overall, FT concluded that the implications of the changing the bargaining 
process and the characteristics of the players are not always clear and need to be 
examined for each specific bargaining game.
Sobel and Takahashi (1983) developed a very similar model in which a seller 
makes offers to a buyer whose valuation is private information. If the buyer accepts 
the offer, trade takes place at that price. If the offer is rejected, the bargaining 
process proceeds to the next period. The bargaining game has at most T  periods 
and delay is costly for both the buyer and seller.
Again, delay may arise in equilibrium as a consequence of the buyer’s private 
information. Another major focus of their paper is the effect of the seller’s ability to 
commit to a pricing schedule over the T  periods. This is compared with the situation 
in which the seller cannot commit to adjust her offer price given the history of the 
game (using the information she has learned about the buyer’s valuation from his 
rejection of previous offers). When commitment is possible the seller determines 
the pricing schedule that maximises ex ante surplus. Without commitment the 
price offered in any period must maximise expected surplus given the information 
that the seller has learned about the buyer from his refusals of all previous offers. 
Thus without commitment the buyer’s strategy conveys information to the seller.
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This inability to commit to a pricing schedule hurts the seller (ex ante). As in FT: 
increasing the length of the bargaining horizon may not necessarily improve the 
welfare of either the buyer or the seller; and making one player more impatient does 
not necessarily improve the welfare of the other bargainer (when commitment is not 
possible).
Result 2.4 summarises the discussion above of the implications of private infor­
mation in one-sided offer models.
Result 2.4 Delays in bargaining can result from the introduction of one-sided pri­
vate information. Moreover, with private information, increasing the number of 
potential bargaining periods does not necessarily improve welfare.
Other papers have made further extensions to the basic one-sided offer model 
with one-sided asymmetric information. For example, Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole 
(1987) developed a model in which the seller can make offers to a buyer whose value 
for the good is private information. In addition, however, the seller can take up an 
outside option. They examined both the case in which the seller can switch to a 
new buyer at a cost and the case where there is a time cost involved in switching 
to another party. Different equilibria are possible, including equilibria in which 
the seller haggles with the buyer for a finite period of time before switching to the 
outside option. This result occur even when it is common knowledge that there 
are potential gains from trade. That is, bargaining ends after a fixed number of 
periods even when there are potential gains from trade remaining. Moreover, the 
introduction of outside options does not necessarily increase total expected surplus.
Crampton and Tracey (1992) modelled a union and a firm bargain over a new 
wage claim. The union makes all the wage offers and the firm has private information 
regarding their willingness to pay. In addition to the basic model, in the event of 
a dispute over a wage claim, the union can either choose to strike or ‘holdout’. A 
holdout is defined as continuing to work (for that period) according to the conditions 
of the expired contract^ The authors presumed that the return to the union (and
* Crampton and Tracey argued that holdouts are a common occurrence in actual labour contract 
negotiations.
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the firm) is larger from a holdout than from striking, although total surplus is 
reduced if a new agreement is not signed. In their model equilibria exist in which 
the union chooses to holdout in the event of a refusal of a wage offer by the firm 
rather than strike. Note, as it is inefficient, holdout is still a form of delay. Gu and 
Kuhn (1998) extended this model to incorporate the idea that by refusing to reach 
agreement (delay) a union can observe other wage outcomes in their industry. If 
the profitability of firms in an industry are correlated, there is an incentive for a 
union to delay its negotiations in order to learn about the firm’s ability to pay from 
other wage deals in the sectord
2.3.2 Alternating-offer models with one-sided asymmetric informa­
tion
Rubinstein (1985) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) developed a model with 
one-sided asymmetric information with sequential alternating offers. As in Rubin­
stein (1982) two players must agree on the division of a cake of size 1. Player l ’s 
utility is represented by Ui =  Xi — Cit, and this is common knowledge. He makes 
an offer to player 2 whose utility function is u2 = x2 — c2t , where c2 can either be 
cH or cl, Cl < C\ < Ch and cl +  C\ +  cH < 1. c2 is private information: player 1 is 
unaware of its value. Player l ’s prior is that c2 =  ch with probability tch and that 
c2 = Cl with probability (1 — 7t#).
If player 2 accepts l ’s offer, the game ends and the cake is divided as agreed. If 
the offer is rejected the game proceeds to period t — 1 in which it is player 2’s turn 
to make a proposal to player 1. If player 1 accepts the payments are made and the 
game ends. If player 1 rejects this proposed division the game continues, it is again 
player l ’s turn to make an offer. This structure of alternating offers is the same as 
the original Rubinstein (1982) game. The first 2 rounds of the bargaining game are
^Kuhn and Gu (1999) developed a similar model in which there was a sequence of union-firm 
bargains. As above, the profitability of the firms are correlated. Consequently, the outcome of 
the preceding negotiation allows unions in subsequent negotiations to learn additional information 
about the firm they are bargaining with. Canadian panel data supports their prediction that there 
will be fewer strikes in ‘follower’ wage negotiations as compared with ‘leader’ negotiations.
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shown in Figure 2.5.
t = 0
Offer {^i, X2 , £ =  0} Offer {xi, X2 , t = 0}
t =  1 2(ctf) 2(cl )
Figure 2.5: Alternating offer game with one-sided private information
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Osborne and Rubinstein showed that there are multiple sequential equilibria in 
this game as little restriction is placed on player l ’s off-equilibrium path beliefs. 
However, a set of equilibria in which the players play stationary strategies involves 
player 1 making a proposal that is accepted by player 2 if she is a high cost type 
(that is she has c2  =  ch) while it is rejected by low cost types. The continuation 
game (after period t =  0) is now effectively one of complete information. As shown 
by Rubinstein (1982) there is no delay in this bargaining game with full information 
- in period t = 1 player 2 (with c2 = eff) makes an offer and player 1 immediately 
accepts. Consequently, this set of equilibria involves a delay when player 2 is a low 
cost type, but only for one period.
To generate delays in negotiations that last for longer than one period Osborne 
and Rubinstein (1990) allowed the strategies of the parties to depend on the bar­
gaining period. Consider the following strategy profile: each player proposes that 
they receive all the surplus whenever they make an offer in every bargaining pe­
riod t, provided t < T \  further, prior to period T  each player only accepts an offer 
that gets them the entire surplus and they reject all other offers. After period T, 
however, the strategies change and each player makes an offer that is immediately 
accepted. These strategies form an equilibrium because any deviation by a party 
(that is, if they make an alterative offer) will be punished by the other party with 
all their future offers. Provided T  is small enough, both players find it better not 
to deviate from this strategy and a delay in agreement of T  periods is observed in 
equilibrium.*
Result 2.5 summarises the main points of this section concerning delays in bar­
gaining.
Result 2.5 In an alternating-offer model in which player 2 has private information, 
delays in agreement can result in equilibrium.
*See section 2.3.3 for a further discussion of this model.
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2.3.3 The Coase conjecture and protracted delays
Gul and Sonnenschein (1988) and Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986), here­
after GSW, argued that bargaining models with one-sided asymmetric information, 
like those discussed above, fail to explain protracted delays in agreement. This 
proposition is also known as the Coase conjecture. Their result relies on the as­
sumption that each player’s action should depend on their beliefs (or on the be­
liefs of the uniformed party) and not on the period of the game; that is, strategies 
should be stationary. This, for example, is not the case in Osborne and Rubinsteins’ 
(1990) non-stationary strategy equilibrium above. In that equilibrium the players 
alter their strategies in period T  even though no information has been revealed 
along the equilibrium path. According to GSW, if no information is revealed to the 
uniformed party their beliefs should remain unaltered, and they should continue to 
play the same action. Further, GSW assumed that there is no free screening: the 
uniformed party does not learn any information about which type she is facing after 
a rejection of an offer if both (all) types would reject the offer. If these assumptions 
hold agreement is reached no later than the second period in the game of Osborne 
and Rubinstein (1990)3 Further, as the time between periods becomes arbitrarily 
small, the time lapsed before agreement is reached becomes small, as does the cost 
of delay (Sutton 1986)3
Several authors have attempted to overcome this critique, as outlined below. 
Hart (1989)
Hart (1989) developed a model to explain the observation that many strikes last 
for an extended period of time. His model incorporates two assumptions. First, 
there is a finite time period between offers. That is, the time lapse between, say, 
period t = 0 and period t = 1 cannot tend to zero in the limit. Second, after the
^See the game where the parties were forced to play stationary strategies in section 2.3.2.
^Muthoo (1999) argued that the Coase conjecture implied that, in the limit, as the time between 
offers approaches zero all potential gains from trade are realised without any costly delay and that 
the uniformed party making the offers effectively loses almost all of the bargaining power typically 
associated with being the party that gets to make the offers (Property 9.2 p. 280).
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strike has lasted for a certain number of periods, in each subsequent period in which 
the strike is not resolved there is a fixed probability that the profitability of the firm 
declines to zero. If this occurs bargaining ceases.
A firm can either be a low profit or a high profit operation; each type occurs 
with known probability. The union (the uniformed party) makes wage offers to the 
firm in each period until an offer is accepted by the firm. To this model Hart adds 
the assumption that after a certain period of time T  there is some probability that 
the firm with a striking workforce becomes valueless. Each party incurs a cost of 
delay as each discounts the future.
Hart found that, provided the profit of the high profit firm is large enough, 
bargaining will extend beyond period T. The advantage to the union of delaying 
agreement until after this point is that the probability of the firm becoming unprof­
itable reduces the union’s effective discount rate, making the post-T period game 
more attractive to the union. The union, as such, must weigh up the cost of delay­
ing agreement until period T  + 1 with the potential benefits of doing so. For some 
parameter values the union wishes to delay, and a protracted disagreement occurs 
in equilibrium.
Admati and Perry (1987)
Admati and Perry (1987) developed a model in which parties can signal their 
bargaining strength by choosing how much time should lapse before they make a 
counter offer (after a minimum delay has passed as in the standard alternating offers 
game). Unlike other bargaining games this model allows the time between offers - 
delay - to be endogenous.
Suppose that in a union-firm bargaining game only the firm has private informa­
tion and that the union makes the first offer to the firm (the union is the uniformed 
party). If the firm is in a strong bargaining position, and it does not wish to ac­
cept the union’s first offer, one option for the firm is to delay making its counter 
offer to signal its strength. In a similar manner to the signalling models of Spence 
(1973), the delay in response must be of such a length that it indicates strength;
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the delay must be of sufficient duration that it would never pay a firm in a weak 
bargaining position to delay negotiations for such a long period. From this point 
on the game becomes one of full information and the union accepts the firm’s offer 
without further delay.
In this bargaining game long delays may exist even when the minimum time 
between offers tends to zero. This model, however, has the unusual characteristic 
that the period of delay involves the parties remaining silent and not making any 
offers.
Hart and Tirole (1988)
Hart and Tirole (1988) considered the long-term relationship between a seller 
of a durable good with a buyer whose valuation of the good is private information. 
For simplicity they assume that the buyer’s per period valuation is either low (b) or 
high (b). It is known that the probability that the buyer has a valuation of b is [i. 
With one-sided offers, the seller makes price offers to the buyer. If the buyer agrees, 
the parties trade according to the contract. If agreement is not reached, the parties 
receive the no-trade payoff (of zero) and proceed to the next period, provided that 
period was not the end of the game.
Hart and Tirole considered several different situations. First, they showed that 
when commitment was possible, the solution in the game is that the seller sets her 
optimal price, be it a sale or rental price. If b < the seller sets price equal to b at 
each point in time. As a result, she only sells to the high-valuation buyer in every 
period. Second, the authors considered when commitment was not possible. In this 
case, if a buyer accepts a price for the good in one period that reveals them to have a 
value 6, the seller will renegotiate price in the next period. Realising this potential 
loss will last for the rest of the game, consumers with a high valuation will not 
be willing to reveal their type if there is a sufficient number of periods remaining. 
Given this, the seller will set the price at b until near the end of the game when 
screening becomes feasible. As a consequence of the lack of commitment, price is 
low for many periods, say for K  periods, after which time the price jumps when the
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seller starts to screen the high-valuation types from the low types.
This contradicts the Coase conjecture. Coasian dynamics suggest that prices 
are monotonic across time and that the player with a high value of the good trades 
earlier: in other words, over time the price falls and after a time everyone consumes 
the good. The equilibrium path in the model of Hart and Tirole (1988) is non- 
Coasian: price remains low for a long time, and everyone consumes the good; after 
a given point in time the price increases, forcing some buyers out of the market.
Result 2.6 summarises the main points of the models discussed in this section.
Result 2.6 The Coase conjecture suggests that models with one-sided asymmetric 
information are unable to explain protracted delays in bargaining. Several models, 
however, overcome this critique by: considering strategies that are non-stationary; 
allowing the bargaining game to alter after a period of delay; when commitment is 
not possible; and allowing the length of delay to be endogenous.
2.3.4 Two-sided incomplete information
An obvious extension of bargaining models with one-sided private information 
is to allow both parties to possess private information. Kennan and Wilson (1993) 
described bargaining models with two-sided asymmetric information as a ‘war of 
attrition’ in which each party tries to out last the other. At some point in time, one 
party will decide that their cost of delay is greater than the cost of the other party 
and they will concede. For example, in a model described by Kennan and Wilson 
(1993) each party has a fixed cost of delay per time period. When a party concedes, 
the game resembles Rubinstein’s (1982) alternating bargaining game with fixed 
costs: agreement is reached immediately, with the division of surplus as described 
by Rubinstein (1982). Perry (1986) found a similar results hold when the parties 
know each other’s cost of delay but possess other private information.
Crampton (1984) extended the models of Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) and So- 
bel and Takahashi (1983) by considering an infinite horizon bargaining model, with 
two-sided incomplete information in which one party makes all the offers. In the
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equilibrium, information is revealed gradually over time and the rate of revelation 
depends on the players’ costs of delay. The results of the model are that: incom­
plete information leads to bargaining inefficiency; these inefficiencies increase as 
uncertainty about preferences increases; bargainers with high delay costs are at a 
disadvantage; and information is revealed more quickly the higher the costs of delay.
Other authors find similar results. Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987) develop 
an infinite horizon alternating offer model with two-sided asymmetric information.* 
They find that the sequential equilibrium in the game is unique. This result holds 
because strategies that require an element of commitment are not credible. Fur­
ther, the model has the implication that a player in a stronger bargaining position 
is more likely to have a larger claim on the surplus. Watson (1998) showed ineffi­
cient equilibria exist in an infinite horizon alternating-offers model with two-sided 
asymmetric information. Further, he derived the result that a player does not gain 
a larger share of surplus from a small chance that they are a strong type but that 
they can be hurt significantly if there is a slight chance that they are a weak agent.
2.4 Symmetric information and delays in bargaining
The models described in the previous section implicitly assume that, if there 
was no asymmetric information between the parties, there would be no delays in 
bargaining (Avery and Zemsky 1994a). This assumption is evident in that there is 
no delay in any continuation game with complete information. The papers reviewed 
in this section attempt to generate delays in bargaining in equilibrium when both 
the parties have symmetric (and possibly complete) information.
Complete information and history-dependent strategies
Haller and Holden (1990) extended the basic Rubinstein model by including the 
decision to strike as a strategic variable. In the first period a firm makes a wage 
offer to a union. If the union accepts the game ends. If the union rejects the offer,
^Also see Chatterjee and Samuelson (1983).
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the union must decide whether to strike or not. If the union strikes it receives a 
payoff of zero, as does the firm. If the union does not strike it receives its wage 
according to the old contract. The parties forgo the increase in surplus, however, if 
they do not reach agreement in that period. If the firm’s offer was rejected in the 
first period, in the second period the union makes another offer. Again, if its offer 
is rejected the union, can opt to strike or not to strike. This process continues until 
agreement is reached. The parties have perfect information.
One equilibrium in this game is the Rubinstein equilibrium.* However, other 
equilibria are also possible. The lowest payoff the union can receive in equilibrium 
is to receive a wage equal to its default payoff. This will occur when the union never 
strikes. If the union strikes only after rejections of its own proposals it will receive 
a payoff greater than the Rubinstein payoff; this is the maximum payoff the union 
can achieve.
Haller and Holden (1990) showed how these multiple equilibria can be used to 
generate delays. Consider the following strategy. For t periods both players offer 
divisions that allocate all the surplus themselves. These offers are all rejected by 
the other player. If a player deviates to make a more generous offer, this player is 
punished by the other player who switches to play the worst efficient equilibrium 
for the deviator from that period on. It is the threat of punishment, that can only 
arise with multiple equilibria, that prevents a player from deviating and making an 
alternative offer. After t periods an offer that is acceptable is made and the other 
player accepts. As a result of this type of strategy, strikes of significant length arise, 
despite complete information.
Fernandez and Glazer (1991) developed a similar model. As in Rubinstein (1982) 
two agents - a union and a firm - bargain sequentially in discrete time over a po­
tentially infinite horizon. Each party takes it in turns to make a wage offer that 
the other party can accept (and terminate the bargaining process) or reject and 
continue bargaining. In addition to the basic model there is an old wage contract 
that continues to apply if an offer is rejected. Thus, if an offer is rejected the union
^This occurs when the union strikes after every rejection.
34
can decide to strike in that period or to continue to work at the wage specified 
in the default contract. If a strike occurs, the union forgoes the wage in the de­
fault contract and the firm forgoes the new revenue in that period. As usual, each 
party discounts future returns, and each party’s objective is to maximise discounted 
returns (surplus).
In a similar manner to Haller and Holden (1990), an inefficient SPE equilibrium 
can take the following form. The union makes very high wage offers that are rejected 
by the firm. Similarly, the firm makes very low wage offers that are also rejected 
by the union. In each of these periods the union then chooses to strike. This 
continues (in equilibrium) for T  periods. After T  periods, a proposition is made 
that is between the high and low wage offers made in the delay periods and this is 
immediately accepted. In equilibrium no party wishes to deviate, despite the loss in 
surplus, because any deviation before period T  is punished thereafter by the other 
party who will play an efficient strategy in every subsequent period, but one that 
adversely affects the deviant.1” As the total time of inefficient bargaining, T  periods, 
can be of substantial length, Fernandez and Glazer argued that the model can 
sustain significant delays in agreement (strikes) as part of an equilibrium strategy.
Busch and Wen (1995) developed a similar model. In their model two players 
make alternating offers for a stream of surplus. If an offer is accepted the parties 
forever share in the flow of surplus in accordance with the agreement. If an offer 
is rejected, before another offer is made, the two parties play a one-shot game, 
known as a disagreement game, to determine their current payoffs. The parties 
cannot contract on moves in this disagreement game. Following the disagreement 
game, the other player makes an offer, and so on. This process continues until an 
agreement is reached. Again, the parties have perfect information. The payoff to 
each player is the sum of their disagreement returns plus their agreement share of 
surplus, all appropriately discounted. To a degree, the authors have combined the
^Note, these history-dependent strategies have similarities to the non-stationary strategies in 
Rubinstein (1985) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) although there is complete information in 
this model. Further, in a similar manner to the trigger-strategy equilibria in infinitely repeated 
games, deviation is not observed in equilibrium because it will trigger a punishment phase.
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alternating-offer bargaining game of Rubinstein with a repeated game.
There are several important elements of the model. The first is that the parties 
can play history-dependent strategies. Second, the inclusion of the disagreement 
game can allow these history-dependent strategies to have an effect on the outcome 
of the game in that a party can be ‘punished’ from deviating from a proposed 
equilibrium path, in much the same as a party can be punished for a deviation 
in an infinitely repeated gamed Provided the disagreement game satisfies certain 
conditions, there are multiple perfect equilibria, some of which involve inefficient 
delayd
Avery and Zemsky (1994b) developed a model to capture the common elements 
of other papers that involved multiple equilibria, delay and threats to reduce total 
surplus. They noted that in all models of this sort there are multiple equilibria 
with immediate agreement. It is the threat that a player will receive their worst 
equilibria payoff that prevents them from making an acceptable offer.
They developed an alternating-offers model in which whenever player 2’s offer 
is rejected she has the option to decrease that period’s non-agreement payoffs or 
increase the discount factor that applies for that period. The authors term this 
ability to reduce surplus ‘money burning’. Although a Rubinstein equilibrium with 
no money burning and immediate agreement always exists, provided player 2 can 
profit from burning money, equilibria involving delay are possible. As above, in 
these equilibria, both players demand the entire share of surplus when making an 
offer and refuse to accept any similar offers from their opponents. Any offers that 
deviate from this path are punished by reverting to the worst equilibrium payoff for 
the deviator. This will be sustained in equilibrium for t periods, provided that t is 
sufficiently small. After time t offers revert to an intermediate share of the surplus
Tn the standard Rubinstein game, history-dependent strategies are ineffectual as, given the 
stationarity of the game, a punishment can only return the parties to identical situation, at a later 
point in time.
* Although this result is similar to the folk theorem with infinitely-repeated games, Busch and 
Wen (1995) noted that the set of possible equilibria is smaller than the potential set of equilibria 
in the disagreement game. This is because the alternating-offers bargaining aspect of the game 
requires the rewards from playing non-Nash strategies in the disagreement game must follow 
immediately given the stationarity of the game.
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and agreement is reached.*
In a somewhat different context, In and Serrano (2000) explored bargaining 
between two parties over several issues. The parties need to accomplish two things: 
first, they need to set an agenda to determine the order in which the issues are to 
be discussed; and, second, they need to resolve each individual issue. The authors 
considered an alternating-offers bargaining procedure that only allows one issue to 
be resolved at a time. Player 1 would make an offer on one, but only one, of 
the remaining issues. Player 2 could then either accept or reject this offer. If she 
accepts the issue is resolved and it is the respondent’s opportunity to make an offer 
concerning one of the remaining issues. If Player 2 rejects player 1 ’s offer there is 
a probability that negotiations will breakdown. If this occurs the game ends. If 
this does not occur, the game continues and player 2’s makes an offer on one of 
the remaining issues. As the players set the agenda, the order that the issues are 
examined is completely endogenous. Further, there is complete information in the 
model.
The bargaining procedure itself contains an inefficiency in that the parties are 
unable to exploit the trade-offs in the marginal rates of substitution between these is­
sues. This inefficiency is accentuated, however, by a large number of non-stationary 
equilibria, some that involve arbitrarily long delays.*
Manzini and Mariotti (1997) examined the effect of an arbitrator on the outcome 
of an alternating-offers model. As usual, player 1 makes an offer over the division 
of surplus. If player 2 accepts this offer the game ends. If she rejects the offer she 
can propose that the parties discontinue bargaining and opt for the arbitrator. If 
the other player agrees to take up this option, the arbitrator divides surplus in a
^Manzini (1997) developed a model in which upon rejection of a union’s offer, the union takes 
an action that reduces the size of the surplus to be bargained over permanently (that is, surplus in 
subsequent periods will be less than 1). In a similar manner, Manzini (1999) allowed the union to 
be able to choose to reduce the total surplus permanently after one of its offers has been rejected. 
Although this destructive power allows its possessor to increase their share of surplus, as it does 
not generate multiple equilibria, it cannot sustain delays in equilibrium.
Tn and Serrano (2000) argued that the multiplicity of equilibria was indicative of a wide range 
of opinions about which items should be discussed first. Disagreement in their model cannot be 
indefinite, however.
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predetermined manner and the game ends. Note, it is costly to use the arbitrator 
(surplus is greater if the parties can agree on a division by themselves) and both 
players know the payoffs they will receive from arbitration (neither party can be 
tricked into accepting arbitration under false pretences). Further, arbitration can 
only be engaged by mutual consent. If player 2’s proposal of arbitration is rejected, 
or if she chose not to exercise it, she then makes a proposal of how to divide the 
surplus to player 1 in the normal manner. The game continues until agreement (or 
an arbitrated outcome) is reached.
Although arbitration is never enacted in equilibrium, the authors find that it 
can dramatically affect the outcome of the bargaining game. For example, the 
outcome of the game is exactly the arbitrated outcome (given arbitration costs are 
sufficiently small) no matter what this outcome is. When players can play non­
stationary strategies, the presence of arbitration can generate delays in bargaining. 
Again, arbitration is never enacted in equilibrium, however, off-the-equilibrium path 
strategies involving the arbitrator can sustain costly delays in bargaining.^
Delays and externalities
Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a) developed a model in which delay may occur 
before trade takes place due to identity-dependent negative externalities between 
the partiesd In the model a seller has an indivisible good that she can sell to one 
of N  potential buyers in any of the T  bargaining periods. In any period the seller 
randomly meets one of the potential buyers. At this point the seller can make an 
offer to that buyer but not to any of the other buyers. The seller is free to make 
an unreasonable offer. This is equivalent to the strategy of making no offer at all. 
After an offer has been made to the nominated buyer, this buyer has the option 
to accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted trade takes place. The seller’s
^McKenna and Sadanand (1995) explored an alternating-offer model in which an arbitrator 
would be enlisted at time T if agreement had not been reached. They found that delay could 
occur until the arbitrator was called upon if the two parties had sufficiently different beliefs about 
how the arbitrator would distribute surplus.
tJehiel and Moldovanu (1995b) also examined delays in bargaining in the presence of 
externalities.
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return is the price p. The buyer’s surplus is his value of the item net of the price 
paid. If trade takes place, the other potential buyers incur a loss that is specific to 
the identity of the buyer. This is typically a negative externality, although it could 
be zero in some cases. If the offer is rejected, the game proceeds to the next period 
unless the period was the last period of the game, in which the game ends. The 
game ends after T  periods even if agreement has not been reached. Provided it is 
not the end of the game, in the period following a rejection a buyer is once again 
randomly paired with the seller, and the bargaining process is as described aboved
In this game both the buyer and seller may be willing to delay agreement, and 
these delays may reduce total ex ante surplus. As an illustration, consider the 
following example taken from Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a). Assume there are 
three potential buyers. Buyers 1 and 2 value the good highly, but they will incur a 
large cost if the item is purchased by buyer 3: they will both incur an external cost 
of either of them purchases the item, but not as large as if buyer 3 gets the good. 
Buyer 3 does not value the good as highly as buyer 1 or 2, and will not suffer any 
external cost no matter who purchases the good.
For the seller, buyers 1 and 2 are more attractive than 3 because not only do 
they value the item more highly, they are also concerned about suffering an external 
cost if buyer 3 purchases the item. The seller may wish to delay making a reasonable 
offer until near the end of the bargaining process so as to make the threat to sell to 
buyer 3 credible. Buyers 1 and 2 will be unwilling to pay the high price until closer 
to the end of the game because each of them hopes that the other will purchase the 
item (at the high price) and save them from buyer 3. It is only when the threat 
that the seller may have no other option than to sell to buyer 3 (because the end 
of the bargaining horizon is approaching) that either 1 or 2 will find it worthwhile
^The structure of the game is motivated by bargaining situations such as when different televi­
sion stations bid for the exclusive telecast rights of special event, like the Olympics. Each station 
may value the rights of this special event differently. The stations that do not end up getting the 
exclusive rights will suffer as their viewing audience will be reduced. Further, this negative exter­
nality will depend on which station acquires the rights, as this determines which of the normal 
programs will be taken off the air. Not all stations will be affected the same, however, as each will 
have different abilities to compete with the special event. Consequently, the negative externality 
incurred by stations from the transaction are identity dependent.
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to endure the high offer price. Buyers 1 and 2 will also delay buying the item in a 
‘war of attrition’ in the hope that the other buyer buys the item instead and saves 
them from buyer 3 (and the high price demanded by the seller).
Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a) noted that delay in their model does not directly 
relate to inefficiency. However, delay may be associated with a loss in total expected 
welfare for certain parameter values (of the private benefit and external costs) as 
there is a positive probability that the item will be sold to the ‘wrong’ consumer, for 
example buyer 3 who has a low value of the item and who generates a high external 
cost.
Frankel (1998) examined a bargaining model in which both parties have the 
opportunity to search for new ideas that enhance total bargaining surplus: the ex­
ternality arises as both parties can benefit from one player’s effort. He considered 
two separate models. First, players can make side payments as part of the bar­
gaining process. In this variant of the model player 1 could make an investment 
that increased the total size of the surplus before entering into an alternating-offers 
bargaining game with player 2. Given that player 2 captures part of the return from 
player l ’s investment, there is underinvestment in creative effort by player 1. This 
result is similar to the underinvestment result of the hold-up literature.* Second, 
Frankel considers when side payments are not allowed (that is, utility is not trans­
ferable and no compensation can be paid). In this case both partes can invest in 
efforts to increase total surplus, however, they strategically restrict their search to 
ideas that benefit them. This imposes a negative externality on the other player. 
There is, however, a positive externality if only one player comes up with an idea. 
Frankel finds that when a player can effectively narrow her search to ideas that give 
her a large share of surplus, there is excessive effort investment in this kind of selfish 
search activity. When the positive externality dominates there will be suboptimal 
investment.
^Depending on the specific assumption concerning the timing of the creative effort, there can 
be an inefficient premature agreement or excessive delay. In either case, however, surplus is not 
maximised.
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Option values and uncertainty
Avery and Zemsky (1994a) examined the effect of uncertainty on delays in bar­
gaining. In their modified alternating-offer game, the two parties bargain over the 
distribution of surplus from the sale of an asset, the value of which is affected by 
exogenous shocks over time.
In each period the value of the asset incurs a positive or negative shock, and 
this shock is observed by both parties via a dividend price for the asset in that 
period. Throughout the game the parties have symmetric information, despite the 
uncertainty about impending shocks. Further, although the shocks are random, the 
authors assume that in the long run the expected value of the asset is unaffected 
by these temporary shocks. Once again this is common knowledge.
The timing of the game is as follows. In any period, one of the parties makes 
an offer to sell the asset at a certain price to the other party. After the offer has 
been made, an exogenous shock affects the value of the asset and the impact of 
this shock is revealed to both parties. It is assumed that the offer price cannot be 
contingent on the new information about the asset (an assumption that is common 
place in the incomplete contracts literature). After observing the shock, the second 
party may accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted trade occurs at the 
agreed price. If not, the opportunity to trade in that period is lost (reducing the 
total available surplus) and the game proceeds to the next period in which the roles 
of the players is reversed. As a result of the timing of the new information about 
the asset, any offer can be treated by the responding party as an option value that 
may be exercised if it is needed. This can act to reduce the offers made by the first 
party.
Delay may occur when players make offers that will only be accepted for some 
asset value realisations (termed ‘separating offer delay’). Avery and Zemsky find 
that if this sort of equilibrium exists it is unique. Alternatively, players may ‘wait’ 
several periods by offering a sequence of unreasonable prices (regardless of the arrival 
of the new information in the form of the dividend prices in those periods). These 
offers are not accepted by the responding party. After a finite number of periods,
41
as in Fernandez and Glazer (1991), an acceptable offer is made and accepted. The 
authors found that if a separating offer delay equilibrium does not exist, there are 
multiple equilibria provided the uncertainty about the asset value is sufficiently 
great.
Result 2.7 summarises the propositions made in the models discussed in this 
section.
Result 2.7 Delays may arise when the bargaining parties have symmetric infor­
mation: if parties play non-stationary strategies in which deviations can be credibly 
punished; in the presence of party specific externalities; and if the parties ar'e un­
certain about the future value of the surplus and are unable to write contingent 
contracts.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter provided a selective review of non-cooperative bargaining models 
and, in particular, their explanations of why costly delays occur. Delays in bargain­
ing arise in equilibrium because of: incomplete information (both one-sided and 
two-sided); the presence of uncertainty; or because of the presence of some market 
failure such as externalities. The discussion also touched on other elements of these 
models that will be relevant in the new explanation of bargaining delay presented 
in the next chapter, specifically that: an outside options only affect the outcome of 
a bargain if they can be credible employed; and the ability to commit (to a particu­
lar offer for example) can potentially affect bargaining outcomes. The model in the 
next chapter provides a new explanation for delays in bargaining. Specifically, delays 
arise due to: an inability of the parties to commit to not renegotiation (incomplete 
contracts); wealth constraints; and there are multiple bargaining periods.
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C H A PT E R  3
Delays in bargaining with incomplete 
contracts
3.1 Introduction
One of the most dramatic industrial confrontations in recent times occurred between 
the newspaper proprietors and the print unions in the United Kingdom during the 
1970s and 1980s over the introduction of photocomposition. This new technology 
allowed copy to be keyed into the computer, newspaper pages to be organised on a 
computer screen, then for the printing plates to be made directly from photographs 
of page bromides (Griffin 1983, p. 42, Martin 1981, p. 30). In terms of out­
put, a linotype operator could set only seven column lines per minute whereas the 
new electronic typesetting technology increased this rate to 3000 column lines per 
minute. Given the tight deadlines of newspapers, this difference was very significant 
(Griffin 1983, p. 42). Photocomposition ‘rendered obsolete many of the craft skills 
possessed by the compositor’ as it ‘removed the need for linotype machines and 
linotype operators’ (Griffin 1983, p. 42)d
The introduction of photocomposition was vehemently opposed by the print 
unions, in particular by the National Graphical Association (NGA) that represented 
linotype operators who set the metal type. Initially the NGA rejected a proposal 
for ‘frontloading’, where journalists and salespeople typeset words directly without 
the use of printers. Another proposal was rejected by Fleet Street union members
^Also see Melvern 1986, p. 5.
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in early 1977 (Willman 1986, p. 127). At The Times between November 1978 
to November 1979 there was an industrial dispute over the introduction of new 
technology. The agreement that resolved this dispute, although establishing a style 
composing-room, was only a partial reform. Further, this dispute enhanced the 
monopoly position of the NGA at other titles such as the Daily Express and the 
Observer (Willman 1986, pp. 128-29). Willman (1986) stated that:
Overall, therefore, the implementation of new technology in national 
newspapers has been substantially delayed by union resistance, in the 
form of strike action and of the imposition of costs (p. 129).
The dispute continued between the Rupert Murdoch, proprietor of the Sun, 
News of the World the Times and Sunday Times and the Fleet Street print unions 
in the 1980s. This dispute was only settled in January 1987.^
Why wasn’t such an obvious surplus enhancing innovation made immediately? 
There are several important characteristics of this dispute. First, as the parties 
were in an on-going relationship it seems implausible that asymmetric information 
between the parties could result in a dispute over ten years longJ Second, as the 
parties were in a long-term relationship any new agreement could act to affect future 
claims on surplus. The introduction of photocomposition would reduce the NGA’s 
bargaining power and control over the workplace as it was their specialist skills, 
and the restriction on supply, that distinguished its members from outside labour 
(Griffin 1983, p. 44). Third, knowing that innovation would reduce their claim 
on future surplus the print unions would require compensation for these losses. In 
this case it was difficult for the companies to provide adequate compensation. For 
example, in 1985 Murdoch’s operation was so highly leveraged that the combined 
earnings of all his companies did not pay his interest bill (Melvern 1986, p. 6). This
^The eventual settlement with the unions was 60 million pounds. This is compared with Drexel 
Burnham’s estimate that the value of Murdoch’s four London papers rose from $300 million to $1 
billion just by moving out of Fleet Street and that profits jumped 85 per cent (Shawcross 1997, p. 
236). This suggests that the innovation clearly increased total surplus.
Tn fact, it was Murdoch’s secret printing plant at Wapping that helped resolve the dispute, 
ending the delay in the introduction of the new technology, rather than the reverse.
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severely limited the amount he could borrow for compensation payments. Fourth, 
the parties were unable to write a contingent contract. The invention of the new 
technology necessitated renegotiation. Further, the labour market was subject to 
recurrent bargaining given the inability of the parties involved not to renegotiate 
(Willman 1983, p. 121) d
The model presented in this paper incorporates the above features to provide 
a new explanation for delays in bargaining. In the model two parties can choose 
to adopt a new innovation in each period of the game. (The basic model has two 
periods.) The innovation generates a known surplus that can be shared between 
the parties. Innovation, however, affects each party’s claim on surplus in future 
periods. When an immediate innovation adversely affects a player’s future payoff, 
that player will only be enticed to accept innovation if the immediate returns are 
sufficiently great so as to compensate her for these future losses. If this is not the 
case, the player will choose to delay, even if this reduces total surplus.
In the print union example above innovation reduced the future bargaining power 
of workers. The removal of a closed shop would have a similar effect. Alternatively, 
a party may wish to delay innovation when the existing contract provides a default 
payoff that it will lose if they agree to the change. That is, innovation changes the 
contract the parties use as a starting point for negotiations rather than altering the 
relative bargaining powers of the parties. For example, some workplace rules provide 
workers with on-the-job leisured By agreeing to change the workers lose their 
default (on-the-job leisure) payoff. This could reduce their claim on surplus in future 
negotiationsd In order to be induced to agree to change the union will need to be
tAlso see Martin (1981) p. 96.
^Workpr act ices may involve: excessive demarcation; double handling; tea breaks or other idle 
time; the use of the same number of workers per machine despite the use of new or improved 
technology; limiting output either per worker or per machine; or requiring excessive overtime 
(Willman 1986, p. 54). Further, technical change may affect current working conditions, work 
allocation or the speed of work, all of which may affect an employee’s surplus (Willman 1986, p. 
47).
^The assumption here is that existing work arrangements affect the bargaining power of each 
party, and hence the distribution of surplus. Cornfield (1987b) suggested ‘changes in labour 
relations arrangements reflect and contribute to the continuous redistribution of authority in the 
employment relationship and, therefore, to the capabilities of labour and management to guide 
their fortunes’ (p. 5).
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compensated for both current and future losses. If this cannot be achieved through 
an adequate compensation package or a credible promise of future payments, a 
union will decline to innovate, even if the change is efficient in the sense that it 
would increase overall surplus.
The different assumptions concerning how innovation affects the bargaining so­
lution generate important alternative predictions. From the basic model, when 
innovation affects the default payoffs a party with a high default, is more likely 
to delay innovation. Further, delay is more likely when expected future surplus 
is lower. On the other hand, a party that loses its bargaining power when facing 
an innovation, as in the print union example, is also likely to oppose innovation. 
Given that it is more likely to face a specific innovation that reduces its bargaining 
power, a craft union is more likely to oppose change than a union with a broader 
constituency. In addition, a party facing an innovation that reduces its bargaining 
power is more likely to delay when future surplus is higher.
Some other recent models have explained delays in the absence of asymmetric 
information in different contexts. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a and 1995b) showed 
that there can be delays in the presence of party-specific externalities. Manzini 
and Mariotti (1997) introduced an arbitrator into an alternating-offers game with 
complete information, where the arbitrator can be called on by mutual consent. 
They find that, although never enacted in equilibrium, the mere presence of the 
arbitrator can result in delays. In Avery and Zemsky (1994a) there is symmetric 
uncertainty about the value of the bargain in the future. A party may wish to stall 
agreement in this situation as delay entails some option value. Last, Fernandez and 
Glazer (1991) showed that delay can arise in a model with complete information 
when parties play Pareto inefficient non-stationary strategies.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the model and section 
3.3 describes the bargaining solution used. This paper uses the same reduced form 
bargaining solution as adopted by Chiu (1998); this bargaining solution is based on 
the infinite horizon alternating offer model with outside options of Shaked and Sut­
ton (1982). In addition, the parties can make additional compensation payments
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subject to their limited funds. Section 3.4 explores the conditions necessary for 
delay when innovation alters the default payoffs of the parties and examines the 
comparative statics of the model. Section 3.5 investigates delay when innovation 
erodes bargaining power, as in the print union example. The predictions of the 
alternative models are outlined in section 3.6. Section 3.7 compares this new model 
with the literature. The model presented here has strong links to the hold-up liter­
ature. In the incomplete contracts literature a party may inefficiently (under)invest 
when they do not expect to receive the entire return from their investment.I In con­
trast to much of that literature, however, the innovation in this paper is cooperative 
in that it (potentially) generates a benefit for both players. Far fewer papers have 
studied the hold-up problem in the presence of cooperative investments, several no­
table exceptions being MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a), Che and Haush (1999) 
and Che and Chung (1999).
Section 3.8 extends the basic model in several ways: first, it extends the analysis 
to both a three period and an infinite horizon model; second, it reiterates how delay 
may arise due to the inability of parties to commit not to renegotiate; third, it 
discusses the implications for delay with specific and general investments (reform); 
and fourth, the section briefly discusses delay when there is more than one potential 
innovation in each period. Applications of the model are discussed in section 3.9. 
Finally, section 3.10 summarises the findings of the paper.
3.2 The model
This section outlines the model. There are two potential trading partners, de­
noted here as the buyer and seller. These parties may represent, for example, 
a worker or her representative (seller) and a firm (buyer), however, these terms 
should be interpreted in the broadest sense. All that is important is that they are 
two parties negotiating about the introduction of a surplus enhancing change in the 
relationship.
^See Grout (1984) and Hart and Moore (1988).
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3.2.1 Timing
Figure 3.1 shows the time line of the model. There are two trading periods. At 
time t = 1 there is an existing relationship between the parties given by a default 
contract. This contract could merely describe the parties’ existing relationship. Al­
ternatively, it could represent a social norm or precedent. This pre-existing contract 
acts as the default contract for the parties, discussed below.
t = 1 t = 2 t = 3
T\ , v\ revealed Trade r2, v2 revealed Trade End
Renegotiation Renegotiation Same
Figure 3.1: Time line of the model
At this point, an exogenous shock occurs. In the print union example this shock 
was the development of the new computer technology. As a result of the exogenous 
event it is revealed to both parties that if the seller performs task T\ surplus v\ 
accrues to the buyer. Further, the performance of T\ is incompatible with the 
activity (and payoff) the seller receives under the default contract. For example, 
the default contract may involve some on-the-job leisure for the seller. The new 
task Ti, on the other hand, could require the seller to work harder or at a constant 
speed. If the worker agrees to make the innovation she can no longer receive her 
default surplus.
After this information is revealed to both of the players, the two parties can 
renegotiate the initial (default) contract. The bargaining process is discussed in 
section 3.3, however, a new contract can only be implemented by mutual consent. 
After renegotiation, trade occurs according to the conditions of the existing contract
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(either the default contract if at least one party rejected change or according to the 
new contract if both parties agreed to innovate). Note also that neither party can 
be forced to trade if they would receive a negative payoff. After trade, each party 
receives their first period payoff.
The game then proceeds to the next period. This additional period captures the 
on-going nature of the relationship between the parties. The second period has the 
same structure as the first. The existing contract acts as the default for both parties. 
Once again, an exogenous event occurs. In light of this new information, it becomes 
apparent to the two parties that the performance of r2 by the seller generates surplus 
V2 for the buyer. This is revealed to both parties and they can then renegotiate their 
default contract. After renegotiation, trade takes place according to the conditions 
of the relevant contract, the players receive their payoffs and the game ends.
3.2.2 Assumptions
Under the initial default contract at t = 1 the seller receives surplus of b G [0, Vl), 
where Vl  is defined below, and the buyer’s return is normalised to zero. These 
payoffs can be thought of as being net returns.
Prior to each period both parties are uncertain about the specific task r t required, 
and the potential surplus associated with it. Further, the expected potential surplus 
in each period is drawn from vt G {vl, vh}> where vl <  Vh • Vl is the potential 
surplus at time t with probability p, and vh is the potential surplus at time t with 
probability (1 — p). Note, however, that the potential value of vt is revealed to the 
parties at the same time as rt . As such, there is no uncertainty regarding vt at 
the time of renegotiation in period t. Also note that the performance of rt only 
generates surplus in that period. Assumption 3.1 summarises these points.
Assumption 3.1 At time t, rt is revealed. I f  rt is performed by the seller at time 
t it generates surplus vt G {vl,vh} for the buyer where vl < vh• vl occurs with 
probability p and the surplus equals vh with probability (1 — p) . However, at time 
t the relevant vt is known to both parties. The initial default return to the seller is
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b G [0,vL).
Note that as b < vl innovation must occur in every period in order for total 
available surplus to be maximised. This is summarised in the following remark.
Remark 3.1 Given Assumption 3.1, adoption of the innovation is efficient in every 
period.
Prior to its revelation, t \ cannot be contracted upon. After it has been revealed 
r t becomes verifiable and the two parties may write a contract on this variable. On 
the other hand, the potential surplus vt is never verifiable, even in period t. As 
such, a surplus sharing rule is not a permissible contract. This is similar to assump­
tions elsewhere in the literature. For example, in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) a 
firm’s profit is unverifiable to the financier preventing the parties from writing an 
‘enforceable profit-contingent contract’ (p. 95). These points are summarised in 
Assumption 3.2.
Assumption 3.2 rt is not verifiable prior to period t. At time t it may then be 
contracted upon. vt is not verifiable at any point in time.
Remark 3.2 As a consequence of Assumption 3.2, it is not possible for the two 
parties to write a contract specifying a surplus sharing arrangement.
The assumption concerning the ex ante non-verifiability of rt and vt prevents 
the parties writing a complete contract at the beginning of the game.
It is assumed that the seller must perform the task r t , perhaps because of special­
isation. Consequently, as in Hart and Moore (1988) and MacLeod and Malcomson 
(1993a), the buyer and the seller may not vertically integrate to overcome their 
bargaining problem. This is stated in Assumption 3.3.
Assumption 3.3 The buyer and the seller may not vertically integrate.
An important element of the model relates to the parties’ inability to provide 
complete up-front compensation. To simplify the analysis it is assumed that neither
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party has access to outside sources of finance and wealth is normalised to zero. 
Although this seems like an extreme assumption, it is not essential that the parties 
have zero wealth or no borrowing capabilities. All that is important is that the 
parties access to funds is limited in comparison with the compensation required. 
Limited ability to borrow funds may arise because the parties could expropriate 
surplus or manipulate financial reports. Another reason why feasible compensation 
could be limited is that utility may not be able to be transferred between parties, 
or there may be limits on such transfers. This would be the case when one of the 
parties received a payoff that was intrinsic to themselves. At the extreme there 
could be no transfer between parties.* Assumption 3.4 summarises these points.
A ssu m p tion  3 .4  The wealth of both parties is normalised to zero, net of access to 
external finance.
Assumptions 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 are important because if the parties could integrate, 
for example, by the buyer selling stock to the seller or by the creation of a surplus 
sharing rule, the incentives to delay innovation could be eliminated. Indeed, in his 
model of specific investments and hold-up, Williamson (1983) used the integration 
outcome as his first-best benchmark. Likewise, if the buyer could borrow against 
future earnings, full compensation could be paid to the other party at the outset of 
the bargaining process, allowing innovation to occur immediately.
After the potential reform rt is revealed to the parties at time t , they can decide 
whether or not to adopt the innovation. Due to the primacy of the default con­
tract, it is assumed both parties must agree to the change. This is summarised in 
Assumption 3.5.
A ssu m p tion  3.5 Innovation can only occur by mutual consent.
This is similar to the model of Hart and Moore (1988) where it was assumed that 
both parties have a switch with ‘yes’ and ‘no’ options. For trade to occur in their
* Frankel (1998) studied bargaining when both utility is transferable (so that side payments 
are allowed) and when it is not (no side payments are allowed).
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model both parties were required to have the switch on ‘yes’- This is equivalent to 
the trade rule in the extensive-form game of MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a and 
1993b).f
The objective of both of the parties is to maximise their expected surplus. To 
simplify the analysis, the parties do not discount second period payoffs. The inclu­
sion of discount factors would only serve to scale second period returns.
3.3 The bargaining solution
The division of surplus resulting from renegotiation is composed of two elements.
First, this model adopts the reduced form bargaining solution used by Chiu 
( 1 9 9 8 ) In the game outside options only affect the division of surplus if players 
can credibly commit to engaging them in the appropriate subgames. If this is not 
the case the outside options do not provide a credible threat and do not affect the 
outcome of the game.
As shown in the property rights literature (see Chiu 1998, De Meza and Lock- 
wood 1998) the form of bargaining solution used can significantly alter the outcome 
of the game. Consequently, it is important that the bargaining solution chosen is 
appropriate to the applications in mind. Here, the outside option rule is appropriate 
as the assumption is the outside option (default) can only be enacted if negotiations 
are abandoned for that period. As a consequence, the seller is unable to adopt the 
option while continuing to bargain (as would be the case with an inside option). 
The threat to enact the default option will only be credible if it is binding.
Consider the bargaining solution that applies in the first period if there is in­
novation in that period or in the second period provided innovation did not occur 
previously. If, upon renegotiation, the parties agree to adopt a new contract in
*Also see Malcomson’s (1997) discussion of fixed price contracts.
tThis bargaining solution is, in fact, a reduced form solution based on the alternating-offers 
bargaining game with outside options of Shaked and Sutton (1984).
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preference to the default, they divide the surplus in the following manner:
{avu (1 -  a)vt} if b < avt\ or (3.1)
{b,vt — 6} if b > avt. (3.2)
where the first element is the return to the seller, the second the return to the buyer 
and a G [0,1].
Temporarily ignoring the outside option, if innovation occurs the parties split 
the surplus with the seller and buyer receiving a  and (1 — a) of the total available 
surplus respectively. This is the solution presented in equation 3.1. In this case 
a reflects the relative bargaining power of each of the players in the renegotiation 
process. *
As discussed above, when the seller’s share of the surplus inside the relationship 
(avt) is less than the outside option, the seller receives a payment equal to her 
default payoff b. This is the bargaining solution presented in equation 3.2.
In the current model the seller has an outside option b provided by the default 
contract. In the incomplete contracts literature, ownership of an asset affects the 
default payoffs of a party. In Chiu (1998) the outside payoffs for the parties are 
determined by their asset ownership.1” In this model the adoption (or otherwise) of 
a potential innovation affects the default payoffs of the parties and their claim on 
surplus.
Now consider the bargaining outcome in period t = 2. As rt only generates 
surplus in period £, if innovation occurred in the first period the period t = 1 contract 
(specifying the performance of ri) generates no surplus in the second period. It is
^The relative bargaining strength of the players perhaps reflects each party’s expectation of 
making the first offer, as in MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a) and Sutton (1986). Alternatively, 
it may relate to exogenous rates of time preference (Rubinstein 1982). Another possible inter­
pretation is that a  reflects the perceived probability of a irreconcilable exogenous breakdown in 
bargaining (Binmore et al 1986). It may also reflect a party’s position in the market place. (This 
issue is discussed further in section 3.5.)
tChiu (1998) explored the effect of altering the bargaining solution on Grossman and Harts’ 
(1986) predictions concerning asset ownership. Specifically, Chiu changes the inside options in 
Grossman and Hart (1986) to outside options. Also see De Meza and Lockwood (1998).
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assumed that neither party can be forced to undertake a trade that yields a negative 
utility. Clearly, the first period innovation contract will provide the buyer with a 
negative surplus in period t = 2 as T\ generates no surplus while the contract requires 
a payment to be made to the seller. In this case the buyer will opt for not to trade. 
Consequently, despite the t = 1 contract, the effective default for the parties is the 
no-trade payoff. Moreover, as innovation has already occurred, the seller’s initial 
default payoff b no longer applies. As such, after innovation in the first period, the 
default payoffs in t =  2 are zero for both the buyer and the seller.
Following the discussion above, if innovation has previously occurred, the bar­
gaining solution then reduces to:
{avt, (1 -  a)vt} (3.3)
if the parties agree to innovate at time t = 2.
Second, in addition to the division of surplus specified by the bargaining rule, 
either party can offer a transfer Ft to the other party paid for out of their share of the 
surplus. The inclusion of this additional fixed payment allows either party to pay 
compensation to the other for any future costs (or potential losses) that result from 
innovation. Ft is an intertemporal transfer that can be considered as separate from 
the extensive form bargaining game that results in the division of surplus outlined 
above. In fact, one of the purposes of the model is to explore situations in which a 
party may refuse to innovate despite the presence of compensation. Again returning 
to the union-firm workplace negotiation example, Ft could represent redundancy 
payments or a sign on bonus. As a convention Ft is a payment made by the buyer 
to the seller. As both parties cannot borrow and have zero wealth, Ft cannot exceed 
the amount of surplus available to the party in that period. (In the second period 
the party has access to the surplus they have received from both period t =  1 and 
period t = 2. Second period fixed payments can be made by a player using their 
first period returns. However, this does not turn out to be an issue in this game.) 
The total payoffs to either party are their bargaining returns net of any transfer
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payments.
3.4 Delay in bargaining
The objective of each player is to maximise their expected total surplus over 
the entire game. As this is two period model with symmetric information the game 
may be solved by backwards induction so as to find the subgame perfect equilibrium 
(SPE). This section breaks down the analysis of the game into stages. The first 
stage analyses the second period innovation decision of both parties. The second 
stage analyses the buyer’s first period decision. The next stage assesses the seller’s 
decision to innovate in the first period when v\ =  vl for various values of b. The final 
stage analyses the seller’s decision to adopt the first period reform when v\ = vh-
The main objective of this analysis is to assess whether a delay in innovation 
can exist as part of a SPE.
3.4.1 Second period reform
First, consider the decision to adopt innovation in the second period for both of 
the parties. Reform will always occur in the second period, regardless of the outcome 
in the first period. If reform occurred in the first period the default contract is the 
period t =  1 agreement. As noted above, the performance of T\ in period t — 2 
does not generate any surplus for the buyer. The t — 1 contract will also require a 
payment from the buyer to the seller. As a result, the buyer will not trade on the 
terms of this contract as his return would be negative. The buyer would choose not 
to trade according to the default contract as he prefers the zero payoff of no trade. 
Consequently, the effective default return of the seller is also zero, as there will be 
no trade in the second period with the period t = 1 contract. Further, as reform 
occurred in the first period, the seller will not receive her initial default surplus of b.
Once r2 and v2 are revealed the parties can renegotiate from the default contract. 
As both parties have a default payoff of zero, if they agree to innovate the division 
of surplus is {au2, (1 — a)i>2} to the seller and buyer respectively. Clearly, it is in the
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interests of both parties to agree to innovation in this situation. No fixed payment 
(F2) is required to encourage one party or the other to agree to the second period 
innovation.
Now consider the decision whether or not to innovate in period t = 2 when no 
innovation took place in the first period. Again, once t2 and u2 have been revealed 
the parties have the opportunity to renegotiate and adopt the innovation. In this 
case the default payoffs for each of the parties are given by the initial defaults; 
that is, b and zero for the seller and buyer respectively. (See the description of 
the bargaining solution in section 3.3.) From Assumption 3.1, b < u2 G {vl,Vh }- 
Consequently, the parties can increase total surplus in the second period by adopting 
the innovation. Given that the second period is the last in the game, there is no 
strategic advantage to either party from delaying innovation. Further, as innovation 
increases total surplus, at least one party can be made better off without making 
the other party worse off. Consequently, both parties will always adopt the second 
period innovation. (The division of the surplus is given by equation 3.1 or 3.2.)*
In summary, both parties will agree to innovation in the second period, regardless 
of the outcome in the first period. This is summarised in Result 3.1.
Result 3.1 Innovation will always occur in period t = 2, regardless of the outcome 
in the first period.
Proof. See Appendix A. □
The following remark relates directly to Result 3.1 and Assumption 3.1.
Remark 3.3 As innovation always occurs in period t = 2 total surplus is maximised 
in the second period.
Tn fact, the buyer will always be made better off by reform in the second period, whereas the 
seller may receive the same payoff as she would have received had innovation not occurred. To see 
this note that by definition b < vl - As a result, the two alternative payoffs for the buyer, u2 — b 
and (1 — a)v2 , are always positive. For the seller, the second period return from innovation is at 
least as good as her default payoff: if b < av2, her return is greater with innovation; if 6 > au2 
her return is the same with innovation as it is without it. Given this indifference we assume that 
she will agree to reform as it does not make her worse off. Alternatively, we could assume that 
the buyer undertakes to make a fixed payment F2 =  e where e is arbitrarily small so as to make 
the seller strictly prefer innovation.
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Following from Remark 3.3, if any welfare loss occurs it will occur in the first 
period.
An important element of Result 3.1 is that in equilibrium neither player requires 
any compensation (or additional encouragement) to agree to reform, as both players 
weakly prefer innovation over no innovation. As such, F2 =  0 , as summarised in 
the following remark.
Remark 3.4 In equilibrium, F2 = 0.
3.4.2 The buyer’s first period decision
Now consider the buyer’s decision to innovate in the first period. The buyer will 
never wish to delay innovation at t =  1 . The intuition for this result is as follows. 
The buyer can only do better in the second stage from innovation in period t =  1 as 
the seller loses her default, improving the buyer’s claim on future surplus in some 
cases. The worst the buyer can do in the first period if innovation occurs is to earn 
a return of zero. This would occur when the additional inducement payment to the 
seller Fi was equal to his entire bargaining claim of surplus in the first period. So, 
if the parties reform at t =  1 , in the first period the buyer is never worse off than 
when there is no innovation. Likewise, when there is first period innovation the 
buyer is never worse off in the second period. It thus appears that the buyer weakly 
prefers reform in the first period, however, as it turns out the buyer strictly prefers 
first period innovation. This is because when the buyer is indifferent in period t = 1 
he will strictly gain from first period innovation in the second period of the game, 
as summarised by Result 3.2.
Result 3.2 The buyer never wishes to delay innovation in the first period.
Proof. See Appendix A. □
The result allows us to focus on the seller’s decision to delay. Clearly, as the 
buyer will always agree to innovation in the first period, it is the seller in this model 
who may act strategically to delay innovation.
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Another important element of Result 3.2 is that the buyer will be willing to 
forgo his entire claim on first period surplus, via the fixed payment Fi, to induce 
the seller to accept innovation at t = 1. This is restated in the following remark.
Remark 3.5 In equilibrium, if necessary the buyer is willing to set the fixed pay­
ment F\ equal to his entire bargaining share of v\ .
3.4.3 The seller’s first period decision when v i=  \ l
The seller’s decision to delay or adopt the innovation depends on the relative 
payoffs of two alternatives, namely her two period payoff from delaying innovation 
in the first period (and accepting it in the second period) and her total payoff from 
accepting innovation at t =  1. If she delays innovation in the first period, her total 
payoff is her default b in the first period plus her claim on second period surplus. 
(From Result 3.1, innovation will always occur in the second period.) If the seller 
accepts first period innovation her total expected utility is her first period claim on 
surplus, plus any fixed payments Fi from the buyer, as well as her claim on second 
period surplus given innovation in the first period. In any SPE, the seller will act 
to maximise her expected utility from both periods.
Consider the seller’s decision in period t = 1 when v\ =  vl- If b < oivl the 
seller’s surplus from agreement in the first period is oivl , not considering, at this 
stage, any additional payment F\ from the buyer. Thus, anticipating the outcome 
the bargaining game in the second period given that innovation has occurred in the 
first period, the expected total surplus of the seller from both periods is oivl +  owf, 
where v\ is the expected surplus in the second period. That is, v\ =  pvl + (1 —p)vh. 
Alternatively, if the seller chooses to delay reform in the first period she will receive 
a payoff equal to her (default) outside option, b. Again, anticipating her claim on 
the surplus in the second period, her total expected utility is b + av\.
In this case, it is apparent that the seller will never wish to delay innovation. To 
see this consider the expected delay payoff minus the expected payoff to the seller 
when she accepts first period innovation (without any F\). This relative payoff is
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b —  a v L  < 0. If V \  = v l  and b < a v L  first period innovation is always in the interests 
of the seller as she does better with innovation than without it. Further, as reform 
is in the seller’s interests, the buyer does not need to offer any additional payment 
Fi to induce the seller to adopt change.
Now consider the case when avL < b < avn- If the seller accepts first period 
innovation her expected payoff is b + av\ plus any fixed payment Fi forthcoming. 
(This is because when olVl < b the seller’s default is binding if innovation takes 
place.) On the other hand, if the seller delays first period innovation her expected 
utility is b + pb +  (1 —  p)ctvm  where pb +  (1 —  p )avn  is the expected second period 
return for the seller. (This is the case as the outside option is only binding if u2 = vl, 
which occurs with probability p. If u2 = vjj, which occurs with probability (1 — p), 
the default is not binding and the seller simply receives a share (1 — a) of v#.) The 
relative payoffs from when the seller delays innovation and when she agrees to it 
is p(b — olvl) > 0. As the return from delay exceeds the expected return to the 
seller from immediate innovation, the buyer needs to make a payment F\ to the 
seller to make her at least indifferent between the payoff when she delays innovation 
as compared with when innovation occurs immediately. As the buyer has limited 
funds, he can only make a payment out of his claim on the first period’s surplus. 
Thus, the largest possible F\ the buyer can make is vl — b. Thus, delay will only 
occur when the buyer cannot adequately compensate the seller for the loss she will 
incur if innovation occurs in the first period (relative to her expected delay payoff). 
That is,
Buyer’s funds < Net gain to seller from delay.
Thus delay will occur if
vl — b < p[b — avL] (3.4)
or if
b > vL
(1 +  otp)
(i + p ) '
(3.5)
Of course, if b < the buyer will be able (and willing) to adequately com-
pensate the seller. If this is the case, the seller will agree to immediate reform.
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Clearly, if 6 < , the buyer will set F\ < vl — b, so as to make the seller
just indifferent between reform and delay. A larger Fi would not alter the seller’s 
decision to innovate but would merely act to reduce the buyer’s surplus. (The 
implicit assumption here is that the buyer has all the bargaining power as regards 
to the compensation payment F\. Any alternative assumption, for example the 
assumption that the seller can make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer, will not 
affect the incidence of delay. It will merely act to alter the distribution of surplus.)
Now consider when v^  > b > avß. Remember, by assumption, b < vl- If the 
seller delays first period innovation her expected surplus is b +  b. Here, she receives 
her default in the both periods, as her outside option is binding in the second 
period bargain. Alternatively, if the seller agrees to innovation in the first period 
her expected return is 6 +  avf , plus any fixed payment F\ . Her bargaining claim in 
the first period is b as her outside option is binding. In this case, the seller’s delay 
payoff relative to her innovation payoff, without any fixed payments, is b — av\ > 0. 
The seller requires some compensation for t = 1 innovation. Adequate compensation 
is not possible if Fi < 6 — a v This is the case when
vl — b < b — av\ (3.6)
or if
b>  i (u L +  au^). (3.7)
On the other hand, if 6 < \{v>L+av|), the buyer can provide the seller with adequate 
compensation, and innovation will be immediate.
The discussion above is summarised in the following result.
Result 3.3 (a) Ifvi  = v l , the seller will accept innovation in the first period when: 
(i) b < avL,‘ (H) avL < b < avn and b < vl / and (in) vl < b < avn and
b < ^(vL+avI), (b) The seller will delay innovation in the first period when v\ = vl 
if: (i) avL < b < avH and b > ŷ ~ py-~; or if (ii) vL < b <  avH and b > ^(vL+av |).
Proof. See Appendix A. □
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Result 3.3(b) demonstrates that in certain circumstances the seller may act 
strategically and delay the adoption of a surplus enhancing innovation so as to in­
crease her overall expected payoff. If agreement reduces a player’s claim on future 
surplus they will require some compensation if they are to accept the change. With­
out sufficient up-front compensation, or a credible commitment to future payments, 
a party may wish to delay a surplus enhancing innovation. Consequently, at the end 
of period t = 1, even though it may appear that the parties have forgone a potential 
Pareto reform, they are in fact maximising their own surplus in the multi-period 
game. Further, where appropriate, a bargain should be considered as a continuing 
relationship as this significantly alters the analysis.
Following from Remark 3.1, when delay occurs total surplus is not maximised. 
This is summarised in the following corollary.
C orollary 3.1 If Result 3.3(b) holds, so that innovation is delayed, total surplus is 
not maximised.
Proof. Let Wd denote the total surplus shared between the two parties over 
the two periods when there was no innovation in period t = 1. Similarly, let WA 
denote total surplus when there is first period innovation and A W  = Wd — WA. As 
Wd =  b + v\ and WA =  vl +  v\ A W  = b — vl < 0. If there is no t = 1 innovation - 
that is, Result 3.3(b) holds - surplus is not maximised. □
Now consider some comparative statics of the model. Define AU as the seller’s 
expected payoff over the two periods from delaying agreement minus her expected 
payoff over the two periods if she accepts innovation in the first period d Each 
of the equations below relates to the seller’s decision to innovate when she is just 
indifferent between innovation and delay, that is, when AU = 0. Consider first the 
effect of b when V\ = vl and avL < b < avn'
dAU/db = p +  1 > 0. (3.8)
* Specifically, let Up be the seller’s ex ante expected utility when she does not agree to the first 
period innovation. Further, let U% be the seller’s ex ante expected utility when she does agree to 
the period t =  1 innovation. From this, AU = Up — U
61
An increase in the outside option b increases the incentive for the seller to delay. 
By accepting innovation, the seller gives up her outside option in the second period 
- this is a cost of innovation. An increase in b means that the outside option allows 
the seller to capture more surplus in the second period when v2 =  vl- This means 
it is less likely that the buyer can provide adequate compensation. Further, an 
increase in b increases the seller’s default payoff in the first period, decreasing the 
cost of forgoing that period’s surplus from reform (in the form of payment Fi).
Further, note that as delay becomes more likely as b increases, the loss in sur­
plus decreases. This suggests that the innovations that will be stalled are those 
that provide only small increases in surplus. Conversely, the model suggests that 
significant reforms are more likely to be accepted immediately as they are more 
likely to generate enough surplus to make compensation possible.
Next, consider the effect of a change in or.
dAU/da = —pvL < 0. (3.9)
An increase in a  decreases the incentive for the seller to delay first period innovation. 
a represents the seller’s claim on surplus in any period when the default is irrelevant. 
Thus a higher a indicates that the seller will get a greater share of the surplus from 
any innovation, disregarding the default. As well as meaning that the seller is more 
likely to be the beneficiary of any innovation, given that b will bind only when 
V2 = vl an increase in a reduces the cost of forgoing this default, decreasing the 
compensation needed to induce innovation.
Both b and a represent different forms of bargaining strength, b represents 
a historical default or contractual right that acts as a minimum the seller must 
receive. On the other hand, a could represent current bargaining strength in the 
renegotiation process, a represents the seller’s negotiation skills or patience relative 
to those of the buyer, regardless of any historical options. Although there may be 
some correlation between b and a, this is not necessarily the case. For example, a 
union may have as a default position rights and conditions that were obtained in
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a different bargaining environment. In negotiations, the union can then refuse any 
change that fails to provide its members with at least the same level of surplus as 
this default. However, unions may differ in their ability to bargain with an employer 
in the absence of a default.
Next consider the effect of Vl and p when v\ = vl and cxvl < b < avn-
dAU/dvL = — (1 +  ap) < 0; (3.10)
and
dAU/dp = b — avL > 0. (3-11)
An increase in vl decreases the incentive for the seller to delay first period innova­
tion. An increase in Vl increases the probability that the buyer can afford adequate 
compensation, in part because an increase in vl decreases the potential losses to the 
seller in the second period from giving up her default and also because it increases 
the potential first period payment iq the buyer can make. An increase in p increases 
the incentive to delay because it increases the chance that v2 =  rq, in which case 
b will bind, increasing the probability that the seller is giving up a real claim on 
second period surplus from accepting t — 1 innovation.
Similarly, the comparative statics when v\ =  vl and vh > b > cxvl are as follows:
dAU/db = 2 > 0; (3.12)
dAUIda  =  - v \  < 0; (3.13)
dAU/dvL = — (1 +  <ap) < 0; (3-14)
dAU/dp  = — avL + avH > 0; (3.15)
and
dAU/dvn = —a ( l  — p) < 0. (3.16)
The only additional variable considered here is vh- An increase in vh decreases
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the expected loss from innovation at t = 1 in the second period as it increases the 
seller’s bargaining claim when v<i = vh-
3.4.4 T he  se lle r’s first period  decision w hen  v i =  v #
Now consider the case when v\ = vh- The seller will go through the same decision 
process as before. Specifically, she will compare the two period payoff if she delays in 
the first period with the payoff she would expect to receive when innovation occurs 
at t = 1. Delay will occur when first period compensation is insufficient to cover 
expected future losses. Result 3.4 summarises the seller’s decision when V\ = vh-
Result 3.4 (a) I f vi = vh, the seller never wishes to delay when: (i) b < cxvl; 
(ii) b G (cxvli &Vh) and b < (apvL +  vh)/(  1 +  p); and if b G (>olVh ,Vl) and b < 
\{vh +  uvI). (b) I f vi =  vh, the seller will delay first period innovation if: (i) 
b G (avL,a vH) and b > (apvL + Vh )/(  1 +  p) ; (ii) or if b E ((xvh , vl) and b > 
VH {1+a(t P)) +  f  VL =  \ ( V H  + CWS).
Proof. See Appendix A. □
As noted above, if innovation is not adopted immediately total surplus is not 
maximised.
C orollary 3.2 I f Result 3.4(b) holds total surplus is not maximised.
Proof. Following the proof of Corollary 1, Wp  =  b +  v\ and Wa = Vh + vf. As 
such, A W  = b — Vh < 0. Consequently, delay in innovation reduces total surplus. 
□
Another important element of this result is that the range of parameter values 
in which delay occurs in equilibrium when v\ =  vh is smaller than when v\ =  Vl - 
If b G (oivl, olvh) and V\ — vl, delay will only occur if 6 > . In comparison,
if b G (avL,avH) and v\ =  Vh , delay requires that b > (apvi + vh)/( 1 +  p)- 
Similarly, if b G [oivh, vl), delay requires that b > \ ( vl + auf) if V\ = Vl , whereas if 
Vi = Vh , for delay to be part of a SPE it needs to be the case that b > \{yn + auf).
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This is not surprising. Delay occurs when the buyer is unable to provide adequate 
compensation to  the seller for her loss in future surplus, or her potential claim on 
future surplus. W hen V\ =  v h , the buyer has more surplus with which to make 
compensation payments.
The comparative statics of the seller’s first period when v\  =  vh and b G 
{ o c v l j Q V h ) are:
dAU /db  =  ( 1 + p )  > 0; (3.17)
d A U / d a  =  — pvl < 0; (3.18)
dAU/dvL = —ap < 0; (3.19)
d A U /d p  = b — avL > 0; (3.20)
d A  U /dvH =  —1 < 0 (3.21)
The equations below show the comparative statics relating to  the seller’s decision 
to delay innovation in the first period when V\ = Vh  and b G (olvh^v l )'
dAU /db  = 2 > 0 (3.22)
d A U / d a  = —v\ < 0 (3.23)
dAU/dvL  =  —ap < 0 (3.24)
d A U /d p  =  — a v L  +  o l v h  > 0 (3.25)
d A U /d v H = —l — a ( l  — p) < 0 (3.26)
The interpretation of the comparative statics is broadly the same as when v\ =  Vl - 
An increase in b increases the incentive for the seller to delay innovation in the first 
period. Conversely, an increase in a  decreases the seller’s incentive to delay. An
increase in vl decreases the incentive to delay, whereas an increase in p increases
65
the incentive for the seller. An increase in Vh decreases the incentive for the seller 
to delay, however, in this case as V\ = vh, an increase in vh makes it more likely 
that adequate compensation is feasible.
3.5 Drastic innovation and bargaining power
Some reforms or innovations dramatically alter a party’s potential bargaining 
power. For example, the removal of a closed shop could reduce a union’s ability to 
exact surplus. Realising that such a reform will affect its future negotiating potency, 
a union would require additional concessions if it were to be induced to accept such a 
reform. More generally, any innovation that shifts a party (the buyer) from a specific 
to a general relationship will drastically reduce the other party’s bargaining power.*  
Another example would be a reform that eliminates the need for the special skills 
of a particular agent in the production process so that other (outside) parties can 
compete for supply. As their skill or input is no longer essential, innovation causes 
the agent to lose their leverage over the other bargaining agent. To distinguish 
clearly the two different potential effects of innovation, denote an innovation that 
reduces the seller’s contemporaneous bargaining power as a ‘drastic’ innovation.
To examine delays in bargaining with drastic innovation consider the following 
alterations to the basic model. First, suppose the seller’s initial default is zero 
(6 =  0). In the first bargaining period, if the agreement occurs the division of 
surplus is {aui, (1 — a)ui} to the seller and buyer respectively. If not, each player 
receives a payoff of zero (their default payoff). In the second bargaining period 
assume the bargaining rule is altered such that if innovation has occurred at time 
t =  1 all of the surplus accrues to the buyer; that is, the division is {0, Ui}.* Clearly, 
innovation eliminates any claim that the seller might have on surplus in future 
periods. If, on the other hand, no innovation took place in the first period, the 
division of surplus is {ctvt, (1 — a)ut} for the buyer and seller respectively, as given
^See Shaked and Sutton (1984).
*An alternative model might not have reform reduce a  completely, but rather have innovation 
reduce a  by a fraction between zero and one.
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by equation 3.1.
As discussed previously, innovation will occur in the last period regardless of 
the outcome in the first period. Thus, if agreement occurred in the first period, 
the seller’s expected return is zero (regardless of the value of uf). If reform did not 
occur, the period t = 2 expected return for the seller is av\ =  apv^ +  a ( l  — v)vh- 
In the first period, when deciding whether or not to agree to immediate innova­
tion, the seller will take into account the potential loss in the second period. Delay 
will occur when
F\ +  avi < apvL +  a ( l  — p)vh- (3.27)
As the buyer never wishes to delay innovation, he is willing to make the fixed 
payment equal to the highest feasible payment; that is, he is willing to set F\ = 
(1 —  ol)v\. As such, delay will occur when
av i +  (1 — a)v i = v\ < apvL +  <a(l — p)vn- (3.28)
From this, when v\ = vl, the seller will delay innovation in period t = 1 when
vL < a( 1 ~ p)vh(1 — ap)
(3.29)
If v\ = vh , delay never occurs in equilibrium because the seller can always receive 
adequate compensation for her loss in future bargaining power.
Unlike the basic model, the incentive to delay is increasing in a
dAU/da = v\ >  0 . (3.30)
This, at first appearance, is a seemingly different result to prediction of the previous 
section. In the basic model the default b represented historical bargaining strength, 
and a seller was more likely to delay innovation in the first period, at the margin, 
given an increase in b. Innovation, however, caused the seller to lose this default. In 
the model in this section, innovation diminishes the bargaining power of one of the 
parties. As such, what the seller forgoes by accepting innovation in the first period
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is increasing in a. In this manner, the results relating to these two variables are 
consistent.
3.6 Predictions of the model
The two different specifications allow for different predictions, however. The 
first two predictions below relate to the basic model. The third relates to the model 
of drastic innovation. The last contrasts the two models.
Prediction 3.1 A party with a strong historical position (b) is more likely to delay 
innovation.
In the basic model the default only increases the seller’s expected claim on future 
surplus if it is to be binding. At the margin, this is more likely the higher the default. 
Prediction 3.1 suggests, for example, that a union that has won generous conditions 
for its members over time, reflecting its historical position of strength, is less likely 
to accept innovation.
Prediction 3.2 A party with a strong claim on current surplus (bargaining power 
a) is more likely to accept innovation.
An example of this would be a worker with specific skills who is required by 
the firm for the new technique or process to be used. Conversely, an agent with 
relatively weak claim on current surplus is more likely to delay innovation. This is 
the opposite prediction of most of the asymmetric information bargaining models 
in which it is the strong agent who endures delay in order to signal their bargaining 
strength to the other party.
Prediction 3.3 The stronger the initial bargaining strength of a party facing a 
drastic innovation (a goes to zero), the more likely they are to reject innovation.
Further to this, a party that loses more of its bargaining strength is more likely 
to oppose innovation. For example, a craft based union is more likely to oppose
68
innovation than a union that represents a broader range of occupations and interests. 
This is the case because innovation (new technology) is more likely to reduce a craft 
based union’s bargaining power, whereas a broader union may be better placed 
to capture any increase in surplus. This prediction accords with the conclusion of 
Dowrick and Spencer (1994). They argued that union opposition to innovation tends 
to occur when union preferences are weighted in favour of jobs and labour demand is 
inelastic. Given the assumption that the elastic of demand is lower at the industry 
level than at the enterprise level, they concluded that industry or craft based unions 
are more likely to oppose technical change than enterprise unions. This logic may 
well have been one of the motivations behind the shift in the late 1980s by both the 
Australian Federal Labor Government and the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
to amalgamate smaller, craft based unions to form larger more broadly represented 
unions.* Similar arguments have been made comparing resistance to innovation 
from decentralised unions in the UK compared with the corporatist unions in the 
then West Germany (see the discussion in Willman 1986, p. 33).
Prediction 3.4 A party with a strong historical default is more likely to delay when 
future surplus is expected to be low (basic model). A party facing drastic innovation 
is more likely to delay when future surplus is expected to be high (drastic innovation 
model).
As a concrete example, consider a union bargaining with a firm. If the union 
has a high default position it is more likely to reject innovation when the industry 
is in decline, as the default is more likely to influence the distribution of surplus in 
the future.* Future surplus may be low because of the impending removal of reg-
tßoth the Industrial Relations Act 1988 and the Industrial Relations Legislation Amendment 
Act 1990 attempted to increase the minimum size of a union from 100 to 1000, then to 10 000. 
Following a ruling by the International Labour Organisation this number was again reduced to 100 
by the Reform Act 1993. Further, evidence from the Australian Workplace Industrial Relations 
Survey 1995 showed that, according to union delegates of the main union at the workplace, 58 
per cent of these unions had been involved in amalgamations. This is 36 per cent of all unionised 
workplace. Further, 30 per cent said that employees at different workplaces had become members 
of the same union.
*This discussion does not consider the possibility that the default exceeds the potential surplus 
from innovation in the future.
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ulations or the introduction of new competitors, as well as an industry in decline. 
On the other hand, the drastic innovation model suggests that employees in a de­
clining industry would accept innovation immediately. Instead, a union would delay 
innovation when expected future surplus is higher than today’s potential surplus. 
This would be the case in an industry that expected a growth in demand (ignoring 
possible entry of other suppliers).
3.7 Comparison with the literature
The insight of this model is that a bargaining party may act strategically, reduc­
ing overall surplus. If the decision to innovation is thought of as an investment, the 
predictions of the model look similar to the finding of some incomplete contracts 
models. That is, the parties will take into account the ex post consequences (during 
renegotiation) of their ex ante actions (investment). In Grout’s (1984) paper, for ex­
ample, the firm takes into account the ex post bargaining game with the union, and 
adjusts its ex ante investment accordingly. Similarly, in Grossman and Hart (1986) 
the parties invest taking account of any potential hold-up in the renegotiation stage 
that occurs after the parties have invested. In the model presented here, the second 
period bargaining game is similar to the ex post bargaining stage in the incomplete 
contract model. As in Grossman and Hart (1986), the ex post bargaining game (the 
second period investment) is efficient. However, ex ante investment or first period 
innovation may not be efficient because one of the parties may act strategically to 
position themselves better in ex post (second period) renegotiation.
As noted above, however, the model here involves a cooperative investment. 
Several papers have discussed institutions that are designed to ensure efficient co­
operative investment. Malcomson and MacLeod (1993a) studied contracts designed 
to encourage efficient ex ante investments. They demonstrated that designing the 
initial contract so as to give one party all of the bargaining power during renegoti­
ation encourages efficient ex ante investments. As this party becomes the residual 
claimant they receive the full return from any investment, giving them first-best
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incentives to invest. Alternatively, if a contract can be written that will not be 
renegotiated, for example a fixed-price contract, hold-up is avoided. Neither of 
these solutions is applicable here as renegotiation is essential to implement the new 
innovation in order to generate the surplus. Further, the parties cannot commit to 
a future price, as the second period price reflects the bargaining process as sum­
marised by equations 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3d Che and Haush (1999) found that where 
they are unable to commit not to renegotiate, parties cannot do any better than to 
have no contract at all and accept the inefficiency effects caused by ex post renego­
tiation. Given the structure of the model here the parties will wish to renegotiate, 
and any commitment otherwise would not be credible.
Frankel (1998) examined a related model. In his model both parties had the 
opportunity to search for new options that could enhance the bargaining surplus. 
However, some search activities enhance a player’s own payoff while others increase 
the joint surplus available (as in a cooperative investment). Under the first assump­
tion the two parties can make side payments. In this case there is underinvestment 
in search activity as a party will not receive the entire return generated by their 
investment. This result is similar to the underinvestment result of the hold-up liter­
ature. When side payments are not allowed (that is, utility is not transferrable and 
no compensation can be paid) each party strategically searched for ideas that are 
advantageous to them, rather than ideas that generate surplus per se. Given this, 
there may be either under or over investment in this kind of selfish search activity.
Hart and Moore (1994) studied optimal debt contracts between a wealthy cred­
itor and a debtor who possessed some inalienable human capital without which the 
project could not go ahead. In their model ex ante inefficiency arises, in the sense 
that projects with a certain positive net return are not financed, because of incom­
plete contracts (the debtor cannot commit not to threaten to withdraw her capital 
which causes renegotiation) and wealth constraints (profitable projects would always 
proceed if the debtor had sufficient wealth). These results are similar to those of this
Tn another paper, Che and Chung (1999) found that a reliance-damages contract can ensure 
efficient cooperative investments.
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paper. Some of the comparative statics also parallel the results here. For instance, a 
project is more likely to be financed if the physical assets are more durable. As the 
investor receives the physical assets in the event of default, this improves her rene­
gotiation position, reducing the hold-up problem. This is similar to the seller in the 
model presented here having a higher a providing her with a higher claim on future 
surplus. Similarly, when returns from the project are front-loaded the investor’s 
bargaining position is enhanced as the liquidation values of the project are high at 
the time when the investor requires the additional coverage. This additional security 
means that a project is also more likely to proceed. However, in Hart and Moore 
the bargaining power at the renegotiation stage is determined by the characteristics 
of the project (maturity, the durability of the physical assets involved) whereas here 
the bargaining power of the parties is determined by previous bargaining outcomes 
(specific investments). Neher (1999) studied a related venture-capital debt financing 
model. In his model, in order to overcome the hold-up problem the parties finance 
the project through a sequence of payments. By financing the project in stages, the 
debtor has less incentive to renege. Further, as the project matures, Neher assumed 
that over time the alienable element of the project, manifest in physical assets for 
example, increases, providing a better default position during renegotiation for the 
creditor in the event of a default. This model potentially relates to the incentive 
to institute reform as a sequence of small changes over time. This issue is briefly 
discussed below.
Dowrick and Spencer (1994) examined when a union could expect to gain or 
lose from the introduction of a labour saving technology. From this they predicted 
under what conditions a union would oppose innovation and under what conditions 
they would embrace changed As in the model presented here, Dowrick and Spencer 
(1994) predicted that if the interests of the two bargaining parties are aligned regard­
ing reform, the innovation will occur without delay. However, the model presented 
here has multiple bargaining periods whereas in Dowrick and Spencer there is one 
potential innovation and one production period. In addition, they did not consider
‘•'Also see Ulph and Ulph (1988).
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the possibility of the firm compensating the union for the losses incurred. On the 
other side of the coin, much of the theoretical bargaining literature has assumed 
that bargaining is immediate because compensation is always possible if agreement 
involves an increase in total surplus. This paper goes some way to bridging the gap 
between the two streams of literature. In the model presented here delay can still oc­
cur in equilibrium because of the following three features of the model: the addition 
of a second bargaining period; the inability of the parties to write fully contingent 
contracts; and wealth constraints that may prevent adequate compensation.
Finally, it is worth contrasting this model to the work of Dixit and Pindyck 
(1994). In their framework there is uncertainty about the future returns of an irre­
versible investment. The firm has the opportunity, however, to delay investment in 
order to gather better, although not necessarily perfect, information. Consequently, 
delay of the investment has an option value. The firm will then weigh the cost of 
delay against the benefits of waiting for new information.
The model in this paper is similar in the sense that innovation is irreversible; once 
the seller has agreed to change the default contract they cannot unilaterally decide 
to reinstate it. There are several crucial differences, however. First, delay occurs 
for different reasons in the models. In Dixit and Pindycks’ model it is uncertainty 
that causes a firm to delay investment.1” On the contrary, in the model presented 
here it is incomplete contracts and wealth constraints that cause strategic delay; if 
adequate compensation can be provided up-front for future losses innovation will 
be immediate. Second, delay in the model here reduces total welfare with certainty. 
This is not the case in Dixit and Pindyck where delay, although possibly involving 
some cost, can increase total surplus by improving the firm’s investment decision.
Tn fact, Dixit and Pindyck noted that the option value - and hence the incentive to delay 
- is not affected if a firm can hedge this risk on the forward or futures market (p. 11). This 
suggests that investment is delayed not because of a lack of insurance (an incomplete market) but 
because waiting improves the information available: it is the extra information that is important, 
not attitudes towards risk.
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3.8 Extensions
The basic model captured the on-going relationship between the parties in a two- 
period model. This section extends the model to three periods and to an infinite 
horizon. Second, it discusses how delays may arise when commitment is not possible. 
Third, it contrasts the incentives to delay with general and specific investments 
(innovation). Last, the section briefly discusses partial reform when there are many 
potential innovations that can be implemented in any given period.
3.8.1 Three period model
With the two period model the seller’s decision is whether to wait and accept 
innovation immediately or whether to accept it in the next (and final) period. In 
reality, as bargaining is typically an on-going process, both parties must decide in 
which period they wish to accept innovation. The timing of reform then becomes 
important. One way of adapting the basic model is to consider the second period 
payoffs as reflecting the outcome that will occur when both parties play optimal 
strategies for the remainder of the game, however long that maybe. Alternatively, 
this section considers a three period model.
To simplify the analysis consider a model in which the potential surplus in each 
period is certain from the beginning of the game. Denote the potential surplus 
in each period as v\, t>2, and v%. Further, adopt the bargaining rule and default 
option assumptions of the basic model. First, consider the second two periods of 
the game. At this junction, if innovation has not occurred in the first period, the 
parties must decide whether they wish innovation to occur in that period or in the 
final period. Once again, it is never in the interests of the buyer to delay innovation 
and he will be willing to forgo his entire share of surplus in that period (t =  2) in 
order to induce the seller to innovate. The seller again compares the two period 
payoff when there is no innovation in the first (t = 2) period with the two period 
payoff when she agrees to immediate innovation. If 6 > av2 and b > av3, the delay 
payoff for the seller is b + b. If the seller agrees to innovation at t = 2 her payoff
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would be 6 + iq +  av3. Letting F\ = 0, AU  =  6 — av3 > 0, thus the seller requires 
compensation in order to be induced to innovate. Delay will occur when sufficient 
compensation is not possible, thus delay will occur when b > \(v2 +  av3). (This 
model has the same properties as the basic model. That is, the incentive to delay 
is increasing in 6, and decreasing in V2 , u3 and at.)
Now consider an additional period that occurs before the two periods discussed 
above, and again consider the case when b > for i =  1,2,3. At time t — 1, 
the outcome of the subsequent periods are already anticipated by the two parties: 
both parties know the choice of the seller at t =  2 if innovation does not occur 
in the first period. Thus, in order to induce the seller to accept innovation in the 
first period, the buyer need only provide the seller with a payoff equal to her payoff 
in the two period game plus her first period default b. If the seller agrees to first 
period reform she receives b + Fi + av2 +  au3. If in the two period game the seller 
would delay, in order to induce immediate innovation the buyer must ensure that 
AU  = 6 + 6 + 6 — [6 + Fi + av2 + au3] < 0 . As a result, the seller will delay first 
period innovation if 6 > |  [v 1 +  av2 + <au3].
If the seller would agree to immediate innovation in the two period game, in 
order to induce t — 1 agreement in the three period game the buyer needs to 
ensure that AU  =  6 +  6 + F2 + av3 — [b +  Fi +  av2 + av^\ < 0. F2 is set so that 
6 +  6 — [6 +  F2 +  avs] = 0 or that F2 =  (6 — au3). Substituting this into the above 
equation lets AU  = 6 + 6 + (6 — av3) +  au3 — [6 +  iq + av2 +  av3]. This is positive 
when F\ = 0, implying that first period compensation is needed to facilitate the 
seller to innovate immediately. Delay will occur when the available first period 
compensation is not adequate, or when 6 > |[ f i  +  av2 +  au3].
In the three period model, the seller can decide to delay innovation either one 
or two periods. Although total surplus is maximised by immediate innovation, the 
seller could opt to innovate in any of the periods. In fact, the addition of another 
period does not make immediate agreement any more or less likely a priori. In the 
two period model immediate agreement was reached provided 62 < \{v2 +  aw3), 
relabelling the periods to correspond to the last two periods in the three-period
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game. On the other hand, immediate agreement is only possible in the three period 
model when 63 < §[̂ 1 + otv2 + av^]. It turns out that either 62 or 63 could be larger. 
If v\ > (3~2q̂ [v2 + CW3], the addition of the extra period decreases the chance of 
delay by increasing the minimum level of b for which it is optimal for the seller to 
delay. Conversely, if v\ < —2~— [u2 +  ctv̂ ] the addition of the extra period increases 
the chance of delay as the minimum level of b necessary for the seller to delay in 
equilibrium is lower than with a game consisting of only the last two periods.
Similarly, when lost surplus is considered as a proportion of total surplus, the 
welfare effects of the additional period is ambiguous. For example, if there are two 
periods of delay, in the extended model the proportional welfare loss is [(ui — b) +  
(u2 — b)]/(vi+V2+vz). This may be greater than or less than the proportional welfare 
loss of a one period delay in the two period model of (v2 — b)/(v2 +  U3). In some 
cases, however, the addition of a period unambiguously improves welfare. This is 
the case when the seller would have delayed agreement in the two period model but 
is willing to innovate immediately in the three period model. These results concord 
with the findings of Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) who found that, in a bargaining 
model with asymmetric information, the addition of extra bargaining periods had 
an ambiguous effect on welfare.
3.8.2 Infinite horizon
This analysis could be extended to an infinite horizon model. Consider a model 
where potential innovation produces a surplus of v in every period. As before, the 
seller has a default of b that is inconsistent with innovation, the relative bargaining 
strength of the parties is reflected in the parameter a  and the default is binding in 
the bargaining process for the seller. In addition, assume the seller has a discount 
factor of 6 G (0, 1).
Given the stationarity of the model, the optimal action in any one period will 
also be optimal in every period. Thus, if the seller does not wish to innovate, she 
will not wish to innovate in any period. In that case, the discounted value of surplus
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to  the seller of delay is:
b +  66 +  626 +  636 +  . . .  — —-----—. (3.31)
(1 -  5)
On the other hand, the value to the seller from immediate innovation is:
b +  F\ +  Sav +  62av +  6sav +  . . .  =  b +  F\ +  —^-rr-au. (3.32)
(1 - 6)
As before, the buyer does not wish to delay innovation.* The maximum innovation
payoff for the seller is:
v + ( l - 5 f v-
(3.33)
Delay will occur when:
b 6
(3.34)
{1- 5 ) > V + ( l - 6 f V'
or when
b > (1 — ö +  aS)v. (3.35)
Unlike models with one-sided asymmetric information, the seller is willing to 
endure a prolonged delay in bargaining. The comparative statics for the delay 
decision are as follows:
dAU/db = , 1 . >  0; (3.36)




dAU/da = V f <  0;
1 — 6
(3.38)
dAU/d6 = J  > 0. (3.39)
The new variable here is the discount factor. Equation 3.39 shows th a t delay is 
more likely the more patient the seller is.
*Note that in this section it is implicitly assumed that payoffs cannot be carried over between 
periods.
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The results of this model are similar to infinite horizon games of tacit collusion,* 
however, the emphasis here is reversed. Tacit collusion models examine whether the 
threat of low future payoffs (punishment) is sufficient to sustain collusion without 
cheating in the immediate term. On the other hand, in the model of delay the 
emphasis is on whether the immediate reward (compensation) is sufficient to induce 
the seller to accept a lower payoff in the future. The impact of the discount factor 
is also reversed. In the standard models of tacit collusion a higher discount factor 
increases the incentive for the firm to cooperate. Here, a higher discount factor 
means that the seller is more patient and requires more compensation if they are to 
agree to innovation.
Thus far in this section it has been assumed that payoffs cannot be carried over 
between periods. As wealth constraints are an important element to the reason for 
delay, it could be expected that the buyer could accumulate savings over several 
periods so as to have sufficient funds to compensate the seller adequately. Assume 
that the buyer receives a small return r from each period of trading that occurs 
according to the old default contract, where r is never binding and is sufficiently 
small so as to ensure that innovation is still optimal. Let the accumulated savings 
of the buyer be represented by S. In this case, delay will occur when:
v+s+öh)av̂jih) (3A0)
so that the buyer will wish to accumulate savings S = [6 — u(l — 5 - f ol5)\/(1 — 6) in 
order to induce innovation. Delay in innovation will be longer the smaller is r  and 
the larger is S.
3.8.3 Inability to commit not to renegotiate
Thus far we have assumed that the two parties have been unable to write a 
fully contingent contract in period t = 1 covering the events of period t = 2 . This 
incompleteness arises because rt only becomes verifiable at time t. Consequently,
^See Tirole (1988) Chapter 6.
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prior to that point in time it is not possible to write a contract specifying the 
performance of t2. As such, the parties write only a one period contract (covering 
the performance of ti, the bargaining solution and any fixed payment F\ to be made, 
if necessary) understanding that the contract will be renegotiated before trade in 
period t = 2. Further, it was assumed that rt only generated surplus in period t.
As noted above, contracts will effectively be incomplete where parties cannot 
commit to not renegotiate. This section briefly examines the incentive for delay 
when the innovation is contractible from the start of the game but the parties can 
always opt to renegotiated In fact, as it turns out, the same results concerning 
innovation and delay may result if parties cannot commit to not renegotiate in 
future periods.
Consider the following modifications. First, allow rt to, if adopted, generate 
surplus in every period after it has been adopted. However, prior to each period, 
there is uncertainty regarding the potential surplus. Specifically, let vt E {vl,Vh } 
where vl < vh, and let vt = vl with probability p, and vt =  Vh with probability 
(1 — p) as before. All of the other assumptions apply. In particular, the bargaining 
rule remains the same as in the basic model. However, in this section assume that 
the parties cannot commit not to renegotiate the existing contract. That is, in 
period t = 2 either party can trigger renegotiation if it is in their interests.
Assume that once a party has triggered renegotiation each player will receive 
their default payoff, unless they agree to a new contract. As before, any new contract 
needs to be adopted by mutual consent. As such, if innovation has not occurred, the 
default payoffs of the seller and buyer are b and zero respectively (Assumption 3.1). 
As above, the no reform bargaining rule is given by equation 3.1 or 3.2. If innovation 
has previously occurred the seller is assumed to have lost her initial default, and the 
relevant defaults for both parties are zero: equation 3.3 gives the bargaining rule if
^The assumption that the parties are unable to commit to not renegotiate relates directly to 
the hold-up model of Grout (1984). A similar assumption is also made by Hart and Moore (1994) 
in which the entrepreneur can always unilaterally opt to renegotiate the contract because there 
is no mechanism by which they can be sanctioned for doing so. It also relates to the bargaining 
models in which commitment to a future strategy is not possible, for example Sobel and Takahashi 
(1983).
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innovation occurred in period t = 1.
First, consider the case in which innovation did not occur in period t = 1. In the 
second period innovation will occur with probability equal to one, and the division of 
surplus will be given by equations 3.1 and 3.2. At this juncture there is no possible 
strategic benefit from delay, so no compensation (F2) is ever required. In this case 
the total payoff to the seller will be b (from the first period) plus her second period 
payoff (given by the bargaining rule). The buyer will simply receive his share of the 
second period return.
Each party will compare these payoffs (the expected return from delaying inno­
vation) with their expected payoff if reform occurs immediately. As it turns out, 
renegotiation will always occur in the second period if innovation occurred in pe­
riod t =  1, despite the fact that the default contract would generate surplus in 
period t =  2. Renegotiation will always occur because the parties cannot commit 
to not renegotiate the existing contract and it is always in the interests of one party 
to renegotiate the contract. Further, only one of the parties is needed to trigger 
renegotiation. As such, both parties will ex ante expect renegotiation will occur at 
period t = 2.
Consider the case when the first period’s return to the seller was b (for example, 
V\ = Vl and b G (avL,avx) and b > 1 + ap)/(l  + p).) If the second period’s
potential surplus turns out to be vl the buyer will initiate renegotiations.! Once 
renegotiations have been restarted the buyer is in a better bargaining position be­
cause the seller no longer has her default, so the surplus split will be {au^, (1 — q) vl)
. Likewise, if =  Vh and b < avn the seller would restart renegotiations, the re­
sulting division would be {avn , (1 — ol)v h }- Further, if innovation occurred in the 
first period when V\ = vh and V2 =  vl, it might be necessary for the initial contract 
to be renegotiated as the contract could give the buyer a negative payoff. In such a 
case, no trade would be preferable to the buyer, so he would initiate renegotiation.
The upshot of the inability to commit to not renegotiate is that the division
^The only case in which the contract will not be renegotiated at time t =  2 is when v\ = vl, 
b < avL and v2 =  vl- In this case there is never any incentive to delay innovation.
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of surplus between the parties over the two periods will be identical to the basic 
model presented in section 3.4. As such, the seller has the same incentives to delay 
innovation in period t = 1.
This inability to commit to not renegotiate is similar to an ‘at-will’ contract 
although in this model both parties have equal power to restart bargaining.t If the 
model was to be altered to incorporate a traditional ‘at-will’ bargaining rule, the 
seller would have a similar incentive to delay innovation, and this incentive may be 
even greater than in the model presented here.
3.8.4 General and specific investment
Thus far we have assumed a bilateral relationship. In that sense the innovation 
has been specific to the parties. In this section we consider the possibility of delay 
with general innovations (investments).
A general investment provides an expected rate of return that is the same re­
gardless of the trading partner. On the other hand, a specific investment generates 
a return if trade occurs with a specific party, but generates no return if trade takes 
places with any other trading party. A partially specific investment generates a 
higher return with the specific trading partner than with other potential trading 
partners 4
Clearly, if a buyer can immediately substitute another seller from n potential 
sellers who are identical to the original trading partner, the buyer has all the bar­
gaining power, as in Bertrand competition with a homogenous product. As a result, 
he will receive all of the surplus generated from innovation and the seller will not 
receive a payoff above her reservation utility in any period.*  In such a situation the
Tn an ‘at will’ contract there is typically an asymmetry in that if the buyer alters the terms of a 
contract, provided the seller continues to supply, it is deemed that she has agreed to the changes. 
On the other hand, if a seller suggests a new trading arrangement the old contract remains in 
place unless the buyer explicitly agrees to the new offer (see Malcomson 1997). As a result of this 
asymmetry, the buyer is assumed to be able to keep the seller at their reservation utility.
^For more details, see MacLeod and Malcomson (1993b) and Malcomson (1997).
*See Shaked and Sutton (1984). In their model when the buyer can costlessly bargain with a 
large number of sellers, the distribution of surplus is the same as the outcome of a competitive 
market.
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seller has no bargaining power to hold-up innovation and there will be no delay. For 
example, again allow the seller to have a default of b. However, now assume that 
there are also n other potential sellers, all with default payoffs of zero. Further, 
after T\ has been revealed, the buyer can initiate discussions, and ultimately trade, 
with either the current supplier or any of the n potential sellers. The presence of 
the outside suppliers means that the default of b has no impact on the bargaining 
solution. Rather, the effective default of the seller is zero, as an attempt by the 
seller to extract any rents will cause the buyer to trade with someone else: the 
innovation will be implemented and the buyer receives all of the surplus. Similarly, 
in period t = 2 reform also occurs, and all of the surplus accrues to the buyer.
From this we could expect that a seller will never delay the adoption of a general 
innovation. However, hold-up of a general investment can occur provided there are 
turnover costs. If an innovation is general, the buyer has a outside option, but 
this outside option will only affect the division of surplus provided this constraint 
is binding. If the party with the outside trading option must incur some turnover 
costs, this option may not be binding. In this case, the threat to implement an 
outside option would not be credible. This allows the other party to hold-up the 
general investment (see Malcomson 1997).
Applying this reasoning to the model presented here, a seller might be able to 
hold-up a general reform provided the buyer must incur some turnover costs if he 
wishes to trade with another party. Turnover costs, in a sense, reduce a general 
reform into a specific one. Consequently, delays in the implementation of a general 
innovation that enhances surplus can occur provided turnover costs are sufficiently 
large.
In fact, the incentives for the seller to delay a general innovation may be greater 
than with a party-specific innovation. As a general innovation increases the trading 
options of the buyer, this could have the effect of reducing the seller’s contemporane­
ous bargaining power (that is, reduce a). As such, a general investment may involve 
two costs to the seller - a loss in her default payoff and a loss in bargaining power. 
This increases the cost to the seller of innovation, thus increasing the compensation
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she requires to agree to t = 1 reform. On the other hand, a specific innovation 
is more likely to leave the relative bargaining strength of each party unchanged, 
or even enhance the seller’s bargaining position, providing her with greater incen­
tive to innovate. In this case, the buyer may have an incentive to delay a specific 
investment.
3.8.5 Partial reform
Partial innovation may eventuate if there is a set of potential reforms, each with 
its own payoff and default for the seller. The seller may then choose to trade in 
some of their defaults but not others. The surplus generated by each innovation 
may vary differently over time. Alternatively, the default practices or innovations 
could interact with one another to affect the surplus generated. In this case the 
seller may opt to introduce a particular subset of innovations at any time. This 
suggests that strategic bargaining between the parties implementing innovation will 
affect both the timing and pattern of innovation.
3.9 Applications
The introduction outlined how the print unions delayed the introduction of new 
printing technology by newspapers in the United Kingdom. This section briefly 
reviews some additional examples of potential Pareto enhancing innovations that 
were not implemented, or whose implementation was stalled. In the model presented 
above delay requires that the seller have the right of veto over whether a project or 
innovation proceeds. Clearly, this is a strong assumption, and it does not always 
hold in the examples below. What is emphasized in the examples below is that: 
delay of innovation is empirically important; parties are concerned about the future 
consequences of innovation; and, further to that, when parties are unable to write a 
complete contingent contract these concerns can manifest themselves in opposition 
to change.
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3.9.1 Social policy reform
A significant component of the social policies of Australian governments in­
volve the performance of non-commercial activities, or community service obliga­
tions (CSOs), by government business enterprises. In 1997 the cost of CSOs in 
Australia exceeded $3 billion (Industry Commission 1997). Governments require 
government business to perform CSOs in a wide range of areas including postal 
services, telecommunications, rail transportation and electricity and water services.
CSOs have typically been funded by cross-subsidies and two of the largest CSOs, 
the uniform charge for the standard letter service within Australia and the telecom­
munications universal service obligation, are still funded by cross-subsidies. Another 
major method of funding CSOs is governments accepting a lower rate of return from 
their trading enterprises that are required to perform these non-commercial activi­
ties.
The Industry Commission (1997) recommended that moving to direct funding 
of these social services would increase total surplus.*  First, allocative efficiency 
would be improved by prices in the high margin markets more accurately reflecting 
costs. Further, cross-subsidies require a restriction of competition in these high 
margin markets. By directly funding the CSOs from taxation revenue, governments 
can remove barriers to competition, potentially creating greater incentive for these 
services to be provided at lower cost. Second, by direct funding CSOs, governments 
can also introduce competition into the provision of those services.* Given these 
resource savings, direct funding of CSOs would allow these social services to be 
financed at lower cost or, alternatively, allow the governments to provide more 
services.
Arguments against explicit funding of community service obligations generally 
have little to do with the efficiency of that method of provision.* Rather, debate
^Also see Industry Commission (1991 and 1994) and Productivity Commission (1999) for rec­
ommendations regarding specific industries.
* Other potential benefits include improved identification and monitoring of CSOs.
* Occasionally, it has been argued that, particularly for State and Territory governments, the 
dead weight loss associated with cross-subsidisation is less than the resource cost of raising the 
necessary funds through the taxation system.
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often centres around the inability for governments to commit to maintaining funding 
to social causes once they are funded directly from the budget. For example, the 
Public Sector Research Centre (1988) noted that ‘[t]he emphasis on cross-subsidies 
is important as such a mechanism is less exposed to political pressures associated 
with reducing budget outlays’ (p. 15).
Similarly, John Quiggin (1998) argued that:
The specification of CSOs tends to be a first step towards their elim­
ination . . .  [a] reason for the vulnerability of CSOs is that CSOs appear 
as part of the budget sector, whereas the earnings of government busi­
ness enterprises are ‘off-budget’. Governments are typically much more 
concerned about on budget than off-budget expenditures, even though 
the economic implications are identical.
Elsewhere Quiggin (1995), referring to Australia Post’s uniform pricing policy, 
argued that ‘given that the political pressure to cut measured government expen­
diture is much greater than the pressure to maximise the returns of government 
business enterprises . . .  the maintenance of uniform pricing would not be long-lived’.
In their submission to the Productivity Commission inquiry into the Impact of 
Competition Policy Reform on Rural and Regional Australia, the Regional Develop­
ment Council of Western Australia (1998) argued that ‘the funding of CSOs though 
cross subsidisation is of considerable benefit itself . . .  cross subsidisation avoids the 
sovereign risk associated with government budget funding, which can be subject to 
varying political pressures from year to year’ (pp. 6-7).
The opinions expressed above directly relate to the model of delays. Many of the 
arguments against reform presented above relate directly to the incomplete contract 
assumption in the model above. In these examples governments are, as a result of 
incomplete nature of the contracting process, unable to commit to a future level of 
provision of social services. Second, in these examples the status quo provides the 
recipients of the benefits a default level of utility. Reform would remove this default 
because with direct funding each year the government needs to decide to provide the
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funding. Further, the current beneficiaries believe their political influence would be 
diminished by reform. Prior to reform, responsibility for cross-subsidies generally 
resides with social welfare departments or the government businesses themselves, 
rather than expenditure revenue committees who are responsible for explicit spend­
ing. Third, it is not feasible to provide up-front compensation for the recipients of 
these benefits. It is difficult to ascertain who would be the potential beneficiaries 
in the future, and how much compensation they would require. Furthermore, polit­
ically it is infeasible to provide lump-sum transfers to a group such as this for their 
potential future losses.
Stiglitz (1998) also made the argument that the political process is subject to the 
market failures discussed in the incomplete contracts literature.* In many situations 
a government is unable to commit to a future policy and it is certainly unable to 
commit its successor to one. Stiglitz proposes that this contractual incompleteness 
is one reason why governments are unable to implement Pareto efficient reforms:*
Policy-making is a dynamic process, with today’s decisions shaping 
options and coalitions in the future. In this naive view, a Pareto im­
provement is a one-shot, static policy change. In reality, it is part of 
a sequence of policies, and although a reform may be favorable to all 
groups in earlier stages of the process, it may undermine one or a few 
groups’ interests in later stages. These disadvantaged groups, of course, 
are often far-sighted enough to anticipate that in the long run they will 
be worse off and thus act accordingly to oppose a seeming Pareto im­
provement. (p. 8)
Stiglitz discusses several examples including the provision of subsidised electric­
ity and the removal of price-fixing arrangements in the dairy industry. In each of 
these examples it possible to compensate the relevant parties, however it is difficult
*See Stiglitz (1998), footnote 13.
tThe other reasons Stiglitz proposes are: coalition formation and destruction in a dynamic 
bargaining setting; destructive competition (particularly in the political process and other zero- 
sum games); and uncertainty about the consequences of change.
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for the government to commit not to remove direct payments to these groups in the 
future.
3.9.2 Taxation reform
In recent years in Australia, the Commonwealth Government proposed and im­
plemented a new taxation system. They argued that their proposed reform would 
create a more efficient system. The centre piece of the proposal was a goods and 
services tax that would replace, among other things, the current wholesales sales 
tax. Two issues relate to model presented here. The first relates to the level of the 
tax. The second relates to the level of compensation for low income earners.
Some commentators, for example Stone (1990) and Moore (1990), have argued 
against a goods and service tax, even though they believe it is more efficient than 
the system it is designed to replace, because the government cannot commit to not 
increase the rate. In fact, in designing its new taxation proposal the Government 
attempted to design a credible mechanism that would provide some assurance the 
rate of taxation would not be increased at a later date7 These arguments are further 
evidence of governments’ inability to make binding commitments.
Brennan and Buchanan (1977) developed a theoretical model that parallels the 
policy-based arguments outlined above. In their model individuals vote on a consti­
tution that determines the taxing powers of the government. Once the constitutional 
rules are in place, the citizens cannot control the actions of the government that 
acts to maximise revenue, not social welfare.* Anticipating this behaviour, the citi­
zens design a tax system (constitution) that limits the ability of the government to 
raise tax revenue, even if this means instituting an inefficient regime. For instance, 
a change to a broad tax base improves efficiency and it allows the government to 
extract more revenue. However, ‘it is precisely on such grounds that the changes 
should be rejected’ (Brennan and Buchanan 1977, p. 272).
^The Federal Government proposed that a majority of State and Territory governments would 
have to agree to any increase in the rate of the goods and services tax. This mechanism may not 
be credible however, as the need for this mechanism can be eliminated by a new Act of Parliament.
^The authors called this type of government ‘Leviathan’.
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The authors compared their predictions with the proposal in the United States 
of America to replace part of the corporation income tax with a broad-based value- 
added tax. The tax was rejected, in part due to fears that the new tax would 
be increased over time to greatly exceed the rate required to replace the old tax 
(Brennan and Buchanan 1977, p. 272).
Their model has similarities to the model presented in this thesis. First, the 
choice about the constitution is irreversible, as was the adoption of innovation. 
Second, there is an incomplete contract in their model as, among other things, the 
citizens are unable to contract over the government’s post-constitution behaviour.
Second, other opponents of the tax changes have made the point that the level 
of compensation to low income earners and others who will be worse off under the 
changes will be eroded over time. That is, they argue that the government cannot 
commit to not revise the compensation package in the future. For example, in 
its submission to the Senate committee inquiring into the goods and services tax, 
Anglicare Australia stated that:
Compensation packages are unlikely to remain intact for long. They 
require highly visible government expenditure . . .  there is always pres­
sure on governments to reduce expenditure. This is likely to lead gov­
ernments of any persuasion to allow inflation to erode compensation 
packages over time. (p. 6)
As in the social policy examples above, the inability of the government to make 
binding commitments to future welfare payments was a crucial element to the op­
position to taxation reform. Further to that, it was both technically and political 
infeasible to provide up-front compensation to welfare recipients.
3.9.3 Workplace reform
Unions are typically thought to oppose innovation. For example, Pollard (1982) 
suggested many unions accept technical change ‘only after bitter struggles’ (p. 107). 
However, unions may react to an innovation with obstruction, competition, control
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or encouragement, depending on how they expect to fare from the change (Slitcher 
and Healy 1960). Much of the bargaining between unions and firms boils down to 
attempting to maintain or improve present and future relative bargaining positions. 
Far from being irrational, as it is often argued, surplus reducing behaviour may well 
be necessary for a party to maximise its total expected surplus.
In relation to the adoption of workplace reform there are several key issues. 
First, it must be ascertained to wrhat extent the union can influence innovation 
in the workplace. * Of course, as well as outright rejection a union or employee 
can resist complete implementation of the new technology, stall its introduction or 
attempt to have old inefficient workpractices maintained after the change. Second, 
a union’s reaction to innovation depends on how they expect to fare from the change 
(see Dowrick and Spencer 1994). Clearly, a union must have both the incentive and 
the means to be able to effectively delay change.
There are three main points of this sub-section. First, as a general rule innova­
tions are either ‘product’ or ‘process’ (cost-reducing) innovations (Willman 1986). 
In process innovating industries, change is generally associated with attempts to 
increase product demand and, as a consequence, increased demand for labour. Will- 
man argued that these innovations are rarely opposed by unions. Cost-minimisation 
innovations, on the other hand, typically involve reducing the demand for labour, 
often by replacing labour with capital. It is ‘cost-reducing’ innovations that unions 
generally oppose.
Second, contractual incompleteness matters. Spot markets provide opportunity 
for unions to hold-up the firm. However, they also provide an opportunity for 
the firm to renegotiate, for example to decrease their labour requirements. With 
process innovation (labour saving or cost-cutting innovation) unions anticipate a 
potential reduction in employment. Consequently, without a credible commitment 
to maintain staffing levels or adequate compensation, unions oppose these changes. 
It may be difficult for firms to make these commitments: in particular, employers
^See Cornfield (1987b) and Batstone and Gourlay (1986) for a review of the potential influence 
of unions over managements’ decision to adopt new technology.
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are often limited in their ability to commit to future wages or employment levels.*
Third, a craft union is more likely to delay or resist innovation than a more 
broadly based union. A union that is most likely to lose out from a change in 
workpractices is one that faces a drastic innovation or one that severely reduces 
their default position. As such, the model predicts that profession-based unions 
facing a drastic new technology would be more likely to oppose change. Dowrick 
and Spencer (1994) also argued that a craft-based union are more likely to oppose 
change. Similarly, Batstone and Gourlay (1986) argued that:
we would expect that, for example, a single-occupation union, par­
ticularly of craft workers, would place greater emphasis upon the preser­
vation of skill and job territory, so that it would demonstrate a greater 
concern over such matters as training and work organisation (p. 37).
3.9.4 Waterfront reform
After World War II, in the United Kingdom dockside workers were employed 
casually. This system evolved due to the unpredictable nature of demand that 
would fluctuate with how many ships were in port. Most workers were employed by 
a ‘holding employer’ (the dock labour board), who would make fail-back payments 
when there was no work, and an ‘operational employer’, who provided the docker 
with the actual work. Over time, however, the number of excess dockers fell as final- 
product demand increased. With their increased market power, the unions increased 
the numbers of employed, extended the length of work and increased wages. The 
restrictive practices included: inflated staffing scales; controls on the hiring process; 
restrictions on working hours; extended tea breaks; and spinning out of work by
t Cornfield (1987a) argued that:
Throughout the course of U.S. industrialization, workers and managers have at­
tempted to control the implementation and outcomes of technological change . . .  
fearing displacement and loss of income, workers have sought control of technological 
innovation in order to maintain their job security, (p. xi)
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‘welting’ and ‘spelling’, effectively increasing the labour required to complete any 
task (Willman 1986, pp 109-112).
The Delvin reforms, implemented in two stages in 1967 and 1970, attempted to 
remove casualisation and secured permanent employment for most dockers. These 
reforms partially paved the way for the introduction of containerisation - a technical 
innovation that would rapidly decrease unloading times and threaten to ‘eliminate 
dockworkers from the chain of transport’ (Fadden 1976, p. 313, as cited in Willman 
1986, p. 116). The introduction of new technology was banned until Phase II of the 
reforms were negotiated, and these were only accepted after a national dock strike 
in 1970. Along with the new technology came a new employment agreement in the 
form of a comprehensive contract, including ‘contingency payments’. Although this 
contract did not end disputes or restrictive practices (dockers tried to extend their 
sphere of influence and many practices like over-staffing, lack of gang mobility and 
demarcation between trades remained, Willman 1986, p. 117) it was a significant 
step away from spot-market contracts, which provided an opportunity to continuous 
renegotiate and stall reform, to more contingent contracts, which provided labour 
with more of the assurances they were looking ford
In the United States longshore industry there are two major unions: the Interna­
tional Longshoremen’s Association, who represent union members on the East and 
Gulf coasts; and the International Longshoremen’s Warehousemen’s Union repre­
sents workers on the west coast. According to Waters (1993) over the last 30 years 
the International Longshoremen’s Association resisted technical change while the 
International Longshoremen’s Warehousemen’s Union cooperated with implement­
ing change (p. 264). Whereas the International Longshoremen’s Warehousemen’s
^Willman (1986) argued that:
Although the system could cope with day-to-day change where ship turn-around 
was more important than labour cost, in the long term the delays promoted by the 
contractual system stimulated its demise. In the short-term, spot contracting was 
a suitable response to product market variance; in the longer term, the needs of 
shipowners for rapid jobs finish ran into conflict with the labour-market necessities 
of job expansion and creation, (p. 118)
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Union decided to invite mechanisation and concentrate its efforts to ensure job 
security, improved working conditions and higher wages, the International Long­
shoremen’s Association viewed containerisation as a threat to job security, tried to 
maintain employment and tried to increase wages (pp. 262-264).* 
Wharves in Australia have not been without conflict either. The Australian 
waterfront was essentially a double-monopoly. The Maritime Union of Australia 
controlled the supply of labour while Patrick Stevedores and P&;0 Ports accounted 
for 90 per cent of container business in a cosy duopoly (Trinca and Davies 2000, p.
5 and p. 30). In this environment of limited competition, the Maritime Union of 
Australia used its almost complete employee coverage and the high cost of berthing 
stoppages or delays to extract favourable terms and conditions for its members 
(Productivity Commission 1998a, p. xxix and p. 138).
Despite attempts to reform the waterfront in the 1980s and early 1990s, there 
was still potential for significant reform. For example, productivity of Australian 
wharves compared unfavourably to the rest of the world (Productivity Commission 
1998b). Many of the inefficient workpractices in the container stevedoring industry, 
such as inflexible work arrangements, reduced productivity, reliability and increased 
labour costs.1’ Further, overtime was also an important, and expected component, 
of salaries (Trinca and Davies 2000, p. 21 and p. 25).1 The potential benefits of 
reform were well known to the stevedores, the Federal Government and the union 
itself (Trinca and Davies 2000, p 5). Despite this, the Maritime Union of Australia 
effectively stalled comprehensive reform.'*' The limited degree of private information 
in this situation strongly suggests that the asymmetric information story cannot
tInterestingly, the members of the International Longshoremen’s Association were better off 
than their counterparts in the short-run. However, in the long run members of the International 
Longshoremen’s Warehousemen’s Union earned more than East coast dockers (Waters 1993, p. 
265, p. 269).
*For example, on the waterfront there was a long-established practice of ‘the nick’ that involved 
wharfies leaving work early when ships were loaded (Trinca and Davies 2000, p 5)
Tn 1996-97 stevedore workers earned on average between $60 000 and $100 000. 20 to 30 per 
cent of these amounts were overtime payments (Productivity Commission 1998a, p. xxi). Overtime 
payments were significantly larger than productivity payments (Productivity Commission 1998a, 
p. xxv).
tFor instance, the Productivity Commission (1998a) argued that strong union bargaining power 
was an important impediment to change (p. xxix). Also see Trinca and Davies (2000).
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effectively explain the union’s attitude towards reform.
The dispute came to a head in 1998 with the lockout of Maritime Union of 
Australia members by Patrick Stevedores. The stevedore wanted to improve pro­
ductivity by introducing new computerised terminals, alter working conditions and 
reduce the workforce.* Reform would have two effects on the union’s claim on fu­
ture surplus. The existing system provided the union members with a high default 
payoff (6). Second, removal of the closed shop would reduce the union’s contempo­
raneous bargaining power (a). These future losses for workers were accentuated by 
the relatively low turnover of stevedore workers (Productivity Commission 1998a, 
p. 17). To entice the union to agree to the change the Stevedore would need to 
provide significant compensation. However, Patrick Stevedores did not have the re­
quired money to pay the payments required by the existing redundancy agreement.* 
For example, in six months in 1997 the company lost $3.6 million at the Melbourne 
docks alone. This suggests that Patrick were severely limited in their ability to raise 
the funds to provide the union members with sufficient up-front compensation. This 
inability to compensate workers, coupled with the significant potential future losses, 
provided the union with the incentive to delay innovation.*
tPatrick Stevedores anticipated that the new technology would reduce the need for labour at 
its bigger ports from 400 to 40 workers (Trinca and Davies 2000, p. 25).
^The Productivity Commission (1998a) argued that ‘redundancy payments’ were part of the 
work arrangements that retarded performance in the stevedoring industry (p. xxvii). However, 
from the theory, these payments may simply be compensation for future losses, in which case 
they could aid the efficient implementation of new technology rather than impeding it. Although 
exorbitant redundancies may be a means of stalling reform, the model suggests that if adequate 
compensation can be paid delay will not be observed. Patrick Stevedores estimated that redun­
dancy packages to members of the Maritime Union of Australia were on average $73 000, while 
redundancies to Australian Maritime Officer’s Union members were on average $190 000 (Produc­
tivity Commission 1998a, p. xxii).
Tn April 1998 Patrick Stevedores attempted to bypass the Maritime Union of Australia by 
generating a dispute, sacking its workforce and establishing a non-union stevedore. This plan had 
the support of the Federal Government who, amongst other things, legislated to pay redundancies. 
This was deemed unlawful by the Federal and High Courts and the dispute was finally resolved in 
September 1998 (Trinca and Davies 2000, pp. xi-xii).
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3.9.5 Computer technology
Computer technology has undoubtedly changed production in many industries as 
well as creating many new jobs. Resistance to computer technologies have typically 
come from workers who fear that the new technology would replace them. Australian 
telecommunications workers went on strike in 1977 against a new computer system 
that threaten a number of jobs (Sale 1995, pp. 252-53). The dispute ended with a 
moratorium on the new machines, although they were eventually introduced with 
a few job terminations (Sale 1995, p. 253). Similarly, in England at the Lucas 
Aerospace plant unions successful sort a moratorium on new computerised machines, 
although it lasted less than a year. Willman (1986) examined the reaction of unions 
to the introduction of computer technology in mature industries and concluded 
that ‘conflicts over change . . .  arose primarily because of the inability of contractual 
forms to accommodate changing economic and technical conditions’ (p. 179).
3.9.6 Automobile industry
Product market innovation in the automobile industry, such as the development 
of new models, go hand-in-hand with process innovation (p. 149). The automobile 
industry in the United Kingdom provides an interesting case study because differ­
ent firms took alternative approaches to contracting with their labour force, with 
different implications for the adoption of innovation.
The United Kingdom producers typically used spot-market contracts, sequen­
tially negotiated, with these negotiations often involving shop stewards. On the con­
trary, Ford in the United Kingdom negotiated at the national level, on a company­
wide basis, a comprehensive annually negotiated pay deal, with relations between 
bargaining dates regulated by a detailed book of rules. The effect of this was greater 
stability in wages and employment than experienced by its United Kingdom-owned 
counterparts. In this way Ford was able to insulate employees from demand fluc­
tuations. Willman (1986) concluded that, as a consequence, Ford avoided many of 
the difficulties associated with innovation experienced by the U.K.-owned manufac-
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turers. For example, Willman (1986) stated:
Recurrent process and product innovation generated conflict over 
technological change. However, only part of the UK industry was af­
fected. This part, British owned and reliant on spot contracting, could 
be contrasted with the US-owned sector of the industry, particularly 
Ford, as well as with the industry in the USA itself. American Car man­
ufacturers tended towards comprehensive contingent claims contracts 
which appeared to leave employment and earning much less susceptible 
to product-market change, (p. 248)
3.9.7 Wide-comb shears
By law, shearers in Australia were not permitted to use combs wider than 64 
mm. From the 1960s, however, wide-comb shears were beginning to be used illegally, 
particularly by New Zealand shearers. Evidence suggested wide-combs were more 
efficient: for example, a University of New England study found that ‘wide combs 
result in a reduction in time required to shear in the order of 17 per cent, cause no 
significant time reduction in the quality of the shearing job, and cause no increase 
in the proportion of skin cuts’ (as reported in Hearn and Knowles 1996, p. 316). 
Despite this, the shearers’ union, the Australian Worker Union, vehemently opposed 
the use of wide-comb and ensured the existing award conditions were upheld where 
possible (Hearn and Knowles 1996, p. 304 and pp. 314-315).
In 1982 an application was made to change the Pastoral Industry Award to 
officially allow the use of wide-comb shears. This application was again opposed 
by the Australian Worker Union. The change in law was seen by the union as an 
erosion of workers’ contractual rights - in terms of the theory, it was an attempt to 
reduce b. Not only that, the issue was seen by the union as a part of a campaign to 
reduce their rights generally. ̂
Tn May 1982 the Australian Workers Union commented that ‘[i]n no time we’ll be back to the 
conditions the industry had before 1990’ (as reported in Hearn and Knowles 1996, p. 316).
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As in the other examples above, there was little scope for the industry to pay 
compensation to the union for its future losses. As well as the itinerant nature 
of shearing, the industry was suffering financially in 1982, hit by low commodity 
prices and drought (Hearn and Knowles 1996, p. 314). Further, as suggested by 
the theory, maintaining their default conditions was important for the shearers as 
they worked in an industry in decline. For instance, in 1956 a shearer could earn 
double the average weekly -wage: in 1986 shearers earned little more than average 
weekly wages (Hearn and Knowles 1996, pp. 313-14.)
In December 1982 the Arbitration Commission ruled to allow combs wider than 
64 mm. Upon losing its appeal in March 1983, union members went on strike for 8 
weeks in a unsuccessful attempt to reverse the court’s decision.
3.9.8 Other restrictive workpractices
Where the removal of restrictive workpractices would increase the total surplus 
available, the parties are forgoing a potential bargaining opportunity. There are 
many other examples of this in Australian industry, see for example Productivity 
Commission (1998c, pp. xx-xxiv and Chapter 8) for restrictive workpractices in the 
Australian Processing Industry and Productivity Commission (1998d, pp. xxvii- 
xxxiii and Chapter 5) for work arrangements in the black coal industry.
3.9.9 Summary
To conclude this section, it is worth reiterating some of the points of these 
examples. First, delay in bargaining (or innovation) is empirically relevant, both in 
terms of numbers and in terms of the loss in overall surplus. Second, the assumptions 
of the model are supported by the case studies presented. Note that in the restrictive 
workpractice and social policy examples presented there was generally common 
knowledge about the benefits of reform. As such, the asymmetric information story 
of delays in bargaining is not always applicable. Further, the incompleteness of 
contracts is an important factor in determining unions’ opposition to change. In
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fact, the type of contracts used in an industry would often have to change to allow 
change to proceed. Willman (1986) argued that:
Conflict over change is particularly likely where two conditions exist.
On the one hand, cost-cutting process innovations are more likely to gen­
erate resistance than product change: expanding sectors where product 
rather than process change predominates are less likely to experience 
problems. On the other hand, spot-contracting bargaining structures 
which transmit product-market volatility through to wages and employ­
ment, and which allow continuous union influence over job content, are 
more likely to generate conflict.
All three industries [docks, newspaper, motor vehicles] experiencing 
a high level of conflict over change were characterized by product-market 
volatility and spot contracting. In all cases, technological change which 
cut costs was accompanied by organizational change which sought to 
move away from spot contracting to a more comprehensive contract.
(pp. 247-48)
The question then remains as to why the contractual environment does not im­
mediately adjust to facilitate change. Notably, all the industries discussed (the 
waterfront, newspaper printing and automobiles) struggled over many years to im­
plement more fully-contingent contracts in an attempt to overcome these problems.
Third, the predictions of the model are consistent with the evidence, namely 
that craft unions were more likely to oppose change than union with a broader 
range members. Again, Willman (1986) argued:
In spot contracting, for example, trade unions must almost by def­
inition be decentralized: the requisite form of bargaining puts pressure 
on local negotiators. Given its origin in product-market variation, trade 
unions are highly likely to become concerned with job control and to 
seek to bargain over work-loads and employment levels. Incremental 
technical change is a bargaining opportunity, but contractual change
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must involve a substantial power shift away from local representatives 
towards those who will design and administer a comprehensive contract.
(pp. 253-54)
3.10 Conclusions
The model developed in this paper generates delays in bargaining with: multiple 
bargaining rounds; incomplete contracts; and wealth constraints. Unlike much of 
the non-cooperative bargaining literature, delays may occur in equilibrium without 
the presence of asymmetric information.
The model consisted of two periods and a buyer and seller. At the start of each 
period a potential new reform or task was revealed to both parties, along with the 
surplus that it could generate. If the parties agree to adopt the new innovation, 
they bargained over the potential surplus. A party’s claim on surplus depended 
on their default payoff and their bargaining strength. An effect of innovation was 
that the seller lost her default payoff (in the basic model) or her contemporaneous 
bargaining power (in the extended model).
If the seller anticipates losing out in subsequent bargains from first period reform, 
she will be only willing to accept innovation if she is adequately compensated. This 
may not be possible because of wealth constraints. Further, because the parties 
cannot write a fully contingent contract, they are unable to implement reform on 
the basis of a surplus sharing arrangement or a commitment to a future remuneration 
scheme.
The basic model predicts that the incentive to delay for the seller is increasing 
in the outside option, decreasing in current bargaining strength, decreasing in ex­
pected surplus and increasing in the probability that future surplus is low. Allowing 
(drastic) innovation to affect the relative bargaining power of the parties alters these 
results. If innovation reduces the bargaining power of the seller, she is more likely 
to delay when surplus is expected to be higher in the future (relative to the present 
potential surplus). Similarly, a seller is more likely to delay a drastic innovation the
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higher the level of her current bargaining strength.
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3.11 Appendix A
Result 3.1 Innovation will always occur in period t = 2, regardless of the outcome 
in the first period.
Proof. Consider the case when innovation has not occurred in the first period. 
If the parties decide not to innovate at t = 2 the payoffs for the seller and buyer 
are b and 0 respectively. If there is innovation at t = 2 the payoffs depend on the 
realisation of v2 and the relative size of b. From equation 3.1 and 3.2, the payoffs for 
the buyer and seller are either: {at^, (1 — &)v2 } if oiv2 > b\ or {6, V2 — b} if b > av2 . 
Thus both the buyer and the seller weakly prefer innovation over the status quo, 
given no innovation occurred in period t = 1.
Now consider the case when innovation occurred in period t = 1. If period 
innovation t = 2 does not occur the payoffs to the buyer and seller are zero. If t = 2 
innovation occurs the payoffs to the seller are (au 2 , (1 —a )^ } . Both players strictly 
prefer period t =  2 reform if innovation occurred in period t = 1. □
Result 3.2 The buyer never wishes to delay innovation in the first period.
Proof. Consider the first period payoffs. If no t = 1 innovation occurs, the 
buyer’s t = 1 payoff is zero. From equations 3.1 and 3.2, if innovation occurs in 
period t =  1 the buyer’s payoff is either: (i) (1 — a)vi — iq; or (ii) (ui — b) — F\. 
From Assumption 3.5, in case (i) Fi < (1 — oi)v\ and in case (ii) F\ < (v\ — b). 
Consequently, the buyer’s first period payoff if there is innovation is greater than or 
equal to his no innovation payoff (zero).
Now consider the effect on second period payoffs from first period innovation. 
From Result 3.1, innovation will always occur in equilibrium in the second period. 
To assess the impact in the second period of t =  1 reform, the buyer must compare 
the expected payoffs given by equation 3.1 or 3.2 (no-innovation payoffs) with the 
expected return given by equation 3.3. If the relevant no-innovation payoffs are given 
by equation 3.1, there is no change to the second period payoff from innovation in 
the first period. (The outside option for the buyer is not binding.) If, on the other
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hand, the relevant no-innovation payoff is given by equation 3.2 the buyer is better 
off in the second period from t = 1 reform, as (1 — a)u 2 — (u2 — b) = b — av2 > 0. 
The buyer’s claim on second period surplus is weakly improved by t = 1 innovation.
Taking into account the effect of t = 1 reform on the buyer’s payoff in both 
periods, the buyer strictly prefers first period innovation as he has an expected 
positive gain from innovation in at least one period. To see this, assume iq is 
equal to the entire size of the buyer’s first period surplus. When b > au# the 
two period return to the buyer if there is t =  1 innovation of [0 + p( 1 — q) vl + 
(1 — p)( 1 — a)vn\ exceeds his payoff over both periods when there no first period 
reform of [0 -F p (vl — b) -f (1 — p)(vn — 6)]. Similarly, when olvl < b < au # , the 
return to the buyer with first period innovation exceeds the no-innovation return, 
as [0 +  p(l — a)uL + (l — p)(l — ol)vh\ > [0+p(ut,—fe) +  (l — p)(l — a)u#]. Therefore, 
the buyer never wishes to reject innovation in the first period. □
Result 3.3 (a) If V\ = ul, the seller will accept innovation in the first period 
when: (i) b < auc,; (™) avL < b < au# and b < ; and (in) vl >
b > olvh and b < \{vl +  av^)- (b) The seller will delay innovation in the 
first period when v\ = vl if: (i) avL < b < cxvh and b > i or if (ii)
vl > b > avH and b > \{ vl + av |).
P roof. First, consider the seller’s decision when v\ — vl and b < avL. Let 
Up be the seller’s ex ante expected utility when she does not agree to the first 
period innovation. Also, let U% be the seller’s ex ante expected utility when she 
does agree to the period t=  1 innovation. If the seller rejects first period innovation 
Ud — b +  auf. In the first period the seller receives her default payoff b. In period 
t = 2 the seller expects to receive auf as her outside option never binds. If the seller 
agrees to the first period innovation, C/J =  au^+ P i+ auf. Again, the seller’s outside 
option is not binding at time t = 1. Letting iq =  0, A U = Up — = b — clvl < 0.
As AU < 0, the seller will be worse off if she delays the first period innovation, 
even without any compensation payment. The seller will always agree to t = 1 
innovation in this case, as in Result 3.3(a) part (i).
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Second, consider the seller’s decision when v\ =  vl and avL < b < avn- Here, 
Up = b +  pb +  (1 — p)avn- If the seller delays first period innovation her outside 
option will be binding only if v  ̂ =  vl . As before, she receives her default payoff 
in the first period. On the other hand, U% = b +  F\ +  olv\ .  Once, innovation has 
occurred, the seller’s expected second period surplus is given by equation 3.3. In 
the first period the outside option is binding, so the seller will receive this payoff, 
plus any fixed payment from the buyer. From Remark 3.5, the buyer is willing to 
set F\ equal to his total share of surplus (vl — b) if necessary. If F\ = vl — b, 
AU = b +  pb +  (1 — p)avH — vl — apvL — a ( l  — p)vn =  b( 1 +  p) — 1 + ap). The
seller will agree to innovation if AC/ < 0, or when b < • This demonstrates
Result 3.3(a), part (ii). The seller will delay if AU > 0, or if b > , showing
Result 3.3(b) part(i).
Third, consider the seller’s when v\ = vl and b > avn  (also note b < vl)- If
the seller delays in the first period, her expected surplus is Up = b + b. Here, the
outside option will be binding in the second period regardless of the value of 
Again, if innovation is delayed at t = 1, the seller receives her default payoff in the 
first period. If the seller agrees to innovation at t = 1, U% = b +  F\ +  In the 
first period, the seller receives surplus equal to her default, plus any transfer from 
the buyer F\. In the second period the division of surplus is given by equation 3.3. 
Again, to see if there is an equilibrium involving delay, consider when F\ = Vl — b, 
the largest feasible transfer from the buyer in this case. With this compensation 
payment AU = 2b — vl — av\. The seller will delay innovation if AU < 0, or if 
b < \{vl +  otvI), as in Result 3.3(a) part (iii) Conversely, the seller will delay first 
period reform if AU  > 0, or if b > \ ( vl +  auf), as in 3.3(b) part (iii). □
Result 3.4 (a) I f V\ = vh, the seller never wishes to delay when: (i) b <
(ii) b E (otVL,avH) and b < (apvL +  u # )/(l +p); and if b G (cxvh,Vl) and 
b < \ { vh + Ofu|). (b) If Vi = vh, the seller will delay first period innovation 
if: (i) b e (avL,avH) and b > (apv^ + vh)/{ 1 + p) ; (ii) or if b G (ocvh, vl) 
and b > vH (l+a(I-U) 2£ Vl = I(yH +  avl).
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Proof. Consider when v\ = vh and 6 < avL• If the seller delays innovation in 
the first period her expected utility is Up =  6 + auf. She receives her default payoff 
in the first period and, as her outside option will never be binding, her expected 
claim on second period surplus is auf. If the seller accept first period innovation, 
her expected utility is U% =  olvh + F\ + auf. As the outside option is not binding, 
the first period claim on surplus is au# plus F\. Second period expected surplus is 
given by equation 3.3. Letting iq = 0, AU  =  b +  auf — (au# +  auf) = b — au# < 0. 
Reform is in the seller’s interests, even without any fixed payment from the buyer, 
so she will always agree to implement reform at t =  1. This demonstrates 3.4(a) 
part (i).
Now consider when v\ = vh and b 6 (au^, avjj). If the seller delays t =  1 
innovation her expected utility Up = b 4- (pb +  (1 — p)cxvh), where (p6 +  (1 — p)avn) 
is her expected second period surplus given that the outside option is only binding 
when V2 = vl- If the seller agrees to first period reform U% = avn  +  Ti +  owf- Here, 
avn+Fi  is the first period payoff with innovation as the default is not binding. Upon 
first period agreement, the seller’s second period surplus is auf. Considering the 
largest feasible Fi, that is F\ = (1 — &)vh, AU =  b — avn  +  (pb — olvl) — (1 — ol)vh = 
6(1 +p) — apvL — vh- The seller will accept period t =  1 innovation if AU < 0, or 
if 6 < (apvL + Ujy)/(1 H- p), as in Result 3.4(a) part (ii). The seller will delay first 
period reform if AZ7 > 0, or if 6 > (apvL + Vh)/(  1 +p), as in Result 3.4(b) part(ii).
Finally, consider when v\ =  vh and 6 G (olvh,vl)- If the seller delays her 
expected utility is Up = b +  6. If the seller accepts reform in the first period her 
expected utility is = (6 +  Fi) +  auf. Considering the largest feasible fixed 
payment, Fi = vh — 6, AU = b +  6 — [vh + apvL + a ( l  — p)vh] = 26 — vh — 
apvL — a ( l  — p)vh■ The seller will accept reform if AU < 0, or if 6 < \ ( vh +  auf), 
as in Result 3.4(a) part (iii). The seller will delay t = 1 reform if AU > 0 or if 
b > \ ( vh +  auf), as in Result 3.4(b) part(ii). □
103
CHAPTER 4
The determinants of innovation: empirical 
evidence from AWIRS 95
4.1 Introduction
At times innovation is contentious as it alters the distribution of surplus. For exam­
ple, a union may oppose reform if it weakens their bargaining strength or reduces 
their share of surplus, even if the innovation increases overall welfare. Using the 
Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995 (AWIRS 95), this chapter 
examines resistance to workplace innovation.
Resistance to change takes different forms and can have varying impacts.t This 
chaprer studies three aspects of innovation. First, opposition to reform may lower 
rates of innovation (Willman 1986, p. 38). With this in mind, the paper compares 
the characteristics of workplaces that adopted an innovation of some sort with those 
that do not. It is then possible to ir \(ec  the features that encourage employees or 
unions to resist change. Second, where innovation did occur, the chapter examines 
the attitudes of employees to these innovations. This allows us to study situations 
in which labour would have vetoed change if they were in a position to do so. Third, 
this chapter examines the characteristics of workplaces that wished to implement 
some change but were prevented from doing so. This analysis provides a direct
^Willman (1986) argued that resistance to innovation could take different forms, including: (i) 
companies dissuaded to innovation given their expectation of excessively costly union/employee 
resistance; (ii) firms factoring higher pay for employees operating the new equipment into the cost 
of innovation; and (iii) firms altering innovations because of the expectation that the benefits of 
innovation will be reduced due to the maintenance of restrictive workpractices (pp. 5-6).
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measure of union or employee resistance to the introduction of surplus enhancing 
innovations.
Although of interest by itself, this chapter provides an empirical test of the 
theoretical results of the model presented in the previous Chapter 3. This study 
also contributes to the existing literature in several other important ways. First, 
the chapter explores innovation using a new data source, AWIRS 95. Second, as 
far as the author is aware, this is the first time attitudes towards innovation and a 
direct measure of delay have been used in such a study.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 briefly reviews previous studies 
of workplace innovation. Section 4.3 outlines the empirical predictions arising from 
the theory of delays in innovation with incomplete contracts, presented in detail 
elsewhere. These predictions provide a framework for the empirical estimation and 
discussion to follow. The AWIRS data and the dependent and independent variables 
used are described in Section 4.4. The empirical estimation results are presented in 
Section 4.5. Finally, Section 4.6 makes some concluding comments.
4.2 Previous studies
This section reviews several studies that have examined the determinants of 
innovation.
Using the Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) conducted in the 
United Kingdom over the period 1981-84, Machin and Wadhwani (1991) exam­
ined the determinants of organisational change defined as ‘substantial changes in 
work organisation or work practices not involving new plant, machinery or equip­
ment’. As independent variables they included: union involvement in bargaining 
with the workplace management; a financial performance dummy; the number of 
competitors; a dummy if product demand was increasing or contracting; and a vari­
able indicating whether the plant was operating at full capacity. As well as industry 
dummies Machin and Wadhwani included data on the local market unemployment 
rate on the basis that this would affect a union’s ability to bargain effectively with
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a firm and veto changed
Their estimations showed that establishments with recognised unions were more 
likely to have implemented organisational change, as were larger plants, poorly 
performing plants and foreign owned plants. The regional unemployment variables 
were insignificant. Although noting the positive effect of the union variable, the 
authors qualified this result by commenting that the union movement was in decline 
over the survey period due to rising unemployment, anti-union legislation and a 
weakening product market. Further, since unionised workplaces had more restrictive 
workpractices at the beginning of this period, those plants had greater opportunity 
to implement organisational change (p. 843). The authors argued that this implies 
that unions in decline were less likely to discourage investment.t
Nunes, Crockett and Dawkins (1993) used the Australian Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey 1990 (AWIRS 90) to test whether organisational technical change 
was more likely in workplaces in the traded sector, in the private sector or in compet­
itive areas of the economy. *  They also tested whether trade unions have a positive 
or a negative effect on innovation.
They created seven dependent variables depending on whether or not a work­
place had recently introduced: significant changes in the product or service; new 
plant, equipment or office technology; a major restructuring of how work was done; 
job redesign; an incentive/bonus scheme; semi-autonomous work groups; or quality 
circles/team building at the workplace.* Logit estimations were made with these 
seven dependent variables. In addition, they created three reform indexes by com­
bining responses to the seven possible changes.* These indices where used to identify
t Unemployment nearly increased three-fold between 1979 and 1982 in the United Kingdom 
(Machin and Wadhwani 1991).
Tn 1995, Australian unions were also undergoing significant changes, with the progressive 
implementation of certified and enterprise bargaining. Union membership was also in decline. 
(See Morehead et al 1997 Chapters 1 and 7.) Consequently, the results presented here need to 
consider the effect of the changing environment oji^union behaviour. However, the reliance on 
labour’s ability to veto change is partly circumnaaagafced by also analysing union and employee 
attitudes to innovation.
*Also see Crockett et al (1993).
^The first three changes were to be introduced within the last two years while the last four 
changes could have been introduced within the last five years.
^The first index combined the first three changes (changes in product or service, new plant or
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whether a workplace had a propensity to make many changes. An ordered probit 
was run on these three indexes.
The independent variables used included: the level of competition; import, ex­
port and private sector dummies; union presence in the workplace; the number of 
unions; union density; size of the workplace and its age; the size of the organisa­
tion; whether demand for the product was changing (increasing or contracting); and 
industry dummies.
The alternative dependent variables yielded different results. For example, union 
presence was positively associated with the probability that a workplace adopted a 
product change. In comparison, when process change was used as the dependent 
variable the coefficient on union density and presence was negative; but for the 
numbers of unions it was positive. Other results included: workplaces from larger 
organisations were more likely to implement a product innovation; workplaces that 
were experiencing some change in demand were more likely to implement a product 
innovation; process innovation was more probable in larger workplaces, older work­
places and when demand was changing; organisation size was positively associated 
with the probability of work restructuring; and, finally, job redesign was positively 
associated with workplace size but negatively associated with being in the com­
petitive sector and with high workplace autonomy.* Further, the results for the 
ordered probits estimations, using the three reform indices suggested a change in 
management, good management-union relations, workplace size and the changing 
demand variable were all positively associated with a higher probability of innova­
tion, while union density and the high autonomy variable coefficients were negative 
and significant.
Using AWIRS 1990, Drago and Wooden (1994) found that unions had a negative 
effect on innovation and investment. They established that investment levels were
equipment and major restructuring of work). The second index contained the other four possible 
changes (job redesign, incentive/bonus scheme, semi-autonomous work groups and quality circles). 
The final index included all seven possible changes.
tWillman (1986) argued unions would oppose process innovation as it were likely to cost jobs, 
but that they would be more accepting of product innovations that were likely to increase demand 
for both the final product and for labour.
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higher in workplaces where unions were active. Using the introduction of major 
new plant, equipment or office technology as the dependent variable, they found 
that size of a workplace had a positive effect; higher rates of return were positively 
associated with change, rising demand was positively associated with change while 
there was a small positive effect of falling demand.^ Overall, these results were 
similar to Machin and Wadhwanis’ (1991) findings in the United Kingdom.
Brooks and Morris (1993), again using AWIRS 1990, examined the determinants 
of whether or not a workplace introduced major new plant equipment or office 
technology in the previous two years for all workplaces, manufacturing workplaces 
and non-manufacturing workplaces. Their union variables gave mixed results in all 
three samples. For example, when all workplaces were examined union presence 
had a significant and negative effect on technical change, whereas increases in the 
number of unions in a workplace a significant and positive effect. Union density was, 
however, not significant. Market growth had a positive and significant effect on the 
probability of innovation for all three specifications, while the variable for a declining 
market was not significant for any of the estimations. Product demand predictability 
had a positive effect on innovation in two of the three specifications. Variables 
proxying for competition levels, including traded sector dummies, were positive for 
some specifications, but they were not always significant. Interestingly, Brooks and 
Morris used as explanatory variables several proxies for innovative management, 
including whether the workplace had introduced new products, new work practices 
and just redesign, that were used as dependent variables by Nunes et al (1993).
In summary, there is mixed empirical evidence about the impact of unions on 
innovation. Some evidence from the United Kingdom suggests that unions are pos­
itively associated with change. On the contrary, it appears that Australian unions 
have often been associated with lower rates of innovation. This conclusion is far 
from definitive, however, as some evidence suggests unions have been positively 
associated with change for some alterative innovations and union variable specifica-
tThey also found that foreign-owned workplaces were less likely to have implemented some 
innovation.
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tions. The size of the workplace and the organisation is often positively associated 
with innovation. The probability of innovation is often positively associated with 
competition and with workplaces in the traded sector.
4.3 Theory
This section briefly outlines the theory of delays in innovation presented in detail 
in Chapter 3. Consider the following example. A firm wishes to implement an 
innovation that increases total surplus. This innovation may be the introduction 
of a new technology or a new workplace procedure. This innovation will also, by 
its very nature, reduce employee’s bargaining power in future negotiations, thus 
reducing their claim on future surplus. As a result, to induce agreement the firm 
must compensate the employees for their future expected losses. If the firm cannot 
provide this compensation up front, or commit to a contract in the future that 
provides the necessary compensation, employees will resist making the change.
The key elements of the model are that: there are multiple bargaining periods; 
the outcome of previous bargaining rounds affects the subsequent distribution of 
surplus; contracts are incomplete; and the parties are wealth constrained. Thus, in 
a reduced-form equation the probability of whether a workplace innovates can be 
written as:
Pr[innovation) = / ( finance, surplus, bargaining power)
In this equation the probability of innovation (or the probability of no delay) is 
a positive function of a workplace’s access to finance. The specific relationship 
between delay, future surplus and bargaining power are described below.
The predictions of the model provide a framework to analyse the empirical re­
sults in this chapter. In the model reaching agreement (innovation) affects parties’ 
claim on future surplus either by altering their default payoffs (historical bargaining 
positions) or by changing their relative contemporaneous bargaining strengths. De­
lay will occur at different times depending on which of these assumptions applies.
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First, if innovation reduces the default payoffs of a party delay is more likely when 
l ^ e - r  -VU*- ^
this-default is-laxger, as outlined in Prediction 4.1.
A
Prediction 4.1 A party with a strong historical position is more likely to delay 
innovation.
If innovation reduces labour’s default position this could reduce their claim on 
surplus in the future, providing possible incentive for delay. An innovation of this 
sort might be the removal of a restrictive workpractice that allows employees leisure 
on the job, excessive staffing levels or outdated work-safety rules. The sort of unions 
we could expect to behave like this are older unions that won major concessions in 
the past. These unions would typically be in more traditional sectors of the economy 
like manufacturing.
Second, a union that is an effective bargainer, even without their historical de­
fault, can expect to receive a large portion of the surplus generated from innovation. 
Such a union will be more willing to accept innovation.
Prediction 4.2 A party with a strong claim on current surplus is more likely to 
accept innovation.
The type of worker organisation referred to in Prediction 4.2 will provide a 
service required by the firms, for example a service in an area where there is a 
shortage of labour with those specialist skills.
Taken together, Predictions 4.1 and 4.2 suggest that measures of bargaining 
strength, such as union density, have an ambiguous sign on the probability of inno­
vation. This is because the incentives to delay depends on the precise relationship 
between bargaining and innovation. This issue is discussed at more length in section 
4.4.
Third, innovation reduces labour’s ability to bargain in the future. The sort of 
change that might have this effect is the removal of a closed shop. This type of 
change can be expected to substantially reduce a union’s bargaining power, increas­
ing the incentive for labour to reject innovation.
4
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Prediction 4.3 The stronger the initial bargaining strength of a party facing an 
innovation that reduces their bargaining power, the more likely they are to reject 
innovation.
Another example of such a change would be the introduction of a new technology 
that makes a particular group of workers redundant. For example, innovation like 
the introduction of new printing technology virtually removed the need for print 
type setters. A craft union is more likely to face a drastic innovation and, as a 
consequence, is more likely to oppose innovation than a more broadly-based em­
ployee organisation. The empirical estimates in this paper test this prediction, in 
particular with reference to craft-based unions.
Last, consider how a labour’s bargaining power interacts with expected future 
surplus. If agreement reduces the future default payoffs of a party, delay is more 
likely when expected future surplus is lower. An example of this would be a union 
in an industry in decline or facing the introduction of new competition (reducing 
rents). On the other hand, if innovation reduces current bargaining power, a party 
is more likely to delay agreement when expected future surplus is larger.
Prediction 4.4 A party with a strong historical default is more likely to delay when 
future surplus is expected to be low and when innovation reduces their default payoff. 
A party facing a drastic innovation that reduces their current bargaining potency is 
more likely to delay when future surplus is expected to be high.
This prediction provides a refutable hypothesis that is exploited in the empirical 
estimation presented below. Essentially this prediction suggests that the effect 
on probability of innovation of higher future surplus (for example positive) is the 
opposite to the effect of lower future surplus (for example negative). It is inconsistent 
with the theory that both variables have a coefficient of the same sign, be it positive 
or negative. This is explored at greater length in section 4.4
111
4.4 Data and empirical models
The data used in this study are from the Australian Workplace Industrial Re­
lations Survey 1995 (AWIRS 95) d The main survey sampled 2001 workplaces with 
over 20 employees covering all major ANZSIC divisions across all States and Terri­
tories. The main survey consisted of four questionnaires: the General Management 
Questionnaire completed by the most senior manager at the workplace; the Em­
ployee Relations Management Questionnaire targeted at the manager with the most 
day-to-day responsibility for employee relations at the workplace; the Union Dele­
gate Questionnaire aimed at the senior delegate from the union with the most mem­
bers at the workplace; and an Employee Survey Questionnaire, which was given to 
a randomly selected sample of employees at workplaces from the main survey. This 
thesis uses of the first three questionnaires, all of which were conducted by personal 
interview. Both the General Management and the Employee Relations Management 
Questionnaires have a sample of 2001, while the Union Delegate Questionnaire has 
a sample of 1086.
4.4.1 Model 1 - the probability of innovation
The first model is based on question BFl from the General Manager in the main 
Questionnaire:
which, if any, of the changes listed, happened at this ^workplace in the 
last 2 years? 1. Introduction of major new office technology (not just 
routine replacement); 2. Introduction of major new plant, machinery 
or equipment (not just routine replacement); 3. Major reorganisation 
of workplace structure (for example, changing the number of manage­
ment levels, restructuring whole divisions/sections and so on); 4. Major 
changes to how non-managerial employees do their work (for example, 
changes in the range of tasks done, changes in the type of work done);
5. None of the above.
*The survey and the data is described in detail in Morehead et al (1997).
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From this question a 0-1 dependent variable was constructed, termed ‘organisa­
tional change’. If none of the four possible changes had occurred at the workplace, 
the dependent variable took on the value of zero. The index was assigned a value of 
1 if there had been some form of innovation at the workplace. This organisational 
change index was used as the dependent variable in a probit estimation.
In addition, each of the four possible changes, namely the introduction of new 
technology, the introduction of machinery or equipment, a major reorganisation of 
the workplace and major changes to work, were used to construct four separate 
variables. Again, if the change was made the dependent variable took on the value 
of 1, and 0 if the change was not made. These four variables were each used as 
dependent variables in probit estimations. This model is similar to the studies of 
Brooks and Crockett (1993), Nunes et al (1993) and Drago and Wooden (1994), all 
of whom used Australian data, and the work of Machin and Wadhwani (1991) who 
used British data.
Table F.l, in Appendix A, presents the number and proportions of workplaces 
that implemented different innovations in the areas of: technical change; plant or 
equipment; a reorganisation of the workplace structure; a change in the work of 
nonmanagers; and organisational change, the composite variable described above. 
This table shows that most workplaces implemented a change of some sort, with 84 
per cent of workplaces making at least one type of innovation. It follows that 16 
per cent of workplaces did not make any of the four innovations. Changes relating 
to plant and equipment were least common (28 per cent) while 59 per cent of 
workplaces made a reorganisation of the workplace.
As a measure of how many different changes were made, the responses to the 
four specific changes were combined to give a number between 0, if no changes were 
implemented, up to 4 if all four possible changes occurred at a workplace in the two 
years prior. This index is used as the dependent variable for an ordered probit.t
^These variables differ from Nunes et al (1993) in several ways. In particular, this paper does 
not use product change, job redesign or the implementation of an incentive/bonus scheme, semi- 
autonomous work groups or quality circles as dependent variables. This approach was decided 
upon because it was thought that these variables do not necessarily capture the essence of an
113
Table *̂-2 shows the number of workplaces that implemented zero, one, two, three 
and all four possible changes.
4.4.2 Model 2 - attitudes towards innovation
The second model examines the attitudes of labour to the major change that 
occurred at their workplace. Question B F ll asked the general manager:
how would you rate the reaction of each of these groups to the introduc­
tion of (the most significant change)? Union delegates; Full time union 
officials; Employees directly affected by the change; Employees generally 
at this workplace; First-line supervisors; Management at this workplace:
1 Strongly resistant; 2 Resistant; 3 Neutral; 4 In favour; 5 Strongly in 
favour.
The responses for: union delegates; full-time union officials; employees directly 
affected; and employees generally were compiled into an index from 1 to 5 for each 
group, with 1 representing a strongly resistant response through to 5 representing 
the relevant party being strongly in favour of the change. Each of these variables 
are used as dependent variables in ordered probit estimations. Tables 4.3, 4-.4, *4.5 
and 4.6 in Appendix A shows the attitudes to the major change at their workplace 
for each group. Notably, union delegates were far less positive than the other groups 
about the innovation. For example, 67 per cent of union delegates were strongly 
resistant to the main change at their workplace, whereas this figure was only 8, 5 
and 2 per cent for full-time union officials, employees directly affected and general 
employees respectively.
innovation in the theoretical model. An innovation in the theory involves a change that cannot be 
unilaterally reversed by the employee or by the union and that involves the worker(s)/union losing 
some bargaining power in the future. It was decided that these characteristics were less applicable 
to these omitted variables, hence they were not included in this study.
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4.4.3 Model 3 - delay of innovation
Finally, the dependent variables of the third model relates to question BF13 in 
the General Management Questionnaire:
What, if any, significant efficiency change would you like to make at this 
workplace but cannot?
Those workplaces that wished to make changes that were irrelevant as far as the 
theory is concerned, such as wanting to change government policy, were excluded 
from the estimates below. In all 1130 workplaces out of a possible 1921 wished to 
implement some change relevant to the theory but could not. First, this demon­
strates that delay is empirically important. Table 4  •? in Appendix A shows the 
reasons why the change could not be implemented. The reasons given by the gen­
eral managers support the assumptions made in the theoretical model, namely that 
firms face wealth constraints and that employees or unions have the ability to stall 
or veto change.
Given this information about the workplaces, two indices of delay are con­
structed. The first dependent variable equalled 0 if a workplace wanted to implement 
a change but could not do so and 1 if it did not have such a problem (it was not 
delayed). This variable is used as the dependent variable in a probit estimation. 
Second, from the two questions from the General Management Questionnaire dis­
cussed above, it is possible to categorise all workplaces into four groups: those who 
didn’t innovate and did not want to; those who wanted to innovate but were pre­
vented from doing so; those who did implement some changes but who still wished 
to do more; and those who innovated and did not wish to implement any additional 
changes. The sample was restricted to those wishing to innovate and an index was 
created for the last three categories. This index provides a direct measure of delay. 
The first group were workplaces that were prevented completely from implementing 
change. The second group of workplaces did implement some changes but wanted 
to do more. Finally, there was no delay of innovation at the last group. This 1,2,3 
index is used as the dependent variable in an multinominal logit.
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Again, as far as the author is aware this is the first time such an index has been 
used in an empirical model.
4.4.4 Independent variables
The theory suggests that the probability of delay is affected by the ability of a 
workplace to pay compensation, the bargaining power of employees or the union and 
the expected size of future surplus. The independent variables used in the empirical 
estimates relate to these factors. Several other variables, highlighted as potentially 
important by other theoretical models, are included as controls. The independent 
variables outlined in this subsection are used in each of the three models described 
above.
Prediction 4.1 suggests that a union with a strong historical bargaining position 
is more likely to delay innovation. Prediction 4.2 suggests that a union with strong 
bargaining power is more likely to accept innovation. The empirical model includes a 
union density variable, defined as the proportion of the total number of employees at 
a workplace who are members of a union. To the extent that union density measures 
the strength of a union’s historical position, it will be negatively associated with 
the probability of innovation. On the other hand, if union density reflects current 
bargaining power it could be positively associated with the probability of change. 
A priori, the sign of union density is ambiguous4
Prediction 4.3 suggests that a craft union is more likely to delay innovation 
than a broadly-based union. From the answers of the union delegate, it is known 
how many different types of workers (managers, para-professionals, trades people, 
labourers etc.) the main union in a workplace represents. This answer is constructed 
into a variable from 1 to 8, with the number referring to how many different types of
Tn the literature the effect of unions on innovation is also ambiguous. Dowrick and Spencer 
(1994) showed that a union may wish to accept or reject innovation under different circumstances. 
Other models suggest that union activity can hinder investment (for example Grout 1984) or that 
it can be positively associated with innovation (Freeman and Medoff 1984 and Williamson 1983). 
Further, the incentive to develop new labour-saving capital may be enhanced if union activity 
has the effect of increasing labour costs. Thus, while in the short run union activity could be 
negatively correlated with innovation, this relationship could be positive in the long run.
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workers the union represents. This number indicates how ‘craft based’ a union is or, 
alternatively, how narrowly defined its interests are.*  Assuming that an innovation 
has a greater negative impact on a craft union than on a more broadly based union, 
the coefficient on this index should be positively correlated with innovation (and 
negatively correlated with delay).1”
The number of unions present at the workplace could also indicate how narrowly 
defined the interests of unions are. However, the probability of innovation could be 
reduced if the presence of many unions in a workplace requires that the firm bargain 
with and compensate a greater number of interest groups.
Prediction 4.4 relates to the expected size of future surplus. According to the 
basic model, delay is more likely when future surplus is low, or when an industry is 
in decline. That is, the expected sign of the coefficient on the demand contracting 
variable is negative (more delay) and it is positive on the demand expanding variable 
(less delay). On the other hand, with the drastic innovation model, delay is more 
likely when expected future surplus is high, for example in an expanding industry: 
this suggests contracting demand is positively associated with innovation while there 
is a negative relationship between expanding demand and innovation. Although 
these predictions differ, it is notable that the theory suggests that if the demand 
expanding coefficient is positive (negative), the demand contracting coefficient is 
likely to be negative (positive).
In the empirical model, product demand is used as a proxy for surplus. Question 
BC8 asks Ts the demand for your workplace’s main product or service currently 
expanding, stable or contracting?’ Responses to this question are used to create 
two dummy variables, one if demand is expanding and one if contracting. If a
^As an alternative specification, dummy variables were created for unions with a ‘medium’ 
diversity of interests who represented two or three employee groups and for unions with ‘broad’ 
interests who represented four or more worker types. The effect of these dummies was estimated, 
relative to ‘craft’ unions who represented only one occupational group. These results, not reported, 
were similar to the results discussed here.
*As the Union Delegate Questionnaire had a smaller number of responses than the General 
Management Questionnaire an additional estimation was calculated including this variable. The 
coefficient estimates for the craft union variable, however, are included in the table along with the 
other variables.
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workplace’s demand was expanding it is interpreted that expected future surplus is 
larger and if demand was contracting it is interpreted that future surplus is expected 
to be smaller.^
The estimates include three broad industry dummies, t In addition, the three 
industry dummies are interacted with the demand expanding and the demand con­
tracting dummy variables. Thus for each industry grouping there are two additional 
dummies.^ Using the demand contracting and demand expanding dummies, con­
strains the coefficients to be the same across all industries. Interacting the three 
industry dummy variables with the demand variables allows for more flexibility. 
Two specification?of each model are estimated. The first includes just the industry 
dummies. The second specification includes both the industry dummies and the 
demand-industry interaction variables.
From the theory, the probability of delay is increased if a workplace has limited 
access to funds in order to pay compensation. Both workplace and organisation 
size are included in the estimates on the assumption that larger bodies have greater 
access to external sources of financed The probability of innovation is expected to 
be positively related to both size measures. Likewise, an owner-operated dummy 
variable was included on the basis that such workplaces may have more limited
typ ically  the introduction of competition to a government monopoly involves a redistribution 
of rents. This provides another possible empirical test of the theory presented above: a union 
facing the onset of competition and an innovation that removes their historical default position 
are more likely to delay, whereas, a union anticipating greater product market competition and a 
drastic innovation are more likely to accept change. This, of course, presumes that participation 
in the market is not dependent on adopting the innovation.
^Industry A includes ANZSIC industries in mining, manufacturing and construction. Industry 
B includes workplaces in accommodation, wholesale, retail and transport while Industry C includes 
business services, property services, education, health, community services, sports and recreation, 
personal services, the arts, other and several other minor categories. The default comparison 
industry group includes government administration and electricity, gas and water. Different in­
dustry specifications were tried and these only marginally altered the coefficients on the other 
independent variables on the other industry dummies. In particular, the Electricity, Gas and Wa­
ter classification was shifted from the default to Industry A and government administration was 
included in Industry C with only a minor effect.
Tn fact the main reason for collapsing the industry dummies is to create a manageable number 
of variables.
* Delay relates to the compensation required relative to the funds available. The compensation 
required for larger organisations is likely to be more than that needed by smaller workplaces, but 
it is assumed that this increase is outweighed by their improved access to finance.
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access to external sources of finance.
The General Manager Questionnaire also provides information about the level 
of competition the workplace faces. The general manager was asked to rank com­
petition level as intense, strong, moderate, some or limited. An index from 1 to 5 
was generated from these responses and included in each of the estimations, 5 being 
the greater the level of competition.^
A workplace can be expected to face greater competitive pressure if it is either 
exporting or facing import competition. From the General Manager Questionnaire, 
a trade index was created with four discrete values between 0 and 3, the higher 
number reflecting either more import or export competition^
A dummy variable was included for non-commercial workplaces.
Table 4- 8 displayed in Appendix A shows the means and standard deviations 
of the independent variables used in the empirical analysis. Appendix B provides a 
detailed account of the data manipulations used in the estimations.
4.5 Results
The estimations were calculated using the STATA statistical software package. 
Marginal effects are reported for the probit estimates. The marginal effects are 
calculated as the change in probability for an infinitesimal change in each continuous 
variable and a discrete change in probability for dummy variables, evaluated at the 
sample means of the datad
i’See Tirole (1988) Chapter 10 for a discussion of the incentive to innovate for a monopolist as 
compared with a competitive firm. Further, Canton, de Groot and Nahuis (2000) and Dowrick and 
Spencer (1994) develop theoretical models in which greater product market competition increases 
the incentive to accept innovation. In Dorwick and Spencer (1994) a union is more likely to 
accept an innovation the higher the elasticity of demand in the product market. This is because 
a reduction in price is more likely to translate into higher sales and greater demand for labour.
t Using the typical import and export dummies separately was also estimated with little effect 
on the coefficient on the variables of interest so, for the sake of having a parsimonious model, the 
single index was adopted.
^Also see Greene (1997), Chapter 19.
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4.5.1 Model 1 - the probability of innovation
The estimation results for Model 1 are shown in Tables 4.9-4.14 in Appendix 
A. The results in Table 4.9 show that organisation size is positively correlated with 
the probability that a workplace made some organisational change (significant at 
the 5 per cent level). The coefficient for organisational ehange is also positive and 
significant for the estimates with technical change, reorganisation of the workplace 
and a change in work of non-managers. A workplace experiencing an increase in 
demand is 5 percentage points more likely to have innovated than a workplace that
<tS
fac®% stable demand, again significant at the one per cent level (Table 4.9). Also 
note, the marginal effect of the contracting demand dummy variable is negative but 
insignificant. A similar pattern emerges with all four specific innovation categories 
(Tables 4-10, 4.11, 4-12 and 4.13). This is consistent with the theoretical model in 
which the bargaining party loses its historical default when agreeing to innovation.
Returning to the organisational change dependent variable, while the level of 
competition was insignificant, the trade index was positive and significant at the 
one per cent level.* The number of unions is positively related to the probability 
of change while the coefficient for the union density variable was negative and in­
significant. The craft union index, from the estimation with the smaller sample, is 
insignificant (Table 4.9). Somewhat similarly, there is no consistent pattern for the 
union variable estimates across the different specific innovations. For example, the 
number of unions is negatively correlated with the probability of technical change, 
whereas it is positively correlated with a reorganisation of the workplace. Further, 
union density is negatively correlated with the probability of technical change but 
it is positively correlated with a change in the work of nonmanagers. Although in­
significant for every other dependent variable, the craft union index was positively 
correlated with a workplace reorganisation (Table 4.12), consistent with the theory.
The estimations that include the interaction terms between demand contracting 
and expanding and the industry groupings are displayed in the right hand columns
^The competition variable was positive and significant for technical change (Table 4*9)-
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of the respective tables. For example, consider the organisation change index pre­
sented in Table 4.9. The results of the estimations are robust to this altered spec­
ification: the size of the organisation and the number of unions at a workplace 
remain positively related to the probability of change at the 1 and 10 per cent levels 
of significance respectively. Similarly, the trade index is positive and significant, 
again at the 1 per cent level. The first notable feature of the coefficients on the 
expanding demand-industry interaction dummy variables are positive, and: all of the 
contracting industry dummies are negative. Further, the demand expanding dum­
mies for industry group A and industry group B are significant at the 5 per cent 
level. Viewed from the framework of the theory presented above, this is consistent 
with the same bargaining model applying across the different industries. Similar 
results were estimated using the specific innovations.
Finally, consider the ordered probit of the number of organisational changes 
implemented in a workplace. The key results discussed above hold. The workplace 
and organisation size coefficients are positive and significant, as is the trade index 
coefficient. The craft union index is positive and significant, indicating workplaces 
with more broadly-based unions were more likely to implement a greater number of 
innovations. The number of unions variable was also positive and significant. Once 
again, the demand expanding variable was positive and significant while the demand 
contracting variable was negative and insignificant. These results translated over to 
the estimates with the industry-demand interaction terms.
4.5.2 Model 2 - attitudes towards innovation
Tables 4.15, 416, 4.17 and 4-18 show the results of the ordered probit es­
timates for the attitudes of: union delegates: full-time union officials; employees 
directly affected by the innovation; and employees generally. Consider the esti­
mates for employees directly affected by the change, presented in Table 4T7. The 
basic estimation specification, reported in the left hand columns, reveals that the 
coefficient for the owner-operated dummy was negative and significant (5 per cent), 
organisation size was negative and significant (1 per cent) and the coefficient on
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commercial workplaces was negative and significant at the 10 per cent level. The 
coefficients on the union density and the number of unions were negative and signif­
icant (at the 1 per cent level), while the craft union index was insignificant. Finally, 
as with Model 1 the demand expanding variable coefficient was positive and signif­
icant (at the 1 per cent level). The coefficient for the demand contracting dummy 
variable was negative but insignificant. For the estimation using the demand inter­
actions, the coefficients on the demand expanding variable for industry A, B and C 
were all positive and significant (at the 10, 10 and 5 per cent level of significance 
respectively).
The estimation results for employees generally were broadly similar to those for 
employees directly affected by the change. The results for the union delegate and the 
full-time union official differed somewhat. For example, the union density variable 
was positive and significant for the full-time union official estimates (see Table 
..16). However, the estimate results relating to the demand variables remained 
remarkably similar across all four groups. The demand expanding coefficient was 
positive and significant for two of the three variables: the demand contracting 
variable was negative and insignificant for two of the three estimation groups as well. 
The estimates with the demand-industry type interaction terms were again similar, 
particularly for the employees directly affected by the change and for employees 
generally.
4.5.3 Model 3 - delay of innovation
The probit estimates with the simple index of delay are reported in Table 4 .19. 
For the basic specification, workplaces with contracting demand were 8 per cent 
more likely to experience delay than workplaces with stable demand (significant at 
the 5 per cent level). The coefficients for the number of unions, union density and on 
the commercial workplace dummy variable were negative and significant at the 1 per 
cent level. These results also held when the probit was estimated using the demand- 
industry interaction terms. Of the interaction terms, only the demand contracting 
dummy variable for industry A was significant (5 per cent), the coefficient showing
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that workplaces with contracting demand had a 14 per cent higher probability of 
delay (that is, not being able to implement some innovation).
The multinominal estimation results using the delay index are presented in tables 
4: .20 and 4:. 21.* For these estimates the base group are workplaces that were delayed 
and did not innovate. The second category are those workplaces that innovated to 
a degree but that were also prevented from implementing some change. The third 
category were those innovating workplaces that were not delayed at all. In the basic 
specification without the demand-industry interaction terms, shown in table .20, 
the first column relates to category 2 (partial innovation) relative to category 1 (no 
innovation due to delay). The coefficient on the demand expanding variable was 
positive and significant (10 per cent), as it was for organisation size (5 per cent level 
of significance) and the trade index (5 per cent). For category 3 (no delay) relative 
to category 1 displayed in the right hand columns, the coefficient on the owner- 
operated workplace dummy variable was positive and significant at the 10 per cent 
level, as was the organisation size variable. The demand expanding dummy variable 
was positive and significant (5 per cent level of significance), while the coefficient 
on the demand contracting variable was negative and significant (also at the 5 per 
cent level). Finally, the union density coefficient was negative and significant at the 
1 per cent but the craft union variable was insignificant.
The results in Table 4 .̂21 show that with the expanded specification the coef­
ficients on organisation size, trade, the owner-operated dummy variable and union 
density remained the same in terms of sign, magnitude and significance as reported 
above. For category 2, as compared with the delayed category (group 1), both of 
the coefficients for industry A interacted with the demand dummies were negative 
and insignificant, while for industry B the coefficient on demand expanding was 
positive and significant (5 per cent) while the contracting demand dummy variable 
coefficient was negative and insignificant. Further, the demand expanding coeffi­
cient for industry C was positive and significant (10 per cent), while the demand 
contracting variable was negative and insignificant. For category 3, relative to the
*An ordered probit was also estimated with the index producing similar results.
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delay-comparison group, the coefficients of the demand variables repeated the pat­
tern observed in the other estimates: the contracting demand variable in industry 
A was negative and significant (10 per cent), demand expanding in industry B was 
positive and significant (1 per cent), as was the demand expanding dummy variable 
for industry C (at a 1 per cent level of significance).
4.5.4 Discussion
The data presented here examines the probability of innovation, the attitudes 
to reform and the factors relating to when a workplace wanted to innovate but was 
prevented from doing so. Overall, larger organisations were more likely to innovate 
and not to suffer delay than their smaller counterparts. This is consistent with the 
predictions of the theory. The effect of the union variables was somewhat mixed 
although union density was positively associated with negative attitudes towards 
innovation and negatively associated with a workplace not experiencing any delay. 
This supports Prediction 4.1 over Prediction 4.2.
A significant contribution of the analysis is that it provides a new interpretation 
for the effect of the demand expanding and contracting variables (Prediction 4.4). 
Other papers have not distinguished between the effect of increasing or decreasing 
demand (for example Nunes et al 1993). Although the incentive to delay depends 
on the type of innovation and the bargaining solution, a prediction from the theory 
is that if the sign of one of these dummies is positive (for example the demand 
expanding dummy), the dummy for the other variable is likely to be negative (the 
demand contracting dummy variable in this case). This result is a common finding 
in the empirical estimations presented above, and when it is not the case at least one 
of the variables is insignificant. These results lend support to the theory presented 
above.
Another new aspect of this empirical model is that it analyses the attitudes to 
innovation and directly assess the factors related to the delay of innovation. Fur­
ther, this is the first study to assess the relationship between innovation and delay 
and how narrowly focused a union is, using the ‘craft’ variable (Prediction 4.3).
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Although some results for the craft variable were positive and significant, the vari­
able was insignificant on a majority of occasions. There are several possible reasons 
for this. First, the index relates to how many worker types a union represented 
rather than directly measuring whether a union is based around a craft or not. 
Second, most unions in the sample have a narrow focus: approximately 75 per cent 
of unions represent fewer than three worker groups. Third, the craft union index 
only relates to the main union in a workplace. Fourth, Dowrick and Spencer (1994) 
also predicted that industry-level unions were more likely to oppose innovation than 
enterprise-based unions. This characteristic is not accounted for in the data used. 
At this stage, further research is needed into this issue.
Of course, there are several caveats that need to be taken into account. First, 
even though the question about innovation relates to the two previous years, the 
data used here are a cross section. As a consequence, there is the possibility that 
a workplace may undertake significant innovation prior to the start of the sample 
period, after, or both. The implicit assumption is that every workplace becomes 
aware of the potential innovations at the same time (at the start of the sample 
period) and choose whether to implement the change immediately (within the two 
year window) or delay. This assumption would not be appropriate if, for example, 
workplaces in larger organisations are more aware of potential reforms than smaller 
workplaces.
Second, given the timing of the questions some of the independent variables may 
not be truly exogenous. For example, whether or not a workplace implemented an 
innovation may help determine whether demand is expanding or contracting.
Third, the organisation change index combines four different types of innova­
tions together. It is not altogether obvious that this grouping is appropriate. By 
combining these innovations it is assumed that these different changes have the 
same effect on the bargaining power of the union/employees.
Fourth, on a related point, the theory makes some very particular assumptions 
that may not hold for some of the innovationsin question. For example, the theory 




This chapter examined three aspects of innovation and delay of innovation using 
the AWIRS 95 survey: first, the characteristics of workplace that implemented an 
innovation; second, the attitudes of unionists and employees of workplaces that im­
plemented some change; and, third, a direct measure of delay in innovation derived 
from information concerning workplaces that were prevented from implementing a 
significant efficiency-enhancing change. As far as the author is aware, this is the 
first time either of the latter two aspects of innovation have been studied.
This study also provided an new empirical test of the theory of delays in bar­
gaining with incomplete contracts presented in Chapter 3, albeit an indirect one. 
Considering the effect of innovation on the distribution of future surplus, the theory 
suggests that if the probability of innovation is positively correlated with higher fu­
ture surplus, innovation should be negatively correlated with lower future surplus. 
This relationship is consistently borne out in the data for different specifications and 
across the three different models. The theory also suggests that workplaces that 
are financially constrained are also more likely to be delayed in their attempt to 
implement change. Variables indicating the size of the workplace and organisation, 
and possibly their access to financial funds, were consistently associated with higher 
rates of innovation and a lower probability of delay. The relationship between 
the union variables and innovation is mixed; the empirical results depended on both 
the specific innovation and the measure of union involvement. However, the theory 
suggests that more broadly-based unions are less likely to oppose innovation that 
unions with a narrow interest group, such as craft unions. Although there is some 
limited support for the notion that broad-based unions are associated with higher 
rates of innovation, this result was far from conclusive. The impact of craft unions 
remains area for future empirical work.
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4.7 Appendix A




P lant and equipment 
Reorganisation 
Work of nonmanagers 
Total







Source: A ustralian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995
Table 4.2: The number of reforms implemented by workplaces







Source: Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995
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Table 4.3: The attitudes of union delegates to the major innovation at a workplace














Source: Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995
Table 4.4: The attitudes of full-time union officials to the major innovation 
at a workplace














Source: Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995
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Table 4.5: The attitudes of employees directly affected by the major innova­
tion at a workplace














Source: A ustralian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995
Table 4.6: The attitudes of employees generally to the major innovation at a workplace














Source: A ustralian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995
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Source: Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995
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Table 4.8: Means and standard deviations of variables used in the empirical analysis
Variable Mean Standard deviation
Owner 0.148 0.355
Workplace size 196.955 369.068
Organisation size 5392.954 7505.756
Commercial workplace 0.283 0.451
Trade Index 0.423 0.746
Level of competition 3.026 0.875
Demand expanding 0.537 0.499
Dem.and contracting 0.113 0.316
Number of unions 1.886 1.813
Union density 0.462 0.338
Craft union index 1.443 1.693
Industry A 0.274 0.446
Industry B 0.226 0.419
Industry C 0.394 0.489
Industry D 0.106 0.308
Industry A * expanding dv 0.113 0.317
Industry A * contracting dv 0.051 0.219
Industry B * expanding dv 0.127 0.333
Industry B * contracting dv 0.024 0.153
Industry C * expanding dv 0.230 0.421
Industry C * contracting dv 0.029 0.168
Source: Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey 1995 
Industry A * expanding dv is equal to the demand expanding dummy variable 
multiplied by the Industry A dummy variable. Likewise for Industries B and C. 
Industry A * contracting dv is equal to the demand contracting dummy variable 
multiplied by the Industry A dummy variable. Likewise for Industries B and C. 
Industry D is the default industry.
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Demand exp a 0.055***
Demand cont ° -0.0219




Ind A a -0.133***
Ind B a -0.157***
Ind C a -0.084
Ind A * exp a 
Ind A * cont a 
Ind B * exp a 
Ind B * cont a 
Ind C * exp a 






Prob >  chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.043





























* significant a t 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant a t 1 per cent
b Coeffs from estimations with 978 obs and log likelihoods of -332.6 and -330.6
a d F /d x  is for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to  1.
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Table 4.10: Probit estimation results with technical change as the dependent variable
O w ner a
dF/dx
-0.028
W orkplace size 5.97E-5
C om petition 0.038***
Org. size 5.25E-6***
D em and  exp a 0.060**
D em and  cont a -0.040
No. o f  un ions -5.67E-4*
U nion density -0.074*
Craft ab 0.015
Trade In d ex 0.032*
In d  A  a -0.177***
In d  B a -0.802
In d  C  a -0.076*
In d  A  * exp a 
In d  A  * cont a 
In d  B  * exp a 
In d  B  * cont a 
In d  C  * exp a 
In d  C  * cont a 


































* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant at 1 per cent 
b Coefficients from estimations with 978 observations and log likelihood of -645.1
and -636.7 respectively
a dF/dx is for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1.
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Table 4.11: Probit estimate results with plant, equipment or machinery- 







Demand exp a 0.058**
Demand cont a 0.002




Ind A  ° 0.313***
Ind B a 0.188***
Ind C a 0.129***
Ind A * exp a 
Ind A * cont a 
Ind B  * exp a 
Ind B  * cont a 
Ind C * exp a 






Prob >  chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.061





























* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant a t 1 per cent 
b Coefficients from estimations with 978 observations and log likelihood of -556.1
and -552.1 respectively
° d F /d x  is for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to  1.
134
Table 4.12: Probit estimation results with reorganisation of workplace as 
dependent variable
dF/dx z dF/dx z
O w ner a 0.106*** 3.02 0.108*** 3.06
W orkplace size 1.32E-4*** 3.29 1.32E-4*** 3.29
C om petition 0.007 0.51 0.008 0.54
Org. size 3.82E-6** 2.13 3.68E-6** 2.05
D em and  exp a 0.050* 1.92
D em and  cont a -0.011 -0.27
N o. o f un ions 0.020** 2.25 0.020** 2.26
U nion density 0.022 0.52 0.020 0.48
C raft ab 0.024** 2.04 0.023** 2.02
Trade In d ex 0.022 1.15 0.021 1.14
In d  A a -0.272*** -5.21 -0.279*** -4.78
In d  B  a -0.301*** -5.81 -0.337*** -5.45
In d  C a -0.180*** -4.01 -0.231*** -4.50
In d  A * exp a -0.011 -0.23
In d  A  * cont a -0.011 -0.18
In d  B  * exp a 0.069 1.32
In d  B  * cont a -0.070 -0.78
In d  C * exp ° 0.089** 2.2
In d  C * cont a -0.031 -0.42
C om m  a 0.005 0.15 0.004 0.11
obs. P 0.587 0.587
pred. P 0.593 0.593
N 1763 1763
Log likelihood -1137.074 -1134.443
Prob > chi2 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.049 0.051
* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant at 1 per cent 
b Coefficients from estimations with 978 observations and log likelihood of -613.3
and -611.4 respectively
a dF/dx is for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1.
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Table 4.13: Probit estimation results with change in the work of nonmanager 
as dependent variable
d F /dx z d F /d x z
Owner a -0.010 -0.27 -0.010 -0.27
Workplace size 9.96E-5** 2.55 9.85E-5** 2.52
Competition 0.005 0.37 0.005 0.34
Org. size 3.71E-6** 2.07 3.7E-6** 2.06
Demand exp a 0.048* 1.81
Demand cont a -0.006 -0.14
No. of unions 0.012 1.43 0.012 1.38
Union density 0.085** 2 0.086** 2.04
Craft ab 0.016 1.35 0.018 1.47
Trade Index 0.039** 2.04 0.038** 1.96
Ind A a -0.149*** -3 -0.155*** -2.75
Ind B  a -0.166*** -3.38 -0.144** -2.4
Ind C a -0.100** -2.37 -0.185*** -3.74
Ind A * exp a 0.004 0.09
Ind A * cont ° -0.039 -0.60
Ind B  * exp a -0.027 -0.49
Ind B  * cont ° -0.111 -1.22
Ind C * exp a 0.138*** 3.30
Ind C * cont a 0.056 0.73
Comm a -0.018 -0.51 -0.020 -0.57
obs. P 0.475 0.475
pred. P 0.475 0.475
N 1763 1763
Log likelihood -1188.35 -1183.81
Prob > chi2 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.026 0.0295
* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant a t 5 per cent, *** significant at 1 per cent 
b Coefficients from estimations with 978 observations and log likelihood of -662.8
and -659.8 respectively
° d F /d x  is for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1.
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Table 4.14: Ordered probit estimation results with organisational change in­
dex as the dependent variable
Coef. z Coef. z
O w ner 0.002 0.03 0.003 0.035
C om petition 0.047 1.59 0.048 1.614
W orkplace size 1.81E-4** 2.17 1.80E-4** 2.169
D em a n d  exp 0.195*** 3.56
D em a n d  cont -0.055 -0.64
Org. size 9.39E-6** 2.53 8.92E-6** 2.39
No. o f  un ions 0.034* 1.90 0.034* 1.88
U nion density 0.116 1.31 0.115 1.31
C raft b 0.055** 2.21 0.055** 2.21
Trade Index 0.136*** 3.44 0.136*** 3.42
In d  A -0.281*** -2.68 -0.378*** -3.19
In d  B -0.352*** -3.40 -0.474*** -3.72
In d  C -0.214** -2.44 -0.371*** -3.58
In d  A  * exp 0.136 1.28
In d  A  * cont -0.058 -0.43
In d  B  * exp 0.233** 2.02
In d  B  * cont -0.260 -1.37
In d  C  * exp 0.264*** 3.05
In d  C  * cont -0.073 -0.46
C om m 0.044 0.61 0.040 0.56
cut 1 -0.764 -0.889
cut 2 0.031 -0.092
cut 3 0.887 0.766
cut 4 1.653 1.53
N 1763 1763
Log likelihood -2652.8 -2649.5
Prob > chi2 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.017 0.018
* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant at 1 per cent
6 Coefficients from estimations with 978 observations and log likelihood of -1458.5
and -1455.5 respectively
Table 4.15: Ordered probit estimation results of attitudes of union delegate 
















Ind A * exp 
Ind A * cont 
Ind B  * exp 
Ind B * cont 
Ind C * exp 







































* significant a t 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant a t 1 per cent
b Coefficients from estimations with 864 observations and log likelihood of -1176.2
and -1172.5 respectively
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Table 4.16: Ordered probit estimation results with attitudes of full time union 














Ind A * exp 
Ind A * cont 
Ind B * exp 
Ind B * cont 
Ind C * exp 





























































* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant at 1 per cent
b Coefficients from estimations with 777 observations and log likelihood of -1012.9
and -1009.0 respectively
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Table 4.17: Ordered probit estimates with attitudes of employees directly 
affected by the most significant change
Coef. z Coef. z
Owner -0.191** -2.25 -0.196** -2.30
Competition 0.028 0.81 0.028 0.84
Workplace size -1.40E-4 -1.34 -1.34E-4 -1.29
Demand exp 0.213*** 3.48
Demand cont -0.036 -0.37
Org. size -1.51E-5*** -3.73 -1.56E-5*** -3.83
No. o f unions -0.073*** -3.66 -0.073*** -3.69
Union density -0.361*** -3.69 -0.354*** -3.62
Craft b -0.011 -0.43 -0.010 -0.36
Trade Index -0.022 -0.49 -0.022 -0.51
Ind A 0.521*** 4.56 0.392*** 3.01
Ind B 0.456*** 4.04 0.293** 2.04
Ind C 0.304*** 3.23 0.166 1.48
Ind A * exp 0.229* 1.93
Ind A * cont -0.114 -0.74
Ind B * exp 0.256* 1.94
Ind B * cont 6.06E-4 0.003
Ind C * exp 0.208** 2.19
Ind C * cont 0.095 0.52
Comm -0.154* -1.95 -0.161 -2.04
cut 1 -1.761 -1.894
cut 2 -0.643 -0.778
cut 3 -0.151 -0.286
cut 4 1.123 0.990
N 1479 1479
Log likelihood -2020.0 -2019.9
Prob >  chi2 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.040 0.040
* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant a t 1 per cent
b Coeffs from estimations with 862 obs and log likelihoods of -1192.5 and -1190.3.
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Table 4.18: Ordered probit estimation results with attitudes of employees 
generally to the most significant change
Coef. z Coef. z
O w ner -0.105 -1.22 -0.110 -1.23
C om petition 0.058* 1.72 0.060* 1.75
W orkplace size -7.72E-5 -0.74 -7.45E-5 -0.71
D em and  exp 0.236*** 3.83
D em and  cont 0.045 0.46
Org. size -1.81E-5*** -4.44 -1.86E-5*** -4.54
No. o f un ions -0.049** -2.45 -0.049** -2.47
U nion density -0.356*** -3.61 -0.355*** -3.60
C ra ftb 0.009 0-34 0.009 0.33
Trade Index -0.040 -0.90 -0.042 -0.95
In d  A 0.583*** 5.07 0.466*** 3.55
In d  B 0.574*** 5.04 0.400*** 2.77
In d  C 0.372*** 3.93 0.177 1.57
In d  A  * exp 0.186 1.55
In d  A  * cont -0.062 -0.40
In d  B  * exp 0.276** 2.07
In d  B  * cont -0.033 -0.14
In d  C * exp 0.300*** 3.13
In d  C  * cont -0.136 -1.71 0.097 0.53
C om m  a -0.136 -1.71 -0.145* -1.82
cut 1 -1.903 -2.064
cut 2 -0.759 -0.918
cut 3 0.021 -0.138
cut 4 1.505 1.348
N 1482 1482
Log likelihood -1865.3 -1963.8
Prob > chi2 0 0
Pseudo R2 0.041 0.042
* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant at 1 per cent
b Coefficients from estimations with 864 observations and log likelihood of -1105.7
and -1100.7 respectively
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D em and exp a 4.36E-3
D em and cont a -0.084**
Org. size -1.76E-6




Ind A a 0.030
Ind B a 0.079
Ind  C a -0.047
Ind A * exp a 
Ind A * cont a 
Ind B  * exp a 
Ind B  * cont ° 
Ind C * exp a 
Ind C * cont a 




































* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant at 1 per cent 
6 Coefficients from estimations with 937 observations and log likelihood of -575.7 
and -574.0 respectively
a dF/dx is for a discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1.
\
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Table 4.20: Multinomial logit estimation results with the index of delay as 
the dependent variable
Coef. z Coef. z
nref=2 nref=3
Owner 0.421 1.36 0.526* 1.68
Competition 0.144 1.42 0.160 1.52
Workplace size -8.46E-5 -0.27 6.07E-5 0.18
Demand exp 0.398* 1.96 0.437** 2.07
Demand cont -0.341 -1.29 -0.646** -2.28
Org. size 3.28E-5** 2.26 2.67E-5* 1.75
No. o f unions 0.113 1.62 -0.012 -0.16
Union density -0.358 -1.12 -0.963*** -2.87
C raftb 0.150 1.52 0.109 1.05
Trade Index 0.359** 2.32 0.244 1.54
Ind A -0.949** -2.40 -0.821** -1.99
Ind B -0.809** -2.02 -0.554 -1.33
Ind C -0.417 -1.20 -0.688* -1.88
Comm 0.025 0.10 -0.386 -1.39
Constant 1.450*** 3.14 1.631*** 3.38
N 1568
Log likelihood -1371.9
Prob >  chi2 0
Pseudo R2 0.043
The base case (nref= l) is workplaces who wished to innovate bu t could not 
nref=2: workplaces th a t made some innovation bu t were prevented from doing all 
they wanted to
nref=3: workplaces th a t innovated and were not delayed at all.
* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant a t 1 per cent
b Coeffs from estimations with 900 obs and log likelihood of -762.3
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Table 4.21: Multinominal logit estimation results with the index of delay as 
the dependent variable with industry-demand interactions
coef z coef z
nref=2 nref=3
Owner 0.446 1.439 0.551* 1.75
Competition 0.145 1.415 0.167 1.57
Workplace size -8.7E-5 -0.27 6.29E-5 0.19
Org. size 3.1E-5** 2.11 2.39E-5 1.55
No. o f unions 0.111 1.59 -0.014 -0.19
Union density -0.388 -1.21 -0.998*** -2.96
C raftb 0.155 1.55 0.117 0.27
Trade Index 0.366** 2.36 0.247* 1.55
Ind A -1.009** -2.27 -0.767** -1.67
Ind B -1.213*** -2.67 -1.13** -2.40
Ind C -0.642* -1.66 -0.95 -2.31
Ind A * exp -0.089 -0.24 -0.191 -0.50
Ind A  * cont -0.215 -0.51 -0.865* -1.90
Ind B  * exp 1.161** 2.44 1.434*** 3.00
Ind B * cont -0.659 -1.23 -0.622 -1.13
Ind C * exp 0.542* 1.69 0.625* 1.83
Ind C * cont 0.562 -1.21 -0.738 -1.39
Comm 0.028 0.11 0.386 -1.39
Constant 1.66*** 3.71 1.838*** 3.94
N 1568
Log likelihood -1364.32 
Prob >  chi2 0.00
Pseudo R2 0.048
The base case (n ref= l) is workplaces who wished to innovate but could not 
nref=2: workplaces th a t made some innovation but were prevented from doing all 
they wanted to
nref=3: workplaces th a t innovated and were not delayed at all.
* significant at 10 per cent, ** significant at 5 per cent, *** significant a t 1 per cent
b Coeffs from estimations with 978 obs and log likelihood of -759.5.
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4.8 Appendix B: Data description and manipulations
This appendix details the questions of AWIRS used and the manipulations un­
dertaken to create the variables in the estimations.
Ownership of the workplace
Questions: bb9. Details: If bb9=l or 2 the owner DV=0; if bb9=3, 4 or 5 owner 
DV=1.
Workplace size
Questions: bbl. Details: workplace size=bbl
Organisation size
Questions: bal3, bbl7. Details: If bal3=2, multi=0, if ba l3= l, m u ltiS ; os- 
izeSO if bbl7= l, osizeSOO if bbl7=2, osize=50 if bb l7= l, osize=300 if bbl7=2, 
osize=750 if b b l7 S , osizeSOOO if bbl7=4, osize=7500 if bbl7=5, osizeS5000 if 
bbl7=6, osize=20000 if bbl7=7; then organisation size=multi*osize.
Commercial operation
Questions: ba6. Details: com m ercials if b a 6 S , commercial=l if ba6=2.
Import competition
Questions: bc4. Details: import com petitions if b c 4 S , import com petitions 
if bc4=2, import com petitions if bc4=.
Export
Questions: bc3. Details: e x p o r ts  if bc3=l, export=l if bc3=2, export=2 if 
bc3=3, e x p o r ts  if bc3=.
Traded sector index
Questions: ba4, ba3. Details: t r a d e S  if import com petitions &; e x p o rts , 
trade=l if import com petitions &; e x p o rts , t r a d e S  if import com petitions & 
e x p o r ts , trade=2 if import com petitions & export=2, trade=2 if import com­
p e tit io n s  & e x p o r ts , t r a d e S  if import com petitions & export=2.
Level of competition
Questions: bc6. Details: competition le v e ls  if bc6=5, competition le v e ls  if 
bc6=4, competition level=2 if bc6=3, competition le v e ls  if bc6=2, competition
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level=4 if bc6=l, competition level=3 if bc6=.
Demand expanding
Questions: bc8. Details: demand expanding=0 if bc8=2, demand expanding=0 
if bc8=3, demand expandings 1 if bc8=l.
Demand contracting
Questions: bc8. Details: demand contracting=0 if bc8=2, demand contract- 
ing=0 if bc8=l, demand contracting=l if bc8=3.
Number of unions
Questions: cnl. Details: number of unions=cnl.
Union coverage or density
Questions: cn6, al, a3. Details: For each occupational group in cn6 (8 groups), 
the following proportions were used All employees (1) =1, Most employees (2) = 
0.67 Some employees (3) =  0.33 None (4)= 0, if cn6=. then 0 allocated. These 
proportions were then multiplied with number of employees in each group given in 
a3. This number is divided by al to give union membership as a proportion of total 
employees at each workplace. This variable is constructed following the technique 
outlined in Morehead et al (1997) pp. 141-42, with the slight difference that they 
drop observations if over one half of the proportion of type of employees responses 
for a workplace are missing. This difference means that the union density variable 
used here is slightly lower than reported by Morehead et al (1997).
Craft union versus broad based union index
Questions: da7 Details: c raftl= l if da7a =  100 and 0 otherwise, craft2=l if 
da7b=100 and 0 otherwise, craft3=l if da7c =  100 and 0 otherwise, craft4=l if 
da7d =  100 and 0 otherwise, craft5=l if da7e =  100 and 0 otherwise, craft6=l if 
da7f =  100 and 0 otherwise, craft7=l if da7g =  100 and 0 otherwise and craft8=l 
if da7h =  100 and 0 otherwise; craft =  craft 1 -I- craft2 +  craft3 - I -  craft4 +  craftö 
+  craftö +  craft7 +  craft8.
Industry dummies
Questions: bb6. Details: industry A=1 if (ANZSIC industries) bb6> = ll & 
bb6<=15, Industry A=1 if bb6>=21 & bb6 <=29, Industry A =  1 if bb6> =  41
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k  bb6 <=42; Industry B=1 if bb6=57, Industry B = 1 if bb6 >=45 k  bb6<=47, 
Industry B = 1 if bb6>=51 k  bb6 <=53, Industry B=1 if bb6>=61 k  bb6< =67; 
Industry C=1 if bb6>=71 k  bb6<=78; Industry C =  1 if bb6=84; Industry C = 1 
if bb6>=86 k  bb6< =87, Industry C =  1 if bb6>=91 k  bb6<=95, Industry C=1 
if bb6=96.
Industry dummy variables interacted with demand expanding and contracting 
variables
Questions: bb6, bc8. Details: Expanding Industry A =  (Industry A) * (demand 
expanding); Contracting Industry A =  (Industry A) * (demand contracting); Ex­
panding Industry B = (Industry B) * (demand expanding); Contracting Industry 
B=(Industry B) * (demand contracting); Expanding Industry C= (Industry C) * 
(demand expanding); Contracting Industry C = (Industry C) * (demand contract- 
ing).
Innovation
Questions: bfl. Details: technical change=l if bfla=100, Technical change=0 if 
bfla=0; new plant or equipment=l if bflb =  100, new plant or equipment=0 if bflb 
=  0; reorganisation of workplace=l if bflc =  100, reorganisation of workplace=0 
if bflc = 0; change in work of nonmanagers=l if bfld =  100, change in work of 
nonmanagers =  0 if bfld =  0; organisational change =  1 if bfle =  0, organisational 
change =  0 if bfle =  100; index of change = (technical change) +  (new plant or 
equipment) -f (reorganisation of workplace) +  (change in work of nonmanagers).
Attitudes to reform
Questions: b fll. Details: Attitudes of union delegate =  1 if b flla  =  1, Attitudes 
of union delegate =  2 if b flla  = 2; Attitudes of union delegate =  3 if b flla  =  3, 
Attitudes of union delegate = 4 if b flla  = 4; Attitudes of union delegate =  5 if 
b flla  =  5; Attitudes of full time union official =  1 if bfl lb  =  1, Attitudes of full 
time union official =  2 if bfl lb = 2, Attitudes of full time union official =  3 if bfl lb 
=3, Attitudes of full time union official = 4 if bfl lb  =  4, Attitudes of full time union 
official = 5 if bfl lb = 5; Attitudes of employees directly affected =  1 if bfllc =  1, 
Attitudes of employees directly affected =  2 if bfllc  = 2, Attitudes of employees
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directly affected = 3 if bfllc =  3, Attitudes of employees directly affected =  4 if 
b fllc  =  4, Attitudes of employees directly affected =  5 if bfllc  =  5; Attitudes of 
employees generally =  1 if b flld  =  1, Attitudes of employees generally = 2 if bflld  
=  2, Attitudes of employees generally =  3 if b flld  =  3, Attitudes of employees 
generally =  4 if bflld  = 4, Attitudes of employees generally =  5 if b flld  = 5.
Non reform (delay/no delay and index of delay)
Questions: bfl3, bfl. Details: non reform=0 if bfl3bl =  100, non reform=0 if 
bfl3b2 =  100, non reform=0 if bfl3b4 =  100, non reform=0 if bfl3b5 = 100, non 
reform=0 if bfl3b6 =  100, non reform=0 if bfl3b8 =  100, non reform=0 if bfl3b9 = 
100, non reform=0 if bfl3bl0 =  100, non reform=0 if b fl3bll =  100, non reform=0 
if bfl3bl2 =  100, non reform=0 if bfl3bl3 = 100, non reform=0 if bfl3bl4 =  100, 
non reform=0 if bfl3bl5 =  100, non reform=0 if bfl3bl7 =  100, non reform=0 if 
bfl3bl8 =  100, non reform=0 if bfl3b20 =  100, non reform=0 if bfl3b21 =  100, 
non reform=0 if bfl3b22 =  100, non reform=0 if bfl3b24 =  100, non reform=0 if 
bfl3b27 =  100, non reform=0 if bfl3b28 =  100, non reform=0 if bfl3b30 =  100, 
non reform=l if bfl3a = 2; Index of delay=l if non reform=0 &; bfle =  100, Index 
of delay=2 if non reform=0 &; bfle = 0, and Index of delay =  3 if non reform =  1 
& bfle =  0.
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CHAPTER 5
Hold-up and sequential specific 
investments
5.1 Introduction
Many projects prior to their commencement are nebulous and difficult to describe. 
For example, research and development projects often have vague objectives and 
speculative or uncertain outcomes; start-up firms are often based around intangible 
ideas. With joint projects this makes it difficult to write a complete contract spec­
ifying the tasks of each party, and the desired outcome. After some of the project 
has been completed, however, it begins to take shape. As a consequence, it may be 
only after the project is underway that something resembling a complete contract 
can be written d That is, after some investment has been sunk the project becomes 
well defined, allowing contracting on subsequent investment to be possible. This 
raises the question for the investing parties: should all the investment be made 
prior to when contracting is feasible, or should one of the parties wait until more 
complete contracts can be written before committing to invest? In the model pre­
sented here we examine this issue by considering simultaneous and sequential (or 
Stackelberg-staged) investments.
The basic structure of the model is as follows. Two parties are required to 
invest in order to complete a project. Two distinct alternatives are possible. First, 
they can invest simultaneously at the start of the game. If they do so, both invest
*Neher (1999) makes the point that contracting becomes more feasible as a project progresses 
as more of the human capital is converted into physical assets.
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prior to complete contracting being possible. After both investments are sunk the 
parties renegotiate and the payoffs are realised. Alternatively, one party can invest 
first while the other party waits. This first investment allows the project to take 
shape: as a result, contracting on the second investment becomes possible. At this 
stage, the parties will renegotiate and write a contract specifying the second party’s 
investment. The final stage of investment will then occur, completing the project 
and allowing the parties to receive their payoffs.
Several important results arise from this simultaneous versus sequential invest­
ment model. First, the paper investigates the relative efficiency of the two alterna­
tive investment regimes. When the investments are independent the model identifies 
three basic trade-offs between the regimes:
• The sequential system enlarges (relative to simultaneous investments) delay 
costs by increasing the length of time before the project matures.
• The sequential system reduces the first player’s incentive to invest, vis-a-vis 
the simultaneous system, because of the longer time between his investment 
and when the returns are realised.
• The sequential system improves the incentive for the second player to invest 
efficiently as they do not suffer hold-up, as they do with simultaneous invest­
ments.
The ultimate impact on total surplus is a combination of these trade-offs. We 
show that under different circumstances either timing regime can be the welfare- 
maximising method of investing. Moreover, despite the simplicity of the model, no 
simple relationship between the welfare effects of the two regimes exists as there 
is no restriction on how the three trade-offs mentioned above interact. The model 
is also extended in several ways, for example by considering these trade-offs when 
the two investments are complements or when they are substitutes. Similarly, we 
examine the relative efficiency of the two regimes when either investment is relatively 
important in terms of its contribution to overall surplus.
150
Second, the sequential regime can create trading possibilities that may not be 
feasible if the parties only have the option of investing simultaneously. For example, 
the second player may not be willing to invest simultaneously because the hold­
up that occurs during the subsequent renegotiation may leave them with negative 
utility. On the other hand, sequential investment gives this player the opportunity 
to delay their investment until when contracts are complete. This encourages the 
seller to invest and allows trade to proceed. This result is similar to the results of 
other authors, for example Neher (1999) and Admati and Perry (1991), albeit in a 
different context.
Third, we show that the possibility of investing sequentially does not always 
improve welfare. As it turns out, the mere possibility of flexibility in the timing of 
investment can act as an additional form of hold-up. For want of a better expression 
we call this kind of hold-up ‘follow-up’. This occurs when both parties should invest 
simultaneously at the start of the project in order to maximise surplus but there 
is an incentive for one party to wait until after the other player has sunk their 
effort before they follow-up with their own investment d Consider the case when 
technology requires that one particular party must invest at the commencement of 
a project but that the other party can invest either at the same time or wait. The 
first party will anticipate that the second party will delay their investment - opt 
for the sequential regime - if it suits them. The first party will then adjust their 
investment accordingly. In the extreme this additional form of hold-up will prevent 
a potential surplus-enhancing project from proceeding. Similarly, if there is an 
advantage from investing second, and there is no clear party that must invest first, 
this timing hold-up could reduce the potential gains from trade. In this situation 
determining who invests first, be it by technology or by some other mechanism, can 
help the parties avoid some of the costs of follow-up. This suggests that having 
different types of parties trading with each other can be a way of overcoming this 
form of hold-up.
Fourth, as discussed above, the second player acting in self-interest may have
t ‘Follow-up’ can occur in addition to the regular hold-up of investment.
151
the incentive to opt for the regime that does not maximise total welfare. The 
burden of this opportunism is typically borne by the other player. However, if such 
opportunism drives the first player’s return below his outside option, the second 
player also bears some of the cost from the reduction in total surplus. Indeed, it 
can be the case that the second player is disadvantaged by her inability to commit 
to a particular timing schedule of investment.
The applications of this model are many and varied. It is applicable where: a 
project is poorly defined before a project begins, but better defined sometime after it 
has been commenced (or commitment is possible at that time); and when the parties 
investments are ‘lumpy’ in the sense that each party makes their total investment 
at one time. For example, two parties making a specific investment in a particular 
location can opt to invest jointly, or in a sequential Stackelberg fashion. Similarly, 
two firms or departments involved in a joint research project may be able to invest 
simultaneously and pool the results or, alternatively, invest one after the other. 
Even two researchers, like a theorist and an econometrician, writing a joint paper 
could work simultaneously and negotiate how the research should be published when 
the results are known. Alternatively, one of them, for example, the econometrician, 
could wait for the theorist to complete her model before renegotiating about his 
specific task and what should be done with the output.
This paper draws on several streams of literature. First, it extends the analysis 
of hold-up with simultaneous investment, for example Grossman and Hart (1986) 
and Hart and Moore (1988).t These models are structured so that investments 
are made prior to renegotiation. This set up is equivalent to the simultaneous 
investment regime in the model presented here. An alternative literature considers 
hold-up when investment in a project can be made in arbitrarily small amounts over 
a potentially infinite horizon. For example, Admati and Perry (1991) show how two 
parties can overcome the free-rider problem by financing a public good in stages. 
Neher (1999) considers staged financing of a project when contracts are incomplete.
Tn a similar fashion to Che and Hausch (1999) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a), this 
paper considers a cooperative investment.
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The model presented here compares the relative advantages of these two streams of 
literature.
In a similar manner to the model in this chapter, De Fraja (1999) considered the 
Stackelberg-type sequencing of investments in the presence of hold-up. However, his 
suggested solution to the hold-up problem is inapplicable to model presented here 
as his model required the first investment to be general. In contrast, our model 
assumes both players make specific investments.*
Pitchford and Snyder (1999) studied a related model in their application of 
the Coase theorem. In their paper one party can choose to invest in a particular 
location aware that in the next period another party will physically locate next 
to them, and that this party will incur an external cost related to its investment. 
Contracts are incomplete as the first party is unaware of the exact identity of the 
second party before they physically locate in the second period. The first party can 
opt to invest prior to the arrival of the second party or to delay their investment 
so as to renegotiate (with complete contracts) with the newcomer when they arrive 
in the second period. Their model differs from ours in several respects. First, they 
consider only negative externalities between the two parties, rather than a joint 
project or partnership. Second, in their model it is the first party with the decision 
regarding timing. Here, the second party has the right to decide on the timing of 
investment.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 outlines the assumptions and 
timing of the model. In this section we also describe the bargaining solution used. 
Section 5.3 explores hold-up (follow-up) when the two parties make discrete invest­
ments. Analogous results are derived in section 5.4 with continuous investments. 
Section 5.5extends the model in several different ways to explore the relative advan­
tage of each regime when: investments are complements and substitutes; one party’s 
investment is relatively more important than the other; the parties are wealth con­
strained; and when there is a lack of commitment so that renegotiation can occur at
tDe Fraja’s (1999) solution to the hold-up problem required the first party to make a general 
investment then make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other party that included him paying for 
the specific investment. Given the first party is the residual claimant he will invest efficiently.
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any time. Finally, section 5.6 concludes the paper. Some of the proofs are contained 
in the Appendix A.
5.2 The model
There is a potentially profitable relationship between a buyer and a seller.t 
Specifically, if the buyer and seller invest I\ and / 2 respectively the two parties 
share surplus R. The exact relationship between the investments and surplus is 
discussed below.
5.2.1 Timing
The timing of investment is the focus of this paper. Two alternatives are con­
sidered. First, the players invest simultaneously. The timing of this system of 
simultaneous investment is shown in Figure 5.1. In this case, both parties invest 
at the same time, at time t =  1 . At this stage, contracting on either investment 
is not possible; consequently renegotiation will occur after both investments are 
sunk. (The renegotiation process is discussed below.) Definition 5.1 reiterates this 
discussion.
Definition 5.1 Simultaneous investment occurs when both 'parties invest at the 
same time, prior to renegotiation.
Figure 5.2 outlines the timing of the alternative investment regime. In this 
regime the buyer invests I\ at time t =  1 prior to when contracting is possible.t 
However, this investment by itself makes the contracting process possible, so having 
observed I\ the two parties renegotiate and contract on I2. It is only at this stage 
that the seller makes her investment / 2. This occurs at time t — 2. After both 
investments have been made, surplus is realised and the payoffs to each party are 
made. Definition 5.2 defines sequential investment.
^These parties could just as well be denoted as Party A and Party B.
Tn the context of the incomplete contracts literature this time can be thought of as the ex ante 
period.
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t = 1 t = 2
t




R  realised and
payoffs made
Figure 5.1: Simultaneous investment
Definition 5.2 Sequential investment occurs when one party (the buyer) invests at 
time t = l, while the other party (the seller) waits and invests at time t = 2.






I 2 invested R  realised and
payoffs made
Figure 5.2: Sequential investment
5.2.2 Assumptions
As noted above, the investments of the buyer and seller (A and A) combine 
together to generate surplus R. The investments of both parties are sunk and 
completely specific to the relationship in that they are worth zero outside the rela­
tionship. R  is only available at the completion of the project. This is summarised
155
in Assumption 5.1.
Assumption 5.1 The buyer can make investment and the seller can invest I 2 . 
Total surplus R is a function of fi and I 2 : R ( I i , l 2 )- Once invested both R  and I 2 
are sunk and specific to the relationship.
Although there is complete and symmetric information between the trading par­
ties, the investments are unverifiable ex ante. However, as discussed above, once 
the buyer’s investment has been sunk the project becomes tangible allowing sub­
sequent investment to be verifiable. On the contrary, the surplus generated by the 
project is always unverifiable. As a result, contracts can be written on investments 
ex post (after the first period) but surplus is never contractible.t This prevents 
the parties writing surplus sharing agreements. These points are summarised in 
Assumption 5.2 and 5.3 and Remark 5.1.
Assumption 5.2 Prior to the investment of I\ both I\ and I 2 are unverifiable, 
hence non-contractible.
Assumption 5.3 Surplus R(/i , / 2) w unverifiable.
Remark 5.1 Surplus sharing agreements are not feasible.
As in Hart and Moore (1988) and MacLeod and Malcomson (1993a), the two 
parties cannot vertically integrate to overcome their hold-up problem. This could 
be due to specialisation, for example. If the parties could vertically integrate, as 
noted by Williamson (1983), they could overcome hold-up and investment would be 
efficient. Assumption 5.4 outlines this point.
^With no uncertainty there is a direct relationship between the level of investment and total 
surplus - a contract on investment effectively acts as an explicit contract on surplus. As a result, 
provided that the parties can write a contract on investment the first-best effort level (at that point 
in time) can be obtained. For example, consider when the parties cannot contract on surplus. A 
contract could specify the first-best level of investment for a player in return for a fixed payment. 
This payment would not be made, however, if the level of investment were observed at any other 
level. Consequently, this contract will ensure that this player invests efficiently. The other player 
could be subject to a similar contract. Alternatively, the second player could be made the residual 
claimant of the project. As the residual claimant they will receive the full marginal return from 
any investment, giving them an incentive to invest efficiently.
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Assumption 5.4 The two parties cannot vertically integrate.
Finally, both the parties discount future returns and costs with a constant dis­
count factor 6, as stated in Assumption 5.5.
Assumption 5.5 Both parties discount future costs and returns with the discount 
factor 6 per period, where 5 E (0,1].
The model adopts a reduced form bargaining solution, similar to one used by 
Chiu (1998), Neher (1999) and Hart and Moore (1994).* During renegotiation the 
final distribution of surplus is a combination of two factors. First, the distribution 
depends on the relative bargaining strengths of the two parties. For simplicity it is 
assumed that the parties have equal bargaining power.*
Assumption 5.6 Both parties have equal bargaining power.
Second, a party’s outside option only affects the distribution of surplus if it is 
binding.
Assumption 5.7 An outside option only affects the distribution of surplus if it is 
binding.
Thus, if the buyer and seller have outside options of bi and b2 respectively and 
the two parties are negotiating over surplus R > bi +  b2 the distribution will be:
R , ^ R } if h  < i R  and b2 < ^ R (5.1)
{öi, R — bi} if bi > R ; or (5.2)
^This bargaining solution is based on the alternating offers model with outside options of Shaked 
and Sutton (1984). Also see Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and Muthoo (1999).
^The relative bargaining strengths of the parties axe encapsulated in Chiu (1998) by a  and 
(1 — a), so that the first party receives a  of the surplus. Here a  = These bargaining strengths 
depend on exogenous characteristics of the negotiating parties, for example their rate of time 
preference or their expectation of a breakdown in bargaining. As usual, sunk costs do not affect 
the distribution of surplus at renegotiation.
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(5.3){R -  b2,b2} if b2 > i R
where the first element is the surplus received by the buyer and the second element 
is the surplus received by the seller.
Typically, the choice of an inside or outside option bargaining solution dramat­
ically affects the outcome of hold-up models.* Here we have adopted an outside 
option model, on the basis that a party must sever the specific relationship in or­
der to take up the alternative. This is appropriate if a party must choose between 
investing in the specific relationship or investing in alternative trading possibility. 
Consequently the threat of adopting the alternative is only credible if it is binding, 
justifying the use of the outside option bargaining solution. It should be noted, 
however, that the choice of an outside option model here is not crucial. Rather, 
many of the results would remain if an alternative (inside) bargaining solution were 
used, suggesting that the results obtained here are robust.
5.3 Discrete-choice investment
This section explores the hold-up problem when the parties make discrete in­
vestments. Assume the buyer and the seller can make discrete investments of 
h  =  {fy/i} and I 2 = {0, / 2 } respectively. The surplus generated will be equal 
to R  if both f i  and f 2 are invested and zero otherwise. Further, the buyer has an 
outside option of 6 1  that he could receive trading elsewhere. However, the buyer 
forfeits this outside option by entering into the specific relationship with the seller. 
As noted above, this could occur if the buyer must choose between investing in the 
specific relationship and making an investment necessary for trade with another 
party.* Similarly, the seller’s outside option b2 is also inconsistent with investing 
in the specific relationship with the buyer. Trade between the buyer and seller 
is efficient; that is, 52R — Sf2 — f\  > bi H- b2J Assumption 5.8 summarises this
^See for example Chiu (1998) and De Meza and Lockwood (1998).
tThis alternative could be a general or a specific investment.
^This assumption means that trade is efficient with both simultaneous and sequential invest­
ment as it follows from 52R  — S f 2 — f i  >  f>i +  b2 (the relevant condition for when investment is
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discussion.
A ssum ption 5.8 The buyer can make investment I\ = {0,/i}  and the seller can 
make investment I2 = {0, / 2} * I f  h  — fi  and I2 =  f i  surplus R is available to the 
two parties. The buyer’s outside option bi is inconsistent with I\ — }\. The seller’s 
outside option b2 is also inconsistent with I2 = f 2. Further, bi + b2 < 52R — S f2 — f\.
First consider the outcome when the parties invest simultaneously. After invest­
ing f i  and f 2) the parties will renegotiate over surplus R. In this case, the parties 
will distribute surplus equally.^ Provided there is investment, the returns to the 
buyer and seller respectively are:
\ s R - f i ; (5-4)
and
\S R  -  h -  (5.5)
When only the simultaneous investment regime is available the buyer will antic­
ipate a return of \ ÖR — f i  from within the relationship. Consequently, the buyer 
will opt into the investment relationship provided
\ 8 R - h > b  i. (5.6)
The buyer will opt not to enter the relationship if
^SR-hKbi.(5.7)
This is an example of the standard hold-up problem that arises with incomplete 
contracts. If contracting were complete, given overall surplus is increased within 
the specific relationship, the parties could contract on f i  and ensure that the buyer
sequential) that 6R —  f 2 —  fi >61+62  (the relevant condition for simultaneous investment).
^Note, as both parties have invested in the specific relationship they have forfeited they outside 
options.
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receive surplus at least as great as b\. The same reasoning applies to the seller. If 
^5R — f  2 > b2 the seller will opt into the relationship. Conversely, if \5R — { 2  <b2 
the seller will anticipate the hold-up problem and opt not to invest, reducing total 
surplus d
Now consider when the parties can only invest sequentially. In this case the two 
parties will renegotiate after the buyer has sunk his investment but prior to the 
seller investing / 2d From the bargaining solution outlined by equations 5.1, 5.2 and 
5.3, when b2 < \{&2R  — bf 2 ) and b\ < \{b2R — Sf2) — A the return of the buyer and 
seller, valued at t = 1 , will be:
\  052 -R-<5/2) - / i; (5.8)
\{52R - 6 h ) . (5.9)
The important element here is the treatment of the buyer and the seller in 
the renegotiation process. As the buyer has sunk their investment, A does not 
affect the distribution of surplus. The seller, on the other hand, has not made 
her investment. Her investment / 2, as a consequence, is considered as part of net 
surplus the parties bargain over. In this sense, the seller avoids being held-up with 
sequential investment.
At this point we turn our attention to the situation when both regimes are 
possible. As noted in the literature, having the option of sequential investment can 
improve welfare. To see this consider the case when the buyer’s outside option is 
never binding (61 < \{52R — 6f2) — / 1): this ensures that the buyer will opt into the 
relationship regardless as to whether investments are simultaneous or sequential.
*As noted below, up-front compensation may have limited success overcoming the hold-up 
problem, as it must somehow be able to tie the party to the specific relationship by ensuring that 
they do not invest in any alternatives: this may not be possible with incomplete contracts. If 
the parties cannot contract on f i  and / 2 they may not be able to contract on their alternative 
investment options.
* Although the seller still has her outside option at this stage, if this option were binding she 
would have maximised her surplus by taking this option immediately at the beginning of the game.
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Further, assume \(S2R  -  5 f2) > b2 > \8R  -  / 2.f As the seller’s outside option b2 
exceeds her return if investments are simultaneous (b2 > ^8R — f 2) she would not 
enter the relationship if investments could only be made simultaneously. However 
the sequential regime may create an environment that helps facilitate trade between 
the parties. The seller will receive a payoff of | ( 52R — 8f2)} valued at time t — 1, as 
the parties renegotiate after the buyer has invested but before the seller has done 
so. As noted above, this allows the seller to avoid being held-up: the extra surplus 
afforded the seller with sequential investment encourages her to invest where she 
would not otherwise done so. This discussion is summarised in Result 5.1.
R esult 5.1 When b\ < \{82R — Sf2) — f \  and \{52R — 6f2) > b2 > \8R  — f 2 
sequential investment allows trade to occur that would not be feasible with only 
simultaneous system available.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above and is omitted. □
This result mirrors much of the existing literature on the staging of investments 
with incomplete contracts. For example, Neher (1999) examined financing an en­
trepreneur overtime in stages rather than funding the entire project up-front. In his 
model the bargaining power of the financier (vis-a-vis the entrepreneur) is enhanced 
by the quantity of accumulated physical assetsf  Consequently, as the project ma­
tures the financier has additional protection from hold-up. The possibility of funding 
in stages allows projects to proceed that would otherwise not be feasible. In the 
model presented here, on the other hand, it is assumed that as the project matures 
contracting becomes possible. If a party can delay their investment until this point 
in time they can avoid being held up. If the costs of hold-up are sufficiently great as 
compared with a party’s outside opportunities the sequential regime provides scope 
for trade that may not have otherwise existed.
Tf b2 > \ {52R — Sf2) the seller will opt out of the relationship immediately and pursue her 
outside option. She will receive a payoff of b2, valued at time t =  1, from doing so. If she waits 
one period for the buyer to invest she will receive b2 in renegotiation, but this will be only valued 
at 5b2 at time t  =  1. Below we discuss the case where b2 > R — 5 f 2) and <5 =  1.
tPhysical assets increase the liquidation value of the firm. This enhances the financier’s outside 
option and, as a result, her claim on surplus.
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Further to this, Neher found that staged financing allowed all profitable projects
to proceed when 6 = 1. In the model presented here, if 5 =  1 the sequential regime
increases the number of projects that will be financed. However, unlike in Neher
(1999) not all profitable projects will proceed. Consider the outcome of the model
when 5 =  1. Given that bi < \{52R — 6f2) — f i  = \{R  — f 2) — f i  the buyer will
\
enter into the specific relationship regardless of regime, as noted above. Unlike in 
Result 5.1, the seller will be willing to invest in the relationship when her outside 
option is binding with both regimes. Assume that b2 > \{62R — Sf2) = \{R  — f 2). 
With sequential investment the seller will receive a payoff of b2 during renegotiation - 
a payoff identical to her outside option valued at time t = 1. Additional trade occurs 
here that would not have done so if only the simultaneous regime were available or 
if 5 < 1. To show that not all profitable projects proceed when 5 = 1  assume that 
b\ > \{62R — 6f2) — f \  = \ (R  — f 2) — f\- If the buyer invests he will forfeit his outside 
option. With sequential investment he will end up with a lower payoff than if he 
had opted out of the relationship immediately. As a consequence, he will not invest 
in the relationship. This discussion is summarised in a corollary to Result 5.1.
Corollary 5.1 When b\ < |(5 2R — Sf2) — } \ ,  b2 > \ ÖR — f 2 and 6 =  1 sequential 
investment allows for trade to occur that would not be feasible otherwise, increasing 
total surplus.
Now we consider the case when \ 6 R —f\  > 61 and \ 6 R—f 2 > b2. Given this, both 
parties would enter into the investment relationship if the simultaneous investment 
regime were the only option available. It is evident that simultaneous investment 
always produces greater surplus than sequential investment f  Nevertheless, the seller 
will act to maximise her own surplus and not to maximise total surplus. As a result, 
the seller will opt for the sequential regime if:
\ ( 52R - 8 f 2) >  (5.10)
tWith discrete investments f i  and f 2 are unchanged between both regimes. The only effect 
of a sequential regime is that it further delays the receipt of surplus one additional period from 
the start of the project. Consequently, if S <  1 the sequential regime produces a smaller ex ante 
return.
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despite the fact that total surplus is reduced. Herein lies a potential hold-up problem 
- the seller will opportunistically opt for sequential investments even though surplus 
is maximised with simultaneous investment. To distinguish the inefficient timing 
of investment from the standard hold-up problem we call this practice ‘follow-up’. 
This discussion is summarised in Result 5.2.
Result 5.2 Given that — f i  > bi and f-R — {2 > &2 ; if the seller has the choice 
of whether to invest simultaneously or sequentially and ^(S2R — 6 / 2 ) > | i 2 — /h they 
will opt for the sequential regime, reducing total surplus.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above and is omitted. □
This analysis brings to light another important implication not previously noted 
in the literature. Unlike most of the literature that has focused on how investing 
over many periods can allow parties to overcome the hold-up problem, it is shown 
here that the option of staggering investments can be detrimental to overall welfare. 1
Now consider the effect of the sequential regime on the buyer’s incentive to 
invest. Sequential investment puts the buyer at a disadvantage as his sequential 
payoff is necessarily less than his simultaneous payoff. From equations 5.4 and 5.8, 
\{d2R  — <5/ 2 ) — fi  < \6R  — f \ .  The buyer will be willing to enter into the specific 
relationship, despite the inevitable follow-up, if
i(<52fl -  5 f 2) -  h> h (5.11)
On the other hand, if
^ P R - S f ä - f , <b,  (5.12)
the buyer will not be willing to enter. In this case, the follow-up problem is suffi­
ciently great that the buyer’s outside option is more attractive than entering into
Tn the bargaining literature it has been known for some time that the addition of extra potential 
bargaining periods can reduce welfare. For example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1983) showed that the 
addition of extra period in a bargaining game with asymmetric information did not necessarily 
increase welfare for a bargaining game with only one potential bargaining period.
163
the relationship. As the buyer gives up his outside option by investing in the rela­
tionship he will require some compensation for doing sod This mechanism, however, 
also requires that the parties can write a contract that precludes trade with other 
parties. Otherwise, after the compensation payment has been made, the buyer will 
opt out of the relationship.+ Consequently, if a compensation payment cannot be 
made, due to wealth constraints or the non-transferability of utility, or if a contract 
precluding trade with another party is not verifiable, the follow-up problem will 
prevent a surplus enhancing trade from occurring altogether.
If the buyer’s return from simultaneous investments exceeds his outside option 
but the sequential payoff did not, the seller would be better off if they could commit 
to invest simultaneously. If the seller could guarantee she would invest simultane­
ously the buyer would opt into the relationship, and both parties would be better off. 
When the seller cannot commit, the buyer will opt out of the relationship and the 
seller will suffer as trade between the parties will not occur. Result 5.3 summarises 
the case when compensation is not possible^
Result 5.3 If ^ SR—fi  > bi > |(<52R — 6/2) — f \  and |(52R — 6/2) > \8R  — f 2 > 
the surplus of the seller is reduced by having the option of a sequential regime of 
investment.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above and is omitted. □
This is a similar result to Grout (1984) who argued that a union would be better 
off if it could commit not to opportunistically renegotiate after the firm has sunk 
its investment..
Up until this point it has been assumed that the seller has the option to adopt 
the sequential regime. What happens if either of the individuals can be the party
*The minimum compensation payment required would be equal to the difference between the 
returns to the buyer outside and inside the relationship, that is 61 — {|(<52I? — 5ff)  — /1}.
tFixed payments do not affect marginal incentives.
tSuppose for a moment that compensation is feasible. Even then, the seller may be forced to 
share in the lower total surplus through her compensation payment to the buyer. If the seller 
prefers the sequential regime the buyer will require a minimum compensation payment of 61 -  
{ | ( S2R — <5/2) — /1 }. The sequential return to the seller of { (̂<52R — 5/2) — compensation} may 
be less than her simultaneous payoff of \ 5R — f 2-
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that invests first? It follows in this situation that either agent could also delay and 
choose to invest after contracts are complete. To investigate this assume the players 
are identical, so that f \  = =  /.* Further, assume that an investment by either
individual would allow contracting to be feasible. If | ( 52R  — öf)  > | R  — / ,  both 
individuals would prefer to invest second.! Let us consider this case in more detail.
First, consider when there are just two potential investment periods in which 
the project can be completed and H(62R — Sf) — f] < 0. In this case neither party 
will be willing to invest first. Moreover, as noted above, a contract on the timing 
of investments coupled with some up-front compensation is unlikely to resolve the 
problem.! Given the non-verifiability of investment a contract written on the tim­
ing of investment is unenforceable. Consequently, after the compensation payment 
has been made the recipient can simply trigger renegotiation again without fear of 
sanction. As a result, trade is unlikely to proceed in this case. Adding additional 
periods will not change this outcome.
Second, consider when the payoff for the individual who invests at t = 1 with 
sequential investments is positive: [|(<52i? — Sf)  — /] > 0. To explore the strategies 
the players will adopt initially consider when there are exactly two periods remaining 
in which the project can be completed. The choice for each player is then to invest 
immediately at t = 1 or to wait and invest in the final period at time t = 2. As 
surplus from simultaneous investments is greater than the outside option, if the 
game reaches t =  2 both agents would invest if they had not previously done so. 
The normal form of this game is illustrated in Figure 5.3. In the figure I  represents 
investing at t =  1 and I I  waiting and investing at t = 2. The payoff for the buyer 
is written in the top of each box in the matrix and the seller’s at the bottom.
As
l ( S2R - 6 f ) > ~ R - f  (5.13)
*Also assume b\ = 62 = 0 for simplicity.
^When \{82R — 6f) < %R — f  the return from simultaneous investment exceeds the sequential 
payoff and both parties will invest at t = 1.




Figure 5.3: Normal form for two period game
and
S(6̂ R - f ) > \ ( S 2R - S f ) - f  (5.14)
both players have a dominant strategy of delaying and investing at time t = 2. 
This is a version of prisoners’ dilemma: surplus is maximised if both players invest 
simultaneously at t = 1, as that avoids the additional costs of delay, but the only 
Nash Equilibrium in this game is that each player will delay investing.
This artifact of the equilibrium arises as a result of the short time horizon. Now 
consider the case when there are three potential investment periods.1”
Figure 5.4 illustrates the normal form game of the investment decision for both 
parties when there are three potential investment periods. The choice of each player 
initially is to invest immediately at t = 1 or to wait. If both players opt to invest
*Note, as above a maximum of two periods is needed to complete the project.
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Seller
I  I I
(62R -6/) -  /
Figure 5.4: Normal form for three period game
at t = 1 the project is completed in the first period and the payoffs are unchanged 
from the two-period horizon game. Similarly, if the buyer invests at t =  1 and the 
seller does not she will invest at t = 2 with probability equal to 1. The payoffs 
are unchanged from above, as they are if the buyer initially does not invest but the 
seller does. The only payoff that is altered is when both players opt to not invest 
at t = 1. When both players delay making an investment they proceed to the next 
period in which they are once again in a two-period horizon game. From above, the 
equilibrium in this two-period horizon game is that both players wait until the last 
period to invest. Consequently, the payoff in the three-period horizon game when 
both parties do not invest at t = 1 is the two-period payoff discounted for the extra 
period - that is, 62(^R — /) . Provided
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(5.15)s2{\R-f)>\m-f)-f
the dominant strategy remains to not invest at t =  1 for both players.
As more potential trading periods are added a similar adjustment of the payoffs 




Figure 5.5: Normal form for n period game
At some point, say when the potential horizon has n periods, the payoff from 
not investing when the other player also does not invest becomes less than choosing 
to invest immediately. This occurs when
< 5 -  / )  < \ (S 2R — S f ) —f  < 5n~ \ S- R  -  /) . (5.16)
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When the potential bargaining horizon is n periods there is no longer a dominant 
strategy for each player: each player will play a mixed strategy between investing 
immediately and waiting. The intuition is that when there is a long potential time 
horizon the players know that stalling until the end of the potential horizon is 
of little benefit as there is a sufficiently large number of periods that the payoff 
from waiting that long is relatively small. This provides an incentive to invest 
immediately. However, there is also a potential dividend from waiting on the chance 
that the other party invests immediately. The players are in a coordination game: 
each party wants the project to go ahead immediately but both investors would 
prefer to follow rather than lead. Also note that the game with n -f 1 potential 
investing periods may return to a prisoners’ dilemma game. This arises because the 
coordination game with n periods is the outcome of waiting in the first of the n +1  
periods. The payoff of this coordination game might be higher than ^(52R — 6f) — /  
which again creates a dominant strategy to wait. The game could chaotically switch 
between a prisoners’ dilemma and a coordination game as periods are added.t
Two points are important here. First, if both parties have the opportunity to 
wait until after the other has invested, strategic behaviour can reduce total surplus. 
Second, if for technical reasons, as assumed above, that one player (the buyer) 
must invest at the start of the project, the potentially damaging coordination game 
regarding which party is to invest first is avoided. This suggests technical differences 
in the individuals that determine which of the parties must invest at the beginning 
of the project may help overcome some of the problems generated by the timing of 
investments and follow-up.
The issue of which party must invest first could be resolved naturally when the 
parties have differing outside options. Again assume that the investment costs and 
outside options are /* and 6* for i = 1, 2, as outlined in Assumption 5.8. However, 
now assume that there is no specified order of investments (that is, either party can 
invest first to start the project). If b\ < [^(62R — 6f2) — /i], the buyer will be willing 
to enter the relationship regardless of which regime eventuates. Further, assume that
numerical example is contained in the Appendix A.
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if the seller’s cost of investment ( /2) or her outside option (62) is sufficiently high as 
to ensure that |(SR — f 2) > b2 > \8R — f 2. In this case the seller would never invest 
first. She would be willing, however, to contract with the buyer after he has made 
his investment. Once again the option of sequential investments improves welfare 
- it allows for a trade opportunity that would not otherwise occur. The differing 
opportunity costs of the parties make it clear which party is to invest at t = 1: 
the party with the smallest investment cost (both direct and indirect) should invest 
first. This prediction accords with what is observed with venture capital projects. 
It is often the case that the financier, who is required to invest in production or 
marketing for example, waits until the venture capitalist, the party with the smaller 
opportunity cost, has already made their investment and the project is underway 
and better defined. Sequencing of investment in this case affords the financier the 
protection from hold-up needed to encourage participation.1”
This section examined how the timing of investments can act as a potential 
source of hold-up. It has been shown that if a party can choose to invest prior to 
or after renegotiation the other party can be held-up by the timing of investment. 
This reduces the incentive for that party to invest and, in the extreme, prevents 
surplus enhancing transactions from taking placed When there is an advantage of 
investing after the other party has sunk their investment (a follower advantage), 
the two parties may vie to invest second. We discuss how this problem can be 
overcome if the two parties are different, either technically or in terms of their 
outside options. The model is sufficiently flexible, however, to also be able to show 
the potential benefits of sequencing investment. Sequencing allows contracts to 
become complete: this protects the party investing second from being held-up, and 
consequently encourages investment by that party. Here, we have assumed that
* Differing discount factors between the two parties may also help to resolve which party should 
invest first. In this case more patient player may be willing to invest first. The second player with 
the lower discount factor, is consequently afforded the benefits of investing a period closer to the 
receipt of surplus.
fOf course, we have only outlined several cases in the discussion and the three results above. 
Other outcomes are possible. For example, if the buyer will only enter the relationship when 
investments are simultaneous, but the seller will only enter with the sequential regime, the two 
parties will forfeit the profitable trading opportunity.
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the level of investment by each player is discrete and hence fixed if they decide to 
invest. In the next section we show how the above discussion applies in the case 
when investments are continuous.
5.4 Continuous investments
This section extends the discrete-choice model by allowing both investments to 
be continuous. As before total surplus is a function of both investments, however, 
now jR(J1} J2) is two times differentiable, non-decreasing in both variables and con­
cave; that is R[ = dR(h, I2)/dIi > 0, i?" =  d2R(h,  I2) /d l f  < 0 for i =  1,2 and 
RUR22 ~  (^12)2 > 0, as summarised by Assumption 5.9.
Assumption 5.9 R[ = dR(I\, I2)/ dR > 0, RH-i =  d2R(R, I2) /dI2 < 0 fori  = 1,2 
and R'hRv ~ {Ru)2 > 0 where R12 = d2R{Il J 2)/dIldI2.
Assumption 5.9 will apply for the rest of the paper, unless explicitly stated 
otherwise. Further, we assume that 61 = b2 = 0 and that it is profitable for both to 
trade with each other, that is 62R — öf2 — /1 > &i +  b2f
5.4.1 The relative advantage of sequencing investments
In this section we will consider four different possibilities: (1) when investment 
is simultaneous and contracts are complete; (2) when investment is simultaneous 
and contracts are incomplete; (3) when investment is sequential and contracts are 
complete; and (4) sequential investment when contracts are incomplete. The real 
emphasis here is comparing the relative efficiency of (2) and (4).
Simultaneous investment with no renegotiation
Assume that investment is contractible. In this case the first-best levels of 
investment are obtainable. If investments are made simultaneously the two parties
1"We discuss non-zero outside options below.
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will maximise
ma xSR{I i , I2)-  h  • (5.17)
h,12
Surplus is discounted because the return from investment take one period in which 
to mature. The first order conditions for this problem are:
Äi =  1/5; (5.18)
and
= 1/5. (5.19)
Assumption 5.9 guarantees there is a unique solution for both I\ and I 2 . Let the 
first best level of investment be /* and I2.
Simultaneous investment with renegotiation
Second, when investments are made simultaneously but contracts are incomplete 
both parties know that renegotiation will occur so they adjust their investments from 
the first-best level accordingly. The buyer chooses 11 in order to maximise
m a x^R (Iu J2) -  h .  (5.20)
h  Z
Here, the returns are discounted by 6 because they are only available after one 
period. Renegotiation occurs after both investments have been sunk. From the 
bargaining solution outlined by equations 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 each party anticipates 
receiving one half of the surplus. The first order condition for the buyer is
K  =  I  (5.21)
The seller faces a similar decision choosing her level of I 2 . She will set I 2 to 
maximise




which yields the first order condition of
R'2 = -5 . (5.23)
Let the buyer’s and seller’s choices when investments are set simultaneously and 
renegotiation occurs to be I\ and I 2 respectively. These values solve system of 
equations 5.20 and 5.22. The solutions are unique because of Assumption 5.9.
Sequential investment with complete contracts (no renegotiation)
Alternatively, if investments are made sequentially, the buyer will invest I\ in 
the first period and the seller will invest I 2 in the second period. As contracts 
are complete renegotiation will never occur. Both investments will be set so as to 
maximise
ma x 82R(I1, I2) - S I 2 - I i .(5.24)
h,h
The first-best first order conditions are:
<5 2R\ = 1; (5.25)
and
614  =  1 (5.26)
so that R[ = 1/62 and R 2 = 1/6. Again, Assumption 5.9 ensures a unique solution 
for both investments. Let the first best level of investment in this case be /** and
T**
12 •
Sequential investment with incomplete contracts (renegotiation)
The final case is when the investments are made sequentially. The buyer invests 
Ii at time t = 1. Following renegotiation, at time t = 2 the seller chooses I 2 . In 
this case the buyer sets I\ to maximise
max 6- [ 6 R ( h , h ) - h } - h .  (5.27)
h Z
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The first order condition for this problem is
K  = j r
The seller, who sets her investment level after observing I\ and renegotiating 
with the buyer will maximise
max ^ [ 6 R ( h , l 2 ) - I 2}. (5.29)
h £
The first order condition for this maximisation problem is
# 2  = (5.30)
Let the buyer’s and the seller’s levels of investment be I\ and / 2. These values are 
the solution to the system of equations 5.28 and 5.30. The solutions are unique 
because of Assumption 5.9.
5.4.2 Simultaneous versus sequential regimes and total welfare
As it turns out very little can be said about the trade off between simultaneous 
and sequential investments when functions are general and contracts are incomplete. 
To explore the issue further first assume that the two investments have no influence 
on the marginal productivity of each other. That is, R u  = 0. This is stated in the 
following assumption.
Assumption 5.10 R'[2 =  0.
Remark 5.2 I f  R!'l2 = 0 it follows that R  = / i( / i )  +  / 2(J2), where f[ > 0 and 
fi < 0  fo r i = 1,2.
R'i2  =  0 could arise when an investment by the buyer increases his benefit from 
trade whereas investment by the seller reduces her costs. Although they do not 
affect one another, each investment increases the potential surplus available to be 
split upon renegotiation. A similar assumption is made by Hart and Moore (1988).
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In this framework three separate effects can be isolated that, when combined, 
give the relative advantage of either investment system. First, consider the costs of 
delay. Let the total surplus ex ante with simultaneous investment be S 2 and the 
total surplus ex ante when investment is sequential be 54d For two fixed levels of 
11 and 12
S2 =  S R (h ,h )  - I i - h >  S2R ( h J 2) 7, -  <572 =  S4. (5.31)
As sequential investment delays the payoff an extra period, the surplus from si­
multaneous investment is greater than with sequential investments when R  and I 2 
are fixed: the costs of delay always favour simultaneous investment. Further, the 
relative payoff of simultaneous investments is increasing as the players become more 
impatient. This effect is summarised below.
Effect 5.1 The costs of delay reduce the surplus generated by sequential investment 
relative to the surplus with simultaneous investments.
Second, consider the investment levels generated from each system. Examining 
the first order conditions 5.21 and 5.28, R[ = |  < R[ = From the assumption 
of concavity and monotonicity of R:
(5.32)
The sequential investment regime delays the collection of returns to the buyer: this 
reduces the incentive for the buyer to invest d
Effect 5.2 Relative to the sequential regime, the simultaneous investment regime 
increases the incentive for the buyer to invest in R .
tßoth S<2 and 54  relate to when contracts are incomplete.
*Note that both R  and R  are below the first-best level. With simultaneous investments R[ = 
2/6 > R 1 =  1/6, meaning that R < I{ . Similarly, with sequential investment, R'x =  2/52 > R x = 
1/Ö2, meaning that R < R * .
h  > h-
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For the seller the relative incentives to invest with simultaneous and sequential 
investments are given by equations 5.23 and 5.30. Again, because of Assumption 5.9,
h  < h- (5.33)
With simultaneous investment the seller is held-up, as is the buyer. With sequential 
investment, however, the seller invests after renegotiation, thus avoiding any hold­
up problems. In fact, the sequential investment level chosen by the seller equals the 
first best level, so that I2 =  I2* - this is the advantage of the sequential regime over 
simultaneous investment. Effect 5.3 summarises this discussion.
Effect 5.3 The sequential investment regime increases I2 to its first-best level.
Effect 5.2 states that the simultaneous regime increases I\. Effect 5.3 suggests 
that the sequential regime increases I2. To assess the impact of an increase in 
either investment on total welfare, isolated from the costs of delay, consider S2 
relative to an augmented £ 4 , termed J74, that has the same discount structure as 
the simultaneous system. U4 ignores the additional discounting of R  and of / 2 that 
occurs because of the additional period. In this case:
S2 =  <5/i(/1 ) -  h  +  6f2(T2) -  I2. (5.34)
where the level of investments are determined by equations 5.21 and 5.23. Similarly, 
using 5.28 and 5.30
Ui = S f1(I1) - I 1+ 6 f2(l2) - I 2■ (5.35)
The relative incentives to invest for the seller and buyer are summarised in the 
following lemma.
Lemma 5.1 6 /i (7i ) -  7i < 5/i(?i) -  h ,  and öf2(I2) - I 2 > 6f2(I2) -  I2.
Proof. See Appendix A. □
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Lemma 5.1 indicates that increasing I\ towards its first-best level always in­
creases the surplus it generates. The same argument applies to / 2. As a conse­
quence of Lemma 5.1, we can say that the surplus generated by I\ is greater with 
the simultaneous regime. Similarly, the surplus generated by / 2 is greater with the 
sequential regime.
In terms of total surplus, the ultimate trade off between simultaneous and se­
quential systems depends on these three effect: delaying incurred from delayed re- 
turns favour simultaneous investments; delayed returns also amplify hold-up arising 
with sequential system and reduce the incentive for the buyer to invest, favouring 
the simultaneous system; and, finally, the sequential system increases the incentive 
for the seller to invest, increasing her contribution to total surplus. Two of these 
effects work in favour of the simultaneous system and one works in favour of the 
sequential system. Result 5.4 summarises this discussion.
Result 5.4 There are three factors that affect the total surplus generated by the 
simultaneous system relative to the total surplus that will be generated by the se­
quential system.
I
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above and is omitted. □
The combined effect of these three effects can be complicated. Note, however, 
that the three effects each depend on 5: the costs of delaying the return of surplus 
another period directly relate to 5; the level of I\ depends on 5 as the two relevant 
first order conditions are R\ = 2 /52 and R[ = 2/5\ and the two first order conditions 
for the choice of / 2 are R2 = 1/6 and R!2 = 2/5. However, if 6 = 1 two of these effects 
disappear. The only remaining effect is that sequential investment allows the seller 
to avoid being held-up, increasing her incentive to invest. Thus, if 5 = 1 , 5 2 < S4 . 
As R  is a continuous function it follows that there is a neighbourhood for 6 close 
to 1 where the surplus from sequential investment exceeds the surplus generated 
with simultaneous investments. This is summarised in the following remark.
Remark 5.3 There is a small enough £ such that for any 6 G (1—e, 1] S2 < 6 4 ; that
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is, the surplus from sequential investments exceeds that produced with simultaneous 
investments.
Exam ple 5.1 Consider the case when R ( I i , l 2 ) = a ln li + ß ln l2 - Figure 5.6 shows 
the four different utilities for both simultaneous and sequential investments when 
contracts are both complete and incompletef First note that U\, the utility when 
investment is contractible and simultaneous, and U3, the total utility when both 
investments are contractible but made sequentially, are equal when 5 = 1 as there 
are no costs of delay. Second, consider the surplus generated when contracts are 
incomplete. U2 represents the total surplus with simultaneous investment, while 
U4 represents the total surplus with the sequential regime. With low values of 5 U2 
exceeds C/4 . However, for values of 5 greater than about 0.9 C/4  > U2 ; that is, the total 
surplus from sequential investments exceeds the total surplus with the simultaneous 
regime.
It is not possible, however, to establish that the relative difference between the 
surplus from sequential and simultaneous investments is monotonically increasing. 
This is because when 5 changes, it is impossible to ascertain with general functions 
how that will translate into a change in I\ an J2 and, subsequently, how R  will be 
affected.
R em ark  5.4 No monotonic relationship between the surplus from the simultaneous 
and sequential systems as 6 changes.
t With simultaneous investment and complete contracts the first-order conditions are ^
1/6. When contracts are incomplete and investments are simultaneous the first order conditions are 
/j- =  ^  =  2/6. When investments are sequential and contracts complete: ^  =  1/62 and ^  =  1/6. 
Finally, when investments are sequential and contracts incomplete the first order conditions are: 
/j- =  2/62 and =  1/6. The specific functions used assume a =  ß  =  5; that is Ui(6) =  
105(ln5<5 -  1), U2{6) =  105(ln55 -  0.5 -  In2), U3{6) =  5<52(ln5<52 -  1) +  5<52(ln5<5 -  1) and 
U4{6) =  5<52(In 5<52 -  0.5 -  In 2) +  5<52(ln 5 5 - 1 ) .
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Figure 5.6: Illustration to example 5.1
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Exam ple 5.2 As an example consider the following explicit function where:
(5.36)
and
h  =  bi:c (5.37)
Here, consider the case when a = 11, b = 10, c =  0.3 and e = 0.7. Using the 
explicit solutions to each party’s first-order condition, the total utility generated 
with simultaneous investment can be written as a function of 6:
Figure 5.7 compares these two surpluses. First, there is clearly a non-monotonic 
relationship between 6 and the difference between 52(5) and 54(5). Second, the two 
functions cross twice, once when 5 is close to 0 and another time when 5 is close
5.4.3 Hold-up and the choice of investment regime
Thus far in this section we have considered the relative merits of the various 
timing arrangements in terms of total welfare. The focus shifts here to explore the 
incentive for the seller to choose the timing of investments that does not maximise 
total surplus - in other words to engage in follow-up. Implicit in this discussion is 
the assumption that the buyer must invest at the beginning of the project. As a 
result, only the seller has the opportunity to delay her investment and follow-up the 
buyer.
There is a trade-off for the seller when she chooses between the two regimes. As
(5.38)






Figure 5.7: Illustration to example 5.2
simultaneous system encourages the buyer to invest, this may allow the seller to 
capture more surplus during renegotiation. However, sequential investments allow 
the seller herself to invest without the fear of hold-up. The seller will choose the 
regime that maximises her welfare. Where her interests differ sufficiently from the 
first-best incentives the seller will adopt the ‘wrong’ system, reducing total welfare.
The seller may find it in her interests to adopt the sequential system when simul­
taneous investments maximise welfare. She will not, however, adopt a simultaneous 
system when the sequential regime maximises welfare. With inefficient simultaneous 
investment the seller will lose out on two fronts: first, she will incur hold-up with
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simultaneous investments; and second, she will be sharing a lower total surplus. 
Consequently, she will never have any incentive to opt for the simultaneous regime 
inefficiently.
To further investigate the incentives of the seller assume that R \2 =  0 and that 
the buyer’s level investment is invariant to the seller’s choice of regime.t Conse­
quently, I\ can be suppressed, allowing all attention to revolve around the choice 
about the timing of I2. The seller will then choose the system (and the level of 
investment) that maximises her surplus, regardless of the effect on total welfare. 
With simultaneous investments total welfare can be written as
SR -  I2 (5.40)
suppressing Ji, and for the seller’s choice of investment I2 = I2. The seller will set 
I2 to maximise
S-R  -  %. (5.41)
Denote the seller’s objective function under the simultaneous regime as iq; that is, 
V \  — I R —  I2• This allows the total welfare generated with simultaneous investments 
to be written as 2v\ + I2.
With sequential investments total welfare is
62R -  6I2 (5.42)
while the seller’s objective function is
j R  -  S- I 2. (5.43)
Denote the seller’s objective functions under sequential investment v2: that is, 
v2 = y i?  —1/2. This means that total surplus generated with sequential investments
tThe buyer’s investment may be invariant because it is a discrete choice as in section 5.3. 
Alternatively, the buyer may have extreme beliefs about the seller’s investment strategy: the 




Now assume that these potential payoffs for the seller are also equal: v\ — v2- 
Given that / 2 >  0, simultaneous surplus will be greater than the surplus from 
sequential investments. It is possible, however, to perturb V2 such that V2 > v\ 
while it remains true that simultaneous surplus exceeds the surplus with sequential 
investments, as 2v\ + I2 >  2u2. In this case the seller will opt for the sequential 
regime even though total surplus is maximised with the simultaneous regime. The 
above discussion is summarised in the result below.
R esu lt 5.5 There exists a range of parameters for which the seller chooses sequen­
tial investments when the simultaneous regime maximises total surplus.
E xam p le  5.3 Consider the case when R  =  lO lnli +  Sln l2. Figure 5.8 plots the 
surplus of the seller with different investment regimes (on the Y-axis) against 5 
(on the X-axis). U22 shows two times the seller’s surplus when investments are 
made simultaneously. U4 shows two times the surplus of the seller - this equals the 
total surplus - when investments are made sequentially. U2 shows the total surplus 
of both parties with simultaneous investments. It can be seen that for 6 > 0.8 
(approximately) the seller will opt for the sequential system over the simultaneous 
option. However, from U2 and I/ 4 it is only when 6 >  0.95 (approximately) that 
the sequential system produces more surplus than simultaneous regime. Thus, for 
6 € (0.8, 0.95) the seller opts for the regime that reduces total welfare. Also note, in 
this example the buyer’s investment is assumed fixed at I\ for all of the functions. 
The specific functions used are U2{S) =  5(101n55+81n45)—45, U22 (5 ) = 5(10 In 55+ 
8 In45) — 85 and Uffö) =  52 (101n55 +  8 In85) — 85.
Now briefly consider the potential effect of non-zero outside options for the par­
ties. As noted in section 5.3 the inability to commit to a particular investment 
regime can hurt the seller as well as the buyer. Consider the case when the buyer 
has an outside option 61 that exceeds his anticipated payoff with sequential invest­
ments but is not binding when investment is simultaneous. If the seller prefers the
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Figure 5.8: Illustration tC exam ple 5.3
sequential regime (even if simultaneous investment maximises welfare) the buyer 
will anticipate that follow-up will occur and decline to take part in the project.1” 
This section derives several results analogous to those discussed in section 5.3. 
First, the sequential investment regime may produce higher surplus than the si­
multaneous investment regime. Second, a player can opportunistically opt for an 
inefficient' sequencing regime, reducing the other player’s surplus as well as total
Tf the parties can contract on the buyer not taking up his outside option the seller could share 
in lower total surplus via her compensation payment to the buyer required to entice him to forfeit 
his outside option.
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welfare. Third, a player may be made worse off by having the option to invest 
sequentially. In this case the seller would prefer to have her hands tied, to be able 
to commit to a particular system or not have the option at all. This shows that 
the possibility for sequential investments is not necessarily a way of overcoming the 
hold-up problem.
5.5 Extensions
This section makes several extensions to the model presented above. First, we 
explore the relationship between the two systems when A and A are complement 
or substitute investments. This allows the relative efficiency of each system to be 
examined when one player’s investment decision is highly sensitive with respect to 
which regime is adopted. Second, the section explores the relative efficiency of each 
regime when one investment is very important in terms of its contribution to overall 
surplus. Third, we examine the situation when one party’s investment is restricted 
due to wealth constraints. To conclude the section, we investigate the implications 
for total welfare when there is a lack of commitment so that either party can trigger 
renegotiation at any point in time.
5.5.1 Substitute and complementary investments
When investments are complements or substitutes, R 12 7  ̂ 0. As this can signifi­
cantly complicate matters, assume that <5 =  1, as summarised in Assumption 5.11.
A ssum ption 5.11 <5 = 1
When Assumption 5.11 holds the total surplus is
S = R ( h , I 2) - I 1 - I 2 (5-44)
with both regimes. For the two regimes each player will choose their level of invest­
ment given their respective first order conditions, shown in the Appendix A. Unlike
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previously, as R12 7̂  0 an adjustment in one investment will alter the marginal 
productivity of the other player’s investment: this will affect the player’s incentive 
to invest.
If the cross derivative of the investments is positive (Ru > 0) the investments 
are complements as an increase in I\ enhances the marginal productivity of / 2, as 
summarised in Definition 5.3.
Definition 5.3 I f  R u  > 0, I\ and / 2 are complements.
Complementary investments between trading parties occur in many situations. 
For example, investment in a convenient location can help enhance the value of the 
other party’s investment. Any effort in learning about the specific requirements 
of the trading partner enhances the productivity of the other player’s investment. 
Similarly, investing in machinery or retooling in such a way to fit the requirements of 
the trading partner can help increase the marginal product of the other investment.
First, consider the case when investments are simultaneous. As one of the par­
ties shades their investment, this encourages the other party to also shade their 
investment. The overall effect is that both parties reduce their investments further 
below their first-best levels. This is the familiar underinvestment of the hold-up 
literature when there are externalities.* As a consequence, when investments are 
simultaneous and the investments are complementary there is underinvestment in 
both 11 and / 2. This is summarised in Result 5.6.
Result 5.6 When the investments are complements and made simultaneously, there 
is underinvestment in both I\ and / 2.
Now consider when Ru  < 0.
Definition 5.4 I f R u  < 0; h  and I2 are substitutes.
An example of substitute investments is when the two parties both require the 
use of a third asset the supply of which is fixed or severely limited, such as a
+See De Fraja (1999).
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particular location or venue.! In this case, the buyer using the asset reduces the 
seller’s return on any investment because their use of the asset is subsequently 
limited.
It is shown in the Appendix A that the overall impact on I\ and I2 is ambiguous 
when investments are made simultaneously. For example, if the seller shades her 
investment level the buyer has an incentive to increase I\. Provided that the substi­
tutability of the investments, as measured by the absolute size of i?12, exceeds the 
effect of diminishing returns to investment, as measured by the absolute value of 
ü^2, the buyer will have an incentive to increase his investment above the first-best 
level. Similarly, there can be over-investment in I2 provided that the substitutability 
of the investments outweighs the negative effect of the diminishing returns of in­
vestment (I R i2 |>| R'h I)- In addition, it follows from the assumption of concavity 
that there will be underinvestment in at least one of the investments, even if there 
is over-investment in one of the investments.! The above discussion is summarised 
in the following result.
R esu lt 5.7 When the investments are substitutes and made simultaneously there 
can be under or over-investment in I\ and I2, however, there will be underinvestment 
in at least one of the investments.
Now consider when investments are made sequentially. The buyer will under­
invest regardless as to whether the investments are complements or substitutes, as 
was the case when R \2 =  0. In regards to I2, when the investments are comple­
ments the seller also underinvests. (Note that when ß 12 =  0 the sequential regime 
encouraged the seller to set I2 at the first-best level.) This is because, unlike when 
R \ 2 — 0, the underinvestment in I\ reduces the incentive for the seller to invest in 
/ 2.
* Another example could be a negative externality between the parties. See, for example, Pitch- 
ford and Snyder (1999). Alternatively, if the two parties both produce a byproduct or pollutant, 
the output of which is limited by government regulation, an increase in output by one party limits 
the permissible output by the other.
*For details see Appendix A.
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In contrast, when the investments are substitutes the underinvestment in I\ by 
the buyer provides an incentive to the seller to overinvest in / 2 . The following 
result summarises the above discussion.
Result 5.8 When investment is sequential, there is underinvestment in I\. When 
investments are complements there is also underinvestment / 2 while if investments 
are substitutes there is overinvestment in / 2.
This subsection has explored the situation when investment by one party affects 
the marginal productivity of the other’s investment, either in a negative or positive 
manner. It was shown previously that when Ri2 =  0 the relative welfare of the two 
systems depended on the interaction of three effects. When the investments are 
either complements or substitutes these three effects are complicated somewhat by 
the impact each investment can have on each other. The next subsection extends 
this analysis further, notably by relaxing the assumption that <5=1.
5.5.2 Substitutes and complements with hyper-incentives
To further explore this issue consider the following specific functional form:
R  = f i ( h )  +  / 2 ( h )  +  e h h  (5.45)
such that total surplus with simultaneous investment is
6 R - I 2 -  h  (5.46)
and total surplus with sequential investment is
S2R — I\ — 6I2. (5.47)
With this function, when e < 0 the investments are substitutes and when e > 0 
they are complements.
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If |e| is small the complementarity or substitutability between I\ and I2 will be 
outweighed by effects 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, outlined when the investments are indepen­
dent (e =  0). As the impact of e is relatively small it remains the case that I\ > I\ 
and I 2 < h ,  in a similar manner as to when R 12 = 0. Further, there are the same 
welfare trade-offs between the regimes, namely that simultaneous investment in­
creases the contribution to total welfare from Ii while the surplus generated by I2 is 
enhanced with sequential investment. This is summarised in the following remark.
Remark 5.5 When R = / i( / i )  + / 2 (h ) + e h h ,  provided the investments are not 
strong complements or substitutes the same three effects outlined in section 5.4 de­
termine the relative welfare of the simultaneous and sequential regimes. Note, the 
directions of these three effects remain unchanged, although the values may be dif­
ferent.
Proof. See Appendix A. □
When |e| is large the effects arising from the interaction between investments 
can lead to other possibilities. For example, if e > 0 it is possible for any one 
of the relevant first-order conditions to be less than zero. This provides that party 
with the incentive to invest 00; given the complementarity between investments,
189
the other party will also invest oo, and the first-best will be achieved (ignoring the 
costs of delay). Another interpretation is that the first party will invest as much as 
they can, given their budget constraint. Again, this will encourage the other party 
to increase their investment. When a party’s derivative is negative, this produces a 
‘hyper-incentive’ for that party to invest. This term is defined below.
Definition 5.5 A hyper-incentive is created when the first-order condition for a 
party is negative.
Interestingly, one regime may produce a negative first-order condition while the 
other may not. For example, the simultaneous regime may produce a negative first- 
order condition for the buyer while the sequential system remains positive. In this 
case, the simultaneous regime produces a hyper-incentive for the buyer to invest - 
this means that this regime is favoured over the alternative. On the other hand, the 
sequential regime may produce a hyper-incentive for the seller, while her first-order 
condition with the simultaneous may still be positive. It is not the case that the 
sequential regime is always preferred, however, as the sequential regime involves 
additional costs of delay. For sequential investment to be favoured these costs of 
delay must be outweighed by the extra surplus generated from the hyper-incentive. 
The above discussion is summarised in the following result.
Result 5.9 When the simultaneous regime creates a hyper-incentive for the buyer 
it is favoured over the sequential regime. When sequential investments generates a 
hyper-incentive for the seller it is favoured over the simultaneous investment regime, 
provided the players are sufficiently patient.
Of course, when both systems generate hyper-incentives for a particular party si­
multaneous investment is preferred as it avoids some costs of delay.
The discussion above of hyper-incentives has an analogue in the property rights 
literature. For example, Hart (1995) suggested that property rights be allocated 
to the party whose investment decision is responsive to asset ownership. Similarly, 
here the favoured timing of investment is the regime that favours the party with 
the hyper-incentives.
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In this subsection we have relaxed the assumption that 6 =  1 when the in­
vestments are either complements or substitutes. When the complementarity or 
substitutability between I\ and / 2 is sufficiently small the same welfare trade-offs 
apply as when # 1 2  =  0: the simultaneous regime encourages investment in Ii and 
lowers costs of delay while the sequential regime encourages investment in I2. With 
significant interaction between the investments the matter is further complicated so 
that other outcomes are possible.
5.5.3 Important investments and timing
From effects 5.2 and 5.3 above, sequential investments favour / 2 while simulta­
neous investments favour Ii. As a consequence, when I\ is very important relative 
to I 2 the simultaneous investment system is preferred over sequential investments. 
Using similar reasoning, when J2 is very important relative to the unimportant I\ 
the sequential system is favoured over the simultaneous investment system.
To see this, we adopt a variant of Hart’s (1995) definition of an unimportant 
investmentd For simplicity we assume /i(0) =  / 2 (C)) = 0.
Definition 5.6 Ii is unimportant if: i? ( /i,/2) = 62/i( / i)  +  62/ 2(/2) — I\ — 6/2 
is close to R{ 0, / 2) =  62/ 2(/2) -  6I2; and R ( lu I2) =  6/1 (ii) +  5f 2{h) ~ h ~ h  
is close to R(0, I 2) =  6 /2(/2) — / 2. Similarly, I2 is unimportant if: R(I i , I 2) =  
ö2f i ( h )  + 62/ 2(/2) -  h  -  6I2 is close to R ( h , 0) =  62fi(Ii)  -  h ;  and J?(/i,/2) =  
6f i {h)  +  6f 2(T2) - I 1 - I 2  is close to R(h,  0) =  S f ^ h )  -  h .
The key element here is that when a particular investment is unimportant it 
contributes relatively little to total surplus, although the marginal incentive to invest 
for the relevant player is unchanged.t The term ‘close to’ in Definition 5.6 can be 
considered as equivalent to the statement that A  is close to B  iff A A — B.
^See Hart (1995), p. 44.
tThe first order conditions for both players axe unchanged from the initial problem. With 
simultaneous investments A (A) = |  for i =  1,2. With sequential investments the first order 
condition for the buyer is f [ ( I i )  =  f s  and the seller’s first order condition is f'2 (12 ) =  T
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First consider when I2 is unimportant. Using the definition above, if I2 is unim­
portant total surplus with simultaneous investment, <5/i(/i) + S f 2( I 2) — I\ — A , can 
be replaced by
S f i ( h ) - h .  (5.52)
As a result all that matters to overall welfare is A- Surplus is then maximised by 
the system that promotes the highest level of A- As noted above, the level of A 
with simultaneous investments, A, is closer to the first best level than A- Following 
from Definition 5.6:
R ( h X )  =  S f ( h )  - h >  R f j u h )  =  S2f ( h )  -  h .  (5.53)
A similar argument can be made when I\ is unimportant. In this case the sequential 
regime provides the seller with greater incentive to invest efficiently. There is, 
however, additional costs of delay with the sequential regime as compared with the 
simultaneous regime. The sequential regime will only be preferred if the benefits 
from the seller’s additional investment outweigh these delay costs. From Definition 
5.6 the total surplus with simultaneous investments is S f ( I 2) — A, whereas the total 
surplus with sequential investments is given by 62f ( I 2) — 6I2. The following result 
summarises this discussion.
Result 5.10 When I2 is unimportant the simultaneous investment system max­
imises total welfare. When A is unimportant either regime may maximise total 
welfare.
This result parallels Proposition 2(B) in Hart (1995). Hart argued that when one 
investment was unproductive asset ownership would be organised as to give the other 
party as much incentive to invest as possible. The model presented here suggests 
that when one investment is relatively unimportant the timing of investment should 
provide as much incentive as possible to the other party (ignoring the costs of delay). 
As in Hart (1995) there is no need to worry about the loss of surplus from reducing 
the other player’s investment because it contributes relatively little to investment.
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5.5.4 Wealth constraints
As alluded to in section 5.5.2, parties may be wealth constrained limiting their 
ability to invest. In the extreme, the wealth constraint will be binding with both 
systems. Consequently, the investment by that party will be the same with ei­
ther regime. This inelasticity can be utilised by concentrating on maximising the 
incentive for the other party to invest.
If the buyer is wealth constrained so that they will always invest 11 , the sequen­
tial regime enhances the seller’s incentive to invest, however, there is an additional 
cost of delay. In terms of maximising welfare, these two factors work against each 
other. As a result, either regime could maximise welfare when the buyer’s wealth 
constraint is always binding. Alternatively, when the seller is wealth constrained, 
say to 12 , the simultaneous regime both encourages greater investment by the buyer 
and reduces the cost of delay. In this case the simultaneous regime is unambiguously 
superior. This discussion is summarised in the following result.
Result 5.11 When the buyer is wealth constrained and this constraint is binding 
under both regimes, there is an ambiguous relationship between regime type and 
total welfare. I f the seller is wealth constrained, and this constraint is binding under 
both regimes, simultaneous investments is unambiguously superior in terms of total 
surplus.
Proof. The proof follows from the discussion above and is omitted. □
This result is similar to Proposition 2(A) in Hart (1995, p. 45). There, if one 
party’s incentive to invest is invariant to asset ownership the other party should own 
the assets in order to encourage more efficient investment. Similarly here, when one 
party’s incentive to invest is inelastic to the regime adopted because of a binding 
wealth constraint, the regime chosen should maximise the incentive for the other 
party to invest. The only complication here is that the cost of delay also need to be 
taken into account. For example, if the generation of additional surplus from more 
efficient investment by the seller with the sequential regime does not outweigh the 
costs of delay, the simultaneous system should still be adopted.
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5.5.5 Renegotiation
Grout (1984) noted that industrial relations contracts are often not binding. 
Similarly, in an ‘at-will’ contracting environment either party can unilaterally trigger 
renegotiation or terminate the contract if they wish.* In this section we assume that 
either party can trigger renegotiation at any point in time.
When this is the case, only the final renegotiation affects the distribution of 
surplus (and hence the incentive to invest). The last opportunity to renegotiate 
occurs after the last investment has been made, that is, once J2 has been completed. 
Renegotiation will always occur at this stage because the buyer is better off with a 
new distribution of surplus after / 2 is sunk.
First consider when investment is simultaneous. As before, renegotiation will 
occur after both investments have been made. Consequently, the first order condi­
tions for both players are the same as described above. With sequential investment 
renegotiation will always occur after the seller has invested. As both investments 
are sunk the parties will split the surplus 50-50. The buyer will set his investment 
to maximise:
j { R { h , h ) ) - h .  (5.54)
His first order condition under these circumstances will be
K  = I  (5-55)
which is unchanged from when there is no subsequent renegotiation. Label the 
level of the buyer’s investment when commitment is not possible with sequential
^See the discussion of ‘at-will’ contracts in Malcomson (1997). The contracts in this subsec­
tion axe slightly different from a typical ‘at-will’ contract environment. Usually in an ‘at-will’ 
environment there is an asymmetry in the bargaining power between the buyer and the seller. 
For example, if the buyer (firm) starts negotiations and proposes a new lower price, the seller 
(worker) is taken to have accepted this new proposed contract if she continues to supply her ser­
vices (labour). On the other hand, if the seller attempts to raise price the default price takes 
precedence, unless the buyer explicitly accepts the new contract.
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investment as I\. From this it can be seen that
h  = h <  h . (5.56)
On the other hand, the seller will maximise:
(5.57)
which yields the first order condition
(5.58)
Label the seller’s choice of her investment when commitment is not possible at any 
stage and investment is sequential as 12- Comparing the first order condition for
If there is ex post renegotiation it does not matter that the investments were initially 
made sequentially as both parties suffer from hold-up. As the buyer is always held- 
up, assuming R'[2 = 0, his incentive to invest is unchanged from the usual sequential 
regime discussed above. Now, however, any potential advantage of the sequential 
regime is eliminated: the seller also suffers from hold-up with the sequential regime 
reducing her incentive to invest. As the sequential system involves more costs of 
delay, the simultaneous system produces higher total surplus than the sequential 
regime. Consequently, if commitment is not possible, simultaneous investment is 
strictly preferred to sequential investment. Moreover the ability of either party 
to trigger renegotiation at any time effectively renders the possibility of sequential 
investment (or its attractiveness) redundant. This is summarised in the following 
result.
the seller when there is simultaneous investment (R!2 — §) and when investment is 
sequential but there is no after-investment renegotiation (R2 =  |)  it can be seen 
that
I 2  —  I 2  <  ^ 2 - (5.59)
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Result 5.12 I f the parties cannot commit not to renegotiate after both investments 
have been made, the simultaneous system strictly dominates sequential investment 
for 6 < 1 in terms of total welfare as well as welfare of the seller. Consequently, 
the possibility of renegotiation of this sort eliminates the feasibility of sequential 
investment.
Proof. The proof follows directly from the discussion above. □
This lack of commitment may be advantageous, however, if the seller would like 
to commit not to adopt the sequential regime (as discussed in section 5.3). The 
knowledge that the buyer will trigger renegotiation acts as a credible commitment 
by the seller to invest simultaneously. This may in turn encourage the buyer to 
invest.
5.6 Conclusion
This paper develops a model in which two parties can invest in a mutually ben­
eficial project together at the same time (simultaneous investment) or they can 
choose to have the investments made one after the other (sequential investment). It 
is assumed that contracting on any future investment becomes possible after some 
investment has been made as it allows the project to become more clearly defined. 
Consequently, the advantage of the sequencing of investments is it allows the party 
that has delayed making their investment to avoid being held-up. The disadvantage 
of staging is that it reduces the incentive to invest of the first-mover. This can also 
have feed-back effects on the second party’s investment depending on the relation­
ship between the two investments. However, sequencing of investment lengthens 
the time from the start of the project until the returns are realised, reducing the 
ex ante value of total surplus when parties discount future returns. The relative 
advantage of the sequential versus the simultaneous investment regime depends on 
the precise nature of these trade-offs.
Much of the emphasis in the existing literature has focused on how staging in­
vestments can improve welfare when there are incomplete contracts or when parties
196
are unable to commit. In the model presented in this paper it is demonstrated 
that, in some cases, the option of sequencing investments can reduce welfare. It is 
shown that under certain conditions a party will opportunistically opt for the se­
quential regime, reducing total surplus. We interpret this possibility as a new form 
of hold-up and term it ‘follow-up’. Moreover, in some cases the mere possibility 
that investment can be made sequentially may discourage investment by one party, 
preventing trade from occurring and reducing welfare of both players.
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5.7 Appendix A
Lemma 5.1 <5/i(/i) ~h< <5/i(/i) -  h, - Sf2(T2) -  %.
Proof. The first-best investment level of I\, derived from — I\ , occurs
when f[ = \- This level of investment is termed I{. For I\ < /J, f i( I i)  > |  because 
f i ( I i )  < 0. For Ii < 7J, [5fi(Ii) — Ii]' > 0, hence —1\ is a non-decreasing
function V I\ 6 [0, /J), which means Sfi(Ii) — h  < ^ /i(/i)  — 7i- A similar argument 
applies to I2 . □
Result 5.6 When the investments are complements and made simultaneously, there 
is underinvestment in both I\ and I 2 .
Proof. When Assumption 5.11 holds the total surplus is
S  = R(I1, I2) - I l - I 2 (5.60)
for the levels of investment chosen in the different systems. The first order conditions 
are




for the simultaneous investment system, and
R x =  2 (5.63)
R l = 1 (5.64)
with sequential investments.
To investigate this further, replace substitute a E [1,2] for 2 in each of the 
equations, so that
R[ = a (5.65)
Ro = a (5.66)
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for the sequential system. This allows the buyer and seller’s investment levels to be 
represented as functions of a: from equations 5.65 and 5.66 the relevant investment 
levels become I\(a) and / 2 (a); and from equations 5.67 and 5.68 I \ (a) and / 2(a) are 
the relevant investment levels. Totally differentiating equations 5.65 and 5.66 with 
respect to a yields
H'n /;(a) +  i?'i'24 (a) =  1 (5.69)
1.
Solving this system of equations using Cramer’s rule yields solutions
(5.70)
h  (« )
/ 2(a)
rL  -
R n K i  -  ( K 2 ) 2
fin - ß n
(5.71)
(5.72)
« 2  -  (ß '1'2)2 '
Note that given the assumption of concavity the denominator is always negative. 
When R 12 > 0,
?1(a )< 0  (5.73)
?2(a) < 0. (5.74)
The overall effect of moving from the first-best level of investment (when =  1) 
to the second best solutions given by equations 5.61 and 5.62, must consider the 
integral of the marginal changes over the entire range of a E [1,2]. However, as the 
marginal change is always of the same sign we can discern that when the investments 
are complements there is underinvestment of both investments. □
Result 5.7 When the investments are substitutes and made simultaneously there
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can be under or over-investment in I\ and I2 , however, there will be underin­
vestment in at least one of the investments.
Proof. From equations 5.71 and 5.72, when R 1 2  <  0,
/1(a) £  0 (5.75)
?2{a) ^  0. (5.76)
For I  1, the derivative is positive if | |> | R"n  |. Likewise, the derivative for
/ 2 is positive if | Ru  |> | R'n I- In addition, it follows from the assumption of
/ /  / /  / /
concavity that lUa) +  / 9 (a) =  < 0 . This suggests that there will be
R \ l R 2 2 ~ \ R \ 2 )
underinvestment in at least one of the investments, even if there is over-investment 
in one of the investments. □
Result 5.8 When investment is sequential, there is underinvestment in I\. When 
investments are complements there is also underinvestment I 2 while if invest­
ments are substitutes there is overinvestment in I 2 .
Proof. As above, totally differentiating the equations 5.67 and 5.68 yields
R u l ' M  + R 'u l ' C )  =  1 (5.77)
R ^j'O  +  i& 4 (a )  =  0. (5.78)
Solving using Cramer’s rule shows that
7  ( \ _  R22
I l \ a ) T 2" d "  CD" \ 2^11^22 \ t t l 2 )
(5.79)
7  ( \ _  -R \2
1 2 \ a ) r>" p" Cq " \2*
-^11^22 \ ^ \ 2 )
(5.80)
Regardless of the sign of R \2 ,
— 7
I x < 0. (5.81)
This indicates that there will be underinvestment in I\.
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For J2, when the investments are complements - that is when R[2 > 0 - there is 
underinvestment in J2 as
Jo < 0. (5.82)
When ]£[2 < 0,
Jo > 0 (5.83)
indicating that there will be over-investment in J2. □
Remark 5.5 When R = /i( /i)  + / 2(/2) +  s h h ,  provided the investments are not 
strong complements or substitutes the same three effects outlined in section 5.4 
determine the relative welfare of the simultaneous and sequential regimes. 
Note, the directions of these three effects remain unchanged, although the 
values may be different.
Proof. Let us consider the following parameterised first-order conditions
f [ (h)  =  a  -  el2 and f ‘7(I2) (5.84)
The following equation on the optimal level of I\ can be derived from the above 
system:
f n - K ( T . \ \
(5.85)
Differentiating this equation with respect to I\ when b = constant and a = a(/i) 
gives
n '  -  f"M
(5.86)-  -e,
which means
d h  1 /£(•) <  o . (5.87)
da a' m m  -  f 2 
Similarly when a = constant and b = b(Ii) differentiating of equation 5.85 with 
respect to I\ gives
(5.88)rut \ f l{' )  i/J2V) -------------- =  b -  e,
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b' e 2 ~
> 0. (5.89)
When |e| is small the effect outlined in equation 5.89 can be ignored. Con­
sequently, equation 5.87 has the dominant effect. From this we know that h  is 
higher with simultaneous investment than with the sequential regime, and that h  
is greater still with complete contracts (first-best h)- Further, in a similar manner 
as outlined in Lemma 5.1, higher levels of h  translate to a greater contribution to 
total surplus. We can rank the regimes in terms of the contribution h  makes to 
welfare: the simultaneous regime dominates the sequential regime.
We now derive the equation on the optimal level of / 2 from the parameterised 
system
(5.90)
Differentiating this equation with respect to h  when: b = constant and a =  a(/i); 
and when a = constant and b = b(h) gives
dh
da
1 £  






/*(•)/"(•) -  £2
< 0 (5.92)
respectively.
In a similar manner as described with h  above, when |e| is small the effect 
outlined in equation 5.92 has the dominant influence on / 2. This suggests / 2 is 
greater with the sequential regime than with simultaneous investments, although it 
is still lower than its first-best level. The levels of I2 also directly translate into its 
contribution to total welfare: / 2 contributes more to total welfare with sequential 
investment than with the simultaneous regime. □
Example 5.4 The following example examines the possibility of chaotic switching
202
between prisoners’ dilemma and a coordination game when there are many potential 
investment periods.
Let 6 =  0.9, /  = 10 and R=100. Figure 5.9 illustrates the normal form game 
of the investment decision of either party when there are n = 1,2. . .  potential 
investment periods.
Seller
Figure 5.9: Normal form for n period game
From Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 the payoffs are A = 35, B = 26, C = 36 and 
D —  6n35. For n = 1 , 2 and 3 we have a prisoners’ dilemma. For n =  4we get a 
coordination game. Let us show that for n = 5 we are back to a prisoners’ dilemma.
If the buyer chooses the first and the second strategies with probabilities a and 
1 — a respectively, while the seller does the same thing with probabilities ß and
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1 — 0, the expected return of the buyer is
Acl0 + Bail -  0) +  C0{ 1 -  a) +  £>(1 -  a )(l -  0). (5.93)
To get a Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies we find 0 such that the payoff to the 
buyer does not depend on a, in other words
0 =
B - D
B + C - A - D
(5.94)
Similarly, when the payoff to the seller does not depend on 0
B - D
B + C - A - D
(5.95)
The payoff to the buyer from playing this mixed strategy is
D + { C - D ) B - D B C - A D
A + C - A - D  B + C - A - D
„ ( A - B ) ( B - D )
B +  B + C - A - D - (5'96)
Because C > A > B > D this payoff is always greater than B and if the discount 
factor is sufficiently high - we are back to a prisoners’ dilemma in period n = 5. In 
this specific example as 6 = 0.9 the relevant payoff for period n = 5 is b+cZa- d^ 
which is greater than B. On the other hand, if 5 were small enough we could end up 
in the coordination game V n >  4. Thus, in general case it is impossible to discern 
the exact structure of the game when n —> oo. The structure is chaotic.
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